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ABSTRACT 
 
    ARAB INTELLECTUALS under the YOUNG TURKS:  
A COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS on MEMOIRS (1908-1918) 
  
    KARAMAN,  FİKRİYE. 
MA, Department of Sociology 
Advisor:    Assoc.  Prof.  Nurullah  Ardıç 
   September 2013, 137 pages 
 
This comparative-historical research aims to explain how and on what basis 
the attitudes of the Arab intellectual elites changed towards the Ottoman rule in the 
Arab provinces between 1908 and 1918. In order to do this I analyze memoirs of the 
five leading Arab intellectuals, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Amir Shakib Arslan, 
Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, Salim Ali Selam, and Muhammad Kurd Ali by applying 
some   concepts   of  Foucault’s   discourse   analysis  method.  The  memoirs,  which   shed  
light on the last decade of the Ottoman authority in the Arab provinces, show that as 
the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its power, Arab intellectual elites became much 
more  concerned  about  the  Peninsula’s  future.   
The   research   reveals   a  number  of   “thresholds,”   crucial   turning  points  based  
on the evaluations by the intellectuals in their memoirs, including the alteration of 
the  CUP’s  policies  from  being  relatively  liberal  and  inclusive  into  more  oppressive,  
centralist,   and   nationalist,   the   breakout   of   the  World  War   I,   Cemal   Pasha’s   strict  
policies, and the 1916 Arab Revolt played a remarkable role in the transformation of 
the  Arab  intellectuals’  ideological  discourses  from  Ottomanism  to  different forms of 
Arab nationalism.  
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This thesis is significant not only because it is located at the intersection of 
the Ottoman-Turkish modernization literature and that of early Arab nationalism but 
also because it throws light on a very critical decade of the Arabian Peninsula given 
the fact that it was in this period that the major power configurations were 
crystallized leading to the emergence of the Modern Middle East.   
 
Key Words: Arab intellectuals, the Committee of Union and Progress, Arab 
nationalism, World War I, Cemal Pasha, the Arab Revolt. 
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ÖZ 
 
JÖN  TÜRKLER  DÖNEMİNDE  ARAP  ENTELEKTÜELLERİ:   
HATIRATLAR  ÜZERİNE  KARŞILAŞTIRMALI  TARİHSEL  BİR  ANALİZ   
(1908-1918) 
  
   KARAMAN,  FİKRİYE. 
MA,  Sosyoloji  Bölümü 
Tez  Danışmanı:  Doç.  Dr.  Nurullah  Ardıç 
       
    Eylül  2013,  137 sayfa 
 
 Arap   entelektüel   elitlerinin, 1908-1918   tarihleri   arasında   Arap  
vilayetlerindeki  Osmanlı  yönetimi  hakkındaki   tutumlarının  nasıl  ve  hangi   temellere  
dayanarak   değiştiğini   açıklamayı   hedefleyen   bu   çalışmada   karşılaştırmalı   tarihsel  
araştırma   yöntemi   izlenmiştir.   Bu   bağlamda   beş   önemli   Arap   entelektüelinin,  
Muhammed  Reşid  Rıza,   Emir   Şekip  Arslan,  Muhammed   İzzet  Derveze,   Selim  Ali  
Selam   ve   Muhammed   Kürd   Ali,   hatıraları   Foucault’nun   söylem   analizi  
kavramlarından  yararlanılarak  analiz  edilmiştir.     
Arap  vilayetlerindeki  Osmanlı   otoritesinin   son  on   yılına   ışık   tutan  hatıratlar  
göstermektedir   ki   Osmanlı   İmparatorluğunun   gücünü   giderek   yitirmesi   Arap  
entellektüel   elitlerinin   yarımadanın   geleceği   konusunda   kaygılarını   arttırmıştır.   Bu  
araştırmada   sözü   geçen   entellektüellerin   hatıratlarında   yer   alan   şahsi  
değerlendirmelerinden  yola  çıkılarak  Arab  entellektüellerinin  ideolojik  söylemlerinin  
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Osmanlıcılıktan   Arap   milliyetçiliğine   dönüşmesinde   önemli   rol   oynayan   dört   ana  
“eşik”,  dönüm  noktası  tanımlanmıştır:  İttihat  ve  Terakki  Cemiyeti’nin  görece  liberal  
ve   kapsayıcı   politikalarının   kısa   zamanda   baskıcı,   merkeziyetçi   ve   milliyetçi   hale  
gelmesi,   Birinci   Dünya   Savaşı’nın   patlak   vermesi,   Cemal   Paşa’nın   otoriter  
politikaları  ve  1916  Arap  İsyanı.   
Bu  tezin  önemi  yalnızca  Osmanlı-Türk  modernleşmesi ve  erken  dönem  Arap  
milliyetçiliği  literatürlerinin  kesişiminde  yer  almasından  değil  aynı  zamanda  Modern  
Ortadoğu’nun   oluşumuna   yol   açan   güç   konfigürasyonlarının   oluşumunu   içermesi  
dolayısıyla   Arap   Yarımadası’nın   son   derece   kritik   bir   on   yılına   ışık   tutmasından  
kaynaklanmaktadır.   
 
Anahtar   Kelimeler:   Arap   entellektüelleri,   İttihat   ve   Terakki   Cemiyeti,   Arap  
milliyetçiliği,  Birinci  Dünya  Savaşı,  Cemal  Paşa,  Arap  İsyanı.   
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CHAPTER 1 
     THE YOUNG TURKS and ARABS  
 
      1.1. Introduction 
It is important for us that you understand our feelings and thoughts about 
affairs of our state. Although we demand decentralization and prerogatives 
we lost, we are strongly attached to the reign of the commander of believers 
(amir al-mu’minin) the glorious caliph.  Refuting his sovereignty and asking 
you to come to our state and protect us never occurs to our minds (Selam, 
2009: 22). 
 
On June 18, 1913 committees from almost all Arab states gathered in Paris to discuss 
issues related to the Ottoman Arab provinces. After negotiations they set forth a list 
of reforms consisting of ten articles to be implemented by the empire in the 
provinces. The Arab committees submitted their demands through the Ottoman 
Embassy in Paris. As a representative of Beirut, Salim Ali Selam, once the mayor of 
Beirut, aiming to clarify their position stated the quotation above to the French 
officer who was responsible for the Eastern issues. The quotation expresses the 
position of many of the Arab intellectuals who identified themselves as both 
Ottoman and Arab until the end of the Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces.  
This position, however, changed in less than a decade from Ottomanism 
toward (different forms of) Arab nationalism. The main research question of this 
research   is,   “how   did the attitudes of an influential group of Arab intellectuals 
change toward Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces in general and in geographical 
Syria in particular under the Committee of Union and Progress and why?”  In order to 
respond to this umbrella question, primarily I analyze the memoires of several Arab 
intellectuals who happened to experience both the Hamidian and the CUP 
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(Committee of Union and Progress) periods of the Ottoman Empire as well as the 
process of the Arab provinces becoming independent states after World War I. The 
subject   matter   is   worth   studying   because   today’s   nation-state-based Middle East 
emerged as a result of the disengagement of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman 
Empire after World War I. In other words, the destiny of the Middle East was 
determined during the first decades of the 20th century. Therefore it is essential to 
look back at this formation period in order to comprehend the social and political 
conditions of the contemporary Middle Eastern nations, which are experiencing the 
‘Arab  Spring’   today.   In   order   to do so I examine the attitudes and perspectives of 
Arab intellectual elites because they were the middlemen between their societies and 
the Ottoman authorities as well as the European powers. They were also pioneers 
who played a role in the creation of the modern Middle East. Furthermore, since the 
period and actors (the Young Turks as well the Arab intellectual elites) of this 
research are directly related to the Ottoman-Turkish modernization, this thesis will 
contribute to our understanding of the latter as well. Finally, I have decided to deal 
with this problem because I have always been interested in knowing more about the 
Ottoman modernization and the process of the separation of the Arab provinces 
(Syria, Hejaz, Beirut, Iraq, and Palestine) from the center.  
In order to answer the main research question I also ask some additional 
questions including the   following.   “What were the attitudes of the Young Turks 
towards Arab elites   and   how   did   they   change?”,   “What were the policies of the 
central government in Arab provinces?”,  “What were the turning points that affected 
the  Arab   intellectuals’   political-ideological   discourses?”,   “What was the impact of 
World War I on the crystallization of Arab nationalism   in   the   Arab   provinces?”,  
“How did European powers, particularly Britain and France, influence the vision of 
Arab intellectuals regarding Ottoman rule as well as post-Ottoman future?”,   “How 
was the ideology of Ottomanism rendered obsolete as Arab nationalism had 
flourished?”,   and   “How did the notion of caliphate change in the perceptions of 
Arabs   from   1908   to   1918?”   I   attempt   to   answer   these   questions   by   drawing   on  
historical material and applying sociological methods. 
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1.2. Literature Review  
 
This thesis is located at the intersection of three literatures: Ottoman Turkish 
modernization, early period of Arab nationalism, and the Ottoman-Arab relations. 
Within the first literature there are two main broad perspectives. One of these 
perspectives sees the modernization process in teleological and dichotomic ways 
under   the   influence   of   “modernization   theories,”   and   the   more   recent   perspective  
advanced by the scholars who are critical of the simplistic, reductionist, and 
positivistic explanations of the former paradigm. 
The prominent representatives of the first perspective include Bernard Lewis 
(1961),  Tarık  Zafer  Tunaya   (1962),  Niyazi  Berkes  (1957,  1964),  and  Feroz  Ahmad  
(1993). They view the process of Ottoman Turkish modernization either as a conflict 
between   the   modernists   and   reactionaries   or   a   struggle   between   the   “forces   of  
change”   and   those   of   “tradition”   of   which   Islam   is   a   segment.   Lewis’s   study   on  
Turkish modernization (1961) is a narrative of an essential conflict between 
reformers who were pro-Western modernists and reactionaries who were anti-
Western traditionalists. According to Lewis, it was Western-oriented  ideas  that  “gave  
a new impetus and a new direction to the young officers and officials, and led to the 
successive  constitutional  and  popular  movements  of  1876,  1908,  and  1920”  (p.  481).  
Thus, for Lewis Turkish modernization is a process of adopting Western institutions 
and   life   styles.  According   to  Ardıç   (2012,  16)  Lewis’s   reductionist  account   “labels  
the   opposition   to   different  modernizing   ‘reforms’   as   the   ‘resistance   by   reactionary  
conservatives,’  paying  little  attention  to  their  political  and  economic  aspects”. 
Tunaya (1962), too, considers Islam a reaction to modernizing reforms in the 
Turkish modernization process. Moreover according to Tunaya Ottoman 
modernization   was   a   civilizational   change   because   “Western   civilization   is   the  
dominant   one…it   is   a   matter   of   survival   to   enter   Western   civilization”   (Tunaya,  
1981: 111). Berkes (1957, 1998) also sees the Ottoman Turkish secularization as a 
conflict  between  the  “forces  of  tradition”  and  those  of  “change”.  He  asserts  that  the  
first steps of Ottoman modernization had been taken in the 17th century, but it 
accelerated and took on the new dimensions in the 19th and 20th centuries, which led 
to secularization and westernization. An age long changing process in Turkey has 
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culminated in the establishment of the principle of secularism in modern Turkey 
(Berkes, 1997). Moreover, he portrays the secularization process as a shift from 
backwardness of the Middle Ages to the modern world and as becoming part of the 
Western civilization, which is the final stage of human development. Similarly, 
Feroz Ahmad (1993) argues that Turkish modernization was a product of conflict 
between   two   opposing   groups:   reformers   and   reactionaries.   Ahmad’s   simplistic  
binary opposition account is discernible in his recent work in which he argues that 
after  the  proclamation  of  the  republic,  “Republicanism and nationalism were adopted 
by   everyone   except   reactionaries   who   still   yearned   for   an   Ottoman   restoration”  
(Ahmad, 1993: 63).  
Challenging this reductionist and dichotomous perspective, a number of 
recent studies (Kara 1998, 2001, 2003, Karpat 2000, 2001, Mardin 1962, 1994, 2003, 
Zürcher 1993) have approached to the Ottoman Turkish modernization as a very 
complex and dialectical process. While the former perspective focused on ruptures 
between the Ottoman and Republican periods, the latter emphasized the continuities 
as well as ruptures. My dissertation sides with the latter perspective. Opposing the 
idea of identifying conflicting groups in the modernization process Karpat (2000, 
2001) argues that what Ottoman reformists had done was a reconciliation of Islam 
and reforms. Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks who brought about wide range of 
modernizing changes in the Ottoman territory adopted Islamist and Ottomanist 
policies as well as Turkist ones. In terms of bureaucratic tradition, statist mentality 
and educational policies of the Ottoman and Republican phases are compatible with 
one  another.  In  a  similar  fashion  Erik  Jan  Zürcher  (1993)  stresses  on  the  continuity  
rather   than   the   rupture   between   the   Ottoman   and   Turkish   Republic.   Şerif   Mardin  
(1962, 2003) also underlines the issue of continuity as well drawing attention to the 
similarity between the policies of reformers and of so-called reactionaries. According 
to  Mardin  (1994:  163),  “in  Sultan  Abdulhamid  II’s  (1876-1909) views, religion took 
the place of nationalism, but his main theme was the same as that of his liberal 
enemies:   Adopt   the   technology,   reject   the   mores”.   Moreover,   Mardin   strongly  
emphasizes the importance of Islam in the fabric of the Turkish society and the 
inability of the Kemalist secular culture to provide patterns as alternatives to the 
widely used Islamic idiom (Mardin, 1994). According to Mardin Islam is significant 
for Turkish society because it provides patterns for Turkish Muslims to follow in all 
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spheres, as seen below 
Kemalist secular culture left these pockets of Turkish culture empty in the 
sense that it consisted only of general injunctions to take the West as an 
example. It provided no equivalent for the widely used Islamic idiom, it did 
not understand the degree to which existing space-time configurations were 
rooted and it had no strategies of the quotidian to offer the masses (Mardin, 
1994: 164). 
Similarly,   İsmail   Kara   highlights   the   significance   of   Islam   as   a   source   of  
legitimation in the Ottoman Turkish modernization process in his work. Kara (1998, 
2001) goes further and claims that modernization indeed increased the importance of 
Islam in Turkey. To him, in Turkey modernization and Islamization took place 
simultaneously (Kara, 2003). This second group of intellectuals have thus 
emphasized the chaotic and complex nature of Ottoman Turkish modernization.  
The second body of literature I draw on is the study of early Arab 
nationalism. This literature, too, is mainly comprised of two phases. The first 
contains the writings of those who took part in the initial stages of the movement and 
their   contemporaries   including   As’ad   Daghir,   Muhammad   ‘Izzat   Darwaza,   Amin  
Sa’id,  Sati-‘al-Husri, and George Antonius. They either observed or took part in the 
events of the pre-1920 period. Among these authors George Antonius (1938) argued 
in his classic, The Arab Awakening, that Arab nationalism can be traced back to the 
mid–nineteenth century: initially liberal Christian and Muslim Arab intellectuals who 
were exposed to the influence of missionaries expressed Arab national consciousness 
in Beirut.  
The  second  phase  “included  the  first  scholarly  attempts  to  revise,  build  upon,  
or  contradict  the  thesis  of  these  first  chroniclers  of  the  history  of  Arab  nationalism”  
(Khalidi, 1991: 50). The revisionist historians wrote in the 1950s and 1960s re-
evaluating  the  early  historians’  explanations  of  Arab  nationalism.  Scholars  such  as  C.  
Ernest Dawn (1991), Albert Hourani (1981a), Abdel Latif Tibawi (1969), Elie 
Kedourie (1974), Zeine N. Zeine (1973), Sylvia Haim (1962), Rashid Khalidi (1991), 
and Philip Khoury (1983) conducted research on Arab intellectuals, diplomatic 
sources, local archives, and journals. This revisionist effort has led to the refinement 
of  our  view  of  Arab  nationalism  and  also  the  reassessment  of  Antonius’s  account  of  
the development of Arab nationalism.  
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The younger generation expressed considerable disagreement with 
Antonius’s  view  of  the  nature  of  Arab  nationalism  in  the  early  period.    Challenging 
Antonius’s   notion   of   liberal   and   secular   Arab   awakening,   Zeine   Zeine   (1973) 
emphasized the importance of Islam in the emergence of Arab political 
consciousness. For him the separation of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire was 
also a consequence of the Turkish nationalism of the Committee of Union and 
Progress   (CUP),  which  “was manifested in the press and in laws requiring the sole 
use  of  Turkish  in  the  administration,  the  courts  and  the  schools”  (Dawn  1991,  p.  12).  
Khalidi (1991), who takes Zionism into account as well, Sharabi (1970) and Tibawi 
(1969) also see Young Turk policy as a major cause of Arab nationalism.  
Unlike other revisionist scholars, Elie Kedourie (1974) and Sylvia Haim 
(1962)  depict  Arab  nationalism  “as  having  been  created  by   the  spread  of  European  
theological and political doctrines that weakened  the  hold  of  Islam  and  Christianity”  
(Dawn 1991, p. 9). Moreover, they believe that Arab nationalism was imported from 
the  West   during  World  War   I,   and   that   there  was  no  “serious   attempt   to  define its 
meaning”  until  the  1930s.  In the literature there is a debate on the role of Christians 
in the development of Arab nationalism in early period. Since there is no Christian 
Arab intellectual among my cases I do not touch upon this issue.  
Albert Hourani (1981a) also questioned the allegations of Antonius 
underlining   the  role  of   the  modernist   Islam  affected  by   the  “Western”  emphasis  on  
“reason”  in  the  development  of  Arab  consciousness.  For  him  Islamic  modernist  ideas  
contributed to the enhancement of Arab consciousness. Hourani argues that 
historically   “there were no lines of exclusion which kept the Arabs out of the 
Ottoman  state  and  society”  before  the  20th  century  (Hourani,  1981a:  10).     
Like Hourani, Ernest Dawn argues that Islamic modernism, represented by 
such intellectuals as al-Afghani and Rida (the latter is among my primary sources), 
contributed substantially to the emergence of Arabism, which was indeed not a 
response   to   the  CUP’s  Turkish-nationalist conducts (Dawn, 1991). Unlike Hourani, 
however, Dawn argues that the ideological foundations of Arabism were well 
established before 1908; nevertheless, it remained an ideology of the Arab elites 
rather than a popular one until the demise of the empire. According to Dawn 
emergence  of  Arab  nationalism   is  a   “result  of   intra-Arab elite conflict, specifically 
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being an opposition movement of Syrian notables directed primarily against rival 
Syrian notables who were satisfied with and occupied positions in the Ottoman 
government,   an  opposition   that   remained  a  minority  until   1918”   (Dawn,   1991:  11-
12). Therefore, for Dawn the belief that Arab nationalism gained strength as a 
reaction   to   CUP’s   nationalist   policies   is   nothing   but   a   tradition   generated   by  
European diplomats (particularly British) and Arab nationalists themselves.   
Challenging  Dawn’s   “elitist”  arguments, Rashid Khalidi claims that leading 
figures of Arab nationalism were from a growing middle class of merchants, 
intellectuals, and lower-level bureaucrats in Syrian cities during the second 
constitutional period (Khalidi, 1991). He also argues that the public sphere in the 
Mediterranean port cities such as Jerusalem and Beirut catalyzed the growth of 
popular Arabism. More recently, Khalidi et al. have examined various aspects of 
Arab nationalism from different angles (Khalidi et al, 1991). Khalidi is ambiguous 
but seems to believe that Arabism had become the majority movement by 1914. In a 
similar fashion, Sharabi and Tibi reject the idea that Arabism originated from Islamic 
modernism (Sharabi, 1970; Tibi, 1997).   
As part of the Ottoman-Arab relations literature Hasan  Kayalı,  aiming to go 
beyond established paradigms of Arab nationalism, underscores the need to study 
Arab nationalism with an integrative approach that considers both the local 
perspective  and  the  central  government  one  (Kayalı,  1997).  In  his  book, The Young 
Turks and Arabs,   Kayalı’s   main   proposition is that because of strong religious 
linkages   “among   the   chief   Muslim   groups   of   the   Ottoman   Empire,   political  
nationalism  was  not  a  viable  force  until  the  end  of  World  War  I”  (Kayalı, 1998: 13). 
Kayalı   argues   as   well   that   the  Young   Turks’   so-called nationalist policies did not 
lead to Arab nationalism but it was possibly the introduction of mass politics, a 
liberal press, and greater educational opportunities that led to the rise of ethnic 
consciousness among certain groups. On the other hand, he indicates that the CUP 
policies were perceived to be Pan-Turkist even though they were not so.  
Dealing   with   Cemal   Pasha’s   Syrian   governorate   years   Talha   Çiçek  
underscores that Cemal Pasha aimed to further the centralization by eliminating the 
“barriers”  for  a  direct  control  of  the  state  over  its  citizens  in  Syria  (Çiçek,  2012).  For  
this purpose Cemal Pasha first dealt with Arab nationalism and exiled some of the 
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Arabist  notables  and  executed  others  in  order  to  “prevent  any  demand  of  autonomy  
or  independence  during  the  peace  negotiations  after  the  War”  (Çiçek,  2012:  405).  He  
also  intervened  with  his  “iron  fist”  in  the  other  autonomous  groups  such  as  Zionists,  
the Christian clergy and the autonomous Government of Lebanon. He tried to 
modernize the cities and also established new educational institutions to Ottomanize 
the minds of the people in Syria.  To construct the Ottomans as the other atrocities of 
Cemal Pasha were utilized during the nationalization process in Syria after the WWI 
(Çiçek,  2012).     
Like  Kayalı   and  Çiçek,  Özgür  Kavak  addresses   in  his   study  both  Ottoman-
Turkish modernization and Arab nationalism literatures. Kavak examines the 
emergence of modern Islamic thought particularly modern Islamic jurisprudence, 
focusing on the case of Rashid Rida (1865-1935), one of the leading modernist 
Muslim thinkers, whose ideas have been influential in the Muslim world including 
Turkey (Kavak, 2011). Kavak analyzes the transformation of Islamic jurisprudence 
from traditional to modern form in the modernization process in the Muslim world 
by examining how Rashid Rida redefined some key concepts in Islamic law and 
philosophy  disturbing  traditional  hierarchies,  and  emphasizing  the  idea  of  ‘reform’  in  
these areas in his writings in al-Manar journal (Kavak, 2011).  
On  the  other  hand,  aiming  to  study  contemporary  Arab  intellectuals’  ontology  
and   “the   socio-cultural factors which determine their status, power, prestige and 
respectability”  M’hammed  Sabour,  analyzes  the  social  and  intellectual  status  of  Arab  
intellectuals in Arab society and the ways in which they reflexively conceptualize 
themselves (Sabour,  2001:  ix).  He  thus  examines  Arab  intellectuals’  own  perception  
of  changes  in  their  status  through  Pierre  Bourdieu’s  concepts  of  capital,  habitus  and  
field. For his research he conducted interviews with fifty academics from Syria, 
Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and   Morocco (Sabour, 2001).  
More recently, using a comparative-historical   method   Ardıç   (2012)  
“examines  the  process  of  secularization  in  the  Middle  East  in  the  early  20th  century  
through an analysis of the debates over the transformation and abolition of Islamic 
Caliphate”   (Ardıç,   2012:   xi).   Ardıç   analyzes   the   discourses   of   “secularists”,  
“modernists”   and   “traditionalists”   related   to   the   notion   of   caliphate   by   using   both  
primary and secondary sources. As part of this analysis he not only deals with the 
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secularization in the caliphal center, but also the colonization in the caliphal 
periphery during 1914-1920. The concept of Caliphate in the Middle East, India, 
north and northwest Africa was located at the center of international politics, 
domestic power relations and circumstances brought by World War I therefore it was 
vulnerable  to  manipulations  of  all  sorts.  Utilizing  the  concept  of  ‘accommodation’  to  
explain the attitudes of the Ottoman Islamists & secularists towards modernization, 
he also demonstrates  the  ways  in  which  “Islamic  discourse  was  secularized  by  both  
Islamists  and  secularists”  (Ardıç,  2012:  xi).     
As we refer to some of the three literatures studies that deal with the Ottoman 
Arab relationship in the process of the modernization or the impact of the Ottoman 
modernization in the Arabian Peninsula are quite rare. While Ottoman modernization 
literature generally concentrates on the imperial center, Arab  nationalism  literature’s  
main concern is the origins and development of Arab nationalism. Thus, as explained 
above,  some  scholars  emphasize  the  CUP’s  Turkish  nationalist  attitudes  towards  the  
Arabian Peninsula. Except  a  few  works  (Kayalı,  1998; Sabour, 2001; Kavak, 2011; 
Ardıç,   2012;;   Çiçek,   2012)   little   has   been   said   about   the   relationship   between   the  
Arab nationalism and Ottoman Turkish modernization. Thus, this thesis aims to help 
fill this gap in literature by analyzing the attitudes of a number of leading Arab 
intellectuals toward modernization strengthening centralization of the empire.  
 
1.3. Sources & Methodology 
 
In order to analyze the attitudes of the Arab intellectual elites towards the 
Ottoman rule in the Arab provinces between 1908 and 1918, I analyze the memoires 
of the five leading intellectuals, including, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Amir Shakib 
Arslan, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, Salim Ali Selam, and Muhammad Kurd Ali. 
These memoirs were recently translated from Arabic to Turkish and for my thesis I 
use their Turkish versions. Thus, in giving references I use Turkish versions of the 
authors’  names.  Shakib  Arslan’s  memoir  is  an  autobiography  covering  between  1869  
and 1920. The Arabic version of his autobiography, Siratu Zatiyya, was published in 
Beirut in  1969.  Likewise,  Kurd  Ali’s  memoir  is  a  kind  of  autobiography  named  as  al-
Muzakkirat, was published in Damascus in 1948. Salim   Ali   Salam’s  memoir   was  
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prepared   by  Dr.  Hassan  Ali  Hallak   based   on  Salam’s  manuscripts   protected   in   the  
Beirut American University. The memoir includes the original text written by Salam 
as   well   as   Hallak’s   comments,   which   include   some   explanations   about   Salam’s  
activities between 1918 and 1938, as well as photographs and relevant documents. 
The Arabic version of his memoir, Mudhakkiratu Salim Ali Salam, was published in 
Beirut in 1982.  Finally, Darwaza’s   memoir   that   was   translated   to   Turkish   is   a  
compilation of the parts that were extracted from his voluminous memoir, 
Mudhakkiratu Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, published in Beirut in 1993. In the case of 
Rashid Rida I refer to Rashid  Rida’s  writings that consist of travel notes taken during 
his trips to Syria, Istanbul, India, and the Hejaz between 1908 and 1918. These notes 
were published in his al-Manar journal while Rida was on the journey. Kavak, the 
translator of Rida’s   notes, compiled some parts of his journey notes that were 
published in al-Manar. Indeed, other than these notes Rida wrote a memoir, al-
Manâr  ve’l-Ezher, soon before his death but because this memoir has not been yet 
translated into Turkish and because the journey notes cover exactly the period I focus 
on in my thesis I refer to these notes to analyze   Rida’s ideological and political 
discourse. I utilize the secondary literature in order to fill the gaps that are left by his 
travel notes.  
As I restricted my research to the Arabian Peninsula particularly Syria, 
Beirut, and the Hejaz and to the CUP period I selected these five intellectuals who 
were from the Arabian Peninsula focusing on this period in their memoirs. At this 
point it is necessary to highlight that  in  the  context  of  this  thesis  “Arabian  Peninsula”  
refers   to   the   Hejaz   and   “Geographical   Syria”   – a term used by scholars such as 
Albert Hourani-  which includes western part  of   the  “Fertile  Crescent”  or   the  lands  
that became Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, and Jordan (and also some parts of 
Turkey) today.   
Furthermore, studying these memoirs is important because these intellectuals 
took part either directly or indirectly in politics of the time as a member of Ottoman 
parliament, as a journalist or as an activist who had an influential status in the Arab 
provinces.  First one of these intellectuals is Rashid Rida (1865-1835), a prominent 
disciple of Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, who contributed to the 
modern Islamist political thought. In collaboration with M. Abduh he launched al-
Manar, an influential journal in Istanbul as well as in the Arab provinces. The second 
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is Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), a Druze prince (amir), who was a politician, 
poet, writer, and historian who advocated that the survival of the Ottoman Empire 
was the only safeguard for the unity of Muslims and for resisting against the imperial 
powers. The third is Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984), a Palestinian writer, 
activist, and post officer who struggled for Arab nationalism during his lifetime. The 
fourth one, Salim Ali Salam (1908-1918) was a pro-Ottoman politician advocating 
decentralization and administrative reforms in the Arab world. He was a member of 
the Ottoman parliament as a representative of Beirut during World War I. Finally the 
fifth actor is Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953), Syrian-born linguist, historian, and 
of Kurdish origin. He wrote for al-Muqtataf journal, edited newspapers of al-
Mu’ayyad and al-Zaher and established al-Muqtabas, a monthly magazine, in 1906. 
After 1909 Revolution he also established the first daily newspaper of Damascus, al-
Muqtabas.   
In terms of the method this dissertation is based on qualitative research 
adopting  comparative  historical  analysis  whose  ultimate  objective  is  to  grasp  “causal  
regularities   across   sets   of   historical   cases”   (Skocpol,   1979;;   39).  As   Skocpol   states  
“’comparative  history’  is  commonly  used  rather  loosely  to  refer  to  any  and  all  studies 
in which two or more historical trajectories of nation-states, institutional complexes, 
or   civilizations   are   juxtaposed”   (Skocpol,   1979;;   36).   In   my   thesis   having   the  
memoirs of the five Arab intellectuals as unit of analysis I focus on micro-social 
phenomena, by trying to connect them to macro-level processes and locating them 
into the wider historical-sociological context from a comparative perspective. My 
micro-level analysis also provides clues for an understanding of more macro units. 
Indeed, providing considerable amount of details about the issues and events such as 
World War I, the Arab Revolt, and Arab nationalism, which had played momentous 
role in transforming the Ottoman Arab provinces into the Modern Middle East in the 
early 20th century, the memoirs I examine make significant references to the macro 
historical   trajectories   of   the   “nation-states”   of   today’s   Middle   East.   Moreover,  
shedding light on the social and political processes in which Arab nationalism 
crystallized paving way for the ideological and actual separation of the Arabian 
Peninsula from the empire, the memoirs demonstrate how the dramatic power shifts 
at   the   macro   level   influenced   the   Arab   intellectuals’   political   discourse   and   vice  
versa. Though more historical than comparative, this study nevertheless examine in a 
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comparative fashion different points of view, political positions and ideological 
discourses as well as the different socio-historical context that produced these 
differences.  
In my examination, I collect the data from the memoirs and then I analyze 
these first-hand accounts in order to comprehend how and on what basis the 
perceptions, views, and positions of Arab elites had transformed in accordance with 
the socio-political conditions between 1908 and 1918 and policies of the central 
government during the reign of the CUP. In this regard memoirs are valuable sources 
in understanding the past and today due to the wide range of details they give. 
Explaining events of the time from a micro level, memoirs provide us with an insight 
on   the   process   through   which   Arab   intellectuals’   ideological   discourses   had  
transformed from Ottomanism to Arab nationalism.  
I analyze the memoirs in two stages. In the first phase I employ narrative 
analysis focusing on the content of narratives told by authors in their memoirs. 
Descriptions   of   the   contents   give   us   an   idea   about   the   authors’   backgrounds   and  
experiences between 1908 and 1918 equipping us with necessary details both for 
examining and comparing their ideological discourses.  
In the next phase I not only examine the memoirs through a discourse 
analysis  based  on  Foucault’s  approach  but  also  compare  the  five  Arab  intellectuals’  
discourses  on  the  issues  such  as  the  Ottoman  administration,  Cemal  Pasha’s  policies  
towards Syrians, the Arab Revolt, European campaigns, the notion of Arab caliphate, 
and the famine.  
Comparing the intellectuals by referring to their discourses constructed in 
their memories is significant to appreciate the diversity of the approaches to the same 
issues and events that took place in the Arabian Peninsula between 1908 and 1918. 
Each of the five intellectuals came from diverse socio-economic backgrounds and 
had different occupations, thus holding different political and ideological positions in 
their respective communities. For instance, Salam, Arslan, and Kurd Ali had close 
links to the inner circle of the Ottoman administration in Istanbul due to the 
occupations and positions they held whereas the relationships of Rida and Darwaza, 
particularly the latter, with the government were not very strong. Moreover, except 
for Rashid Rida who was born in Syria but moved to Egypt in 1897, all the Arab 
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intellectuals I analyze in this thesis were from the Arabian Peninsula. However, each 
of them was from different regions living under different social, political, and 
economic conditions and dealing with varied issues. Furthermore, comparing these 
five intellectuals demonstrates how all these differentiations were influential in 
shaping their approaches towards the Ottoman rule as well as their general 
ideological discourses.  
As the above description implies, my second main method is discourse 
analysis. Analyzing discourse is useful because discourses  
both affect, and are affected by, social developments, thereby functioning as 
indicators of social change. That is, they both reflect changes in social reality 
and help shape them, by making sense of this very reality for individuals and 
groups, thereby informing their decisions, actions and reactions. For they 
provide   cognitive   and   social   lenses   through  which   to   perceive   one’s   social  
environment which in turn influences the ranges and angles of these lenses. 
Furthermore,  discourses   not  only   affect   actors’  dispositions, but also justify 
their positions – and  undermine  their  opponents’  – in  social  struggles  (Ardıç,  
2012: 33). 
 
Though I do not fully apply the Foucaultian discourse analysis, I use as 
methodological tools some concepts he provides, particularly those   of   “threshold”,  
“analysis   of   descent”,   and   the   “analysis   of   historical   emergence”.      In   his  
archeological approach Foucault identifies four types of threshold through which 
scientific discursive formation develop: positivity, epistemologization, scientificity, 
and formalization. In my study, I identify a number of crucial events, serving as 
thresholds  that  heavily  affected  the  transformation  of  actors’  discourses  (see  below).   
In  his   analysis  of  genealogy,  Foucault  underscores   ‘the   analysis  of  descent’  
that  “dissolves  unity  and  identity  to  reveal  the  multiplicity  of  events  which  lie  behind  
historical beginnings. It rejects the lazy assumption of unbroken continuity linking 
phenomena   and   instead   seeks   to   preserve   the   dispersion   associated   with   events”  
(Smart,   2002:   49).   As   the   second   aspect   of   genealogy,   Foucault   considers   ‘the  
analysis  of  historical  emergence’,  “conceptualized  not  as   the  culmination  of  events,  
or as the end of a process of development but rather as a particular momentary 
manifestation  of  ‘the  hazardous  play  of  dominations’”  (Smart,  2002:  50).  Moreover,  
the analysis of historical emergence 
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embraces the confrontation, the conflicts, and the systems of subjection of 
which emergent historical forms are but temporary manifestations, 
furthermore within this scheme of things there is no place for a constituting 
subject,  for  ‘no  one  is  responsible  for  an  emergence’,  it  is  merely  an  effect  of  
the play of dominations (Smart, 2002: 50).       
 
Using   the  Foucaultian   concept  of   ‘threshold’   I   identify,   as  mentioned some 
turning points and thresholds, such as World War I and the Arab Revolt, which led to 
the ideological repositioning of Arab elites and transformation of their discourses 
from Ottomanism to Arab nationalism. Through an analysis of descent and that of 
historical emergence I show the multiplicity of the stands and ideological affiliations, 
various dimensions of the events, and finally a wide-ranging social, political and 
economic factors and key political developments which led to the transformation in 
the attitudes of Arab intellectuals in the first quarter of the 20th  century.  
Finally, I need to point out a methodological issue that arises out of the fact 
that the memoirs -with  the  exception  of  Rashid  Rida’s- were written after World War 
I years later than the events they discuss. Thus, these intellectuals might have 
changed their ideological stances due to the new positions they began to hold under 
the mandate administrations in the Arabian Peninsula. In other words, there is a 
possibility that the authors might have reevaluated the events they witnessed or 
participated during the period 1908-1918 in the light of the political developments in 
the region after the Great War. So the memoirs might reflect their attitudes towards 
the same issues differently than before. On the other hand, as the Arab intellectuals 
wrote their memoirs under no pressure after the Ottoman authority ended in the 
Arabian Peninsula, they might have been able to reflect their exact thoughts about 
the Ottoman rule in the region as well. For instance, Muhammad Kurd Ali, a Syrian 
journalist, wrote his memoirs al-Muzakkirat in 1948. If he wrote them in the first 
quarter of the 20th century, he might not have been able to reflect his thoughts freely 
due to the political oppression exerted by the CUP at the time. Thus, for instance 
Kurd   Ali’s   writings   in   al-Muqtabas newspaper, which had been published with 
Cemal  Pasha’s  financial  support  during  the  Great  War,  may  not  be  as  “genuine”  as  
his memoirs.  
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A final note on the methodology of this thesis that needs to be made is about 
the technique with which I have examined the memoirs. Aiming to facilitate handling 
1500 pages of data I have used a qualitative research software program, Nvivo. After 
downloading softcopies of the memoirs into this software, I have read each memoir 
carefully. While reading I have not only taken note of key points but I also come up 
with   various   codes   revealing   the   intellectuals’   views   on   any   given   issue   or   event.  
These tags (codes) have enabled me to reach any issue or topic easily while 
examining the narratives and the discourses of the Arab intellectuals. . Furthermore, 
the program helped me with grasping the relationship between the codes.   
 
1.4. Historical Background  
 
The rising industrialization, capitalism, economic and political imperialism 
led to the social, economic, and political changes of the agriculture-based societies 
including the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. In addition to territorial, social, 
and political transformations, the empire also faced a great deal of internal unrest 
caused by ethnic tensions and international pressures due to its Christian 
communities. Facing the rise of Europe the Ottoman government attempted to make 
wide range of reforms, which required it to become more centralized than ever. With 
centralization the number of civil servants increased and bureaucracy gradually 
turned into a power center.  
The first reforms were made in military culminating in the destruction of the 
Janissaries  in  1826  by  Mahmud  II,  whose  “reforms  paved  the  way  for  the  Tanzimat  
(Reforms) period (1839-1876)  that  brought  deeper  and  more  lasting  changes”  (Ardıç,  
2012:  42).  This  era  began  with   the  promulgation  of  Royal  Decree  of  Gülhane  on  3  
November 1839, promising equal rights to Ottoman Christians to terminate the 
nationalist and separatist movements among non-Muslim communities of the empire.  
In  the  short  term  the  edict  realized  this  objective  (Zürcher,  2003).  With  the  edict  new  
commercial laws, enabling foreign merchants to travel and trade freely, were also 
introduced. The Tanzimat was a period marked by   the   concentration   “all   political,  
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financial,   and  military   power   in   a   refurbished   bureaucracy”   (Kayalı,   1998: 19) as 
well  as  by  “the  direct  political  and  economic  impact  of  the  West”  (Ardıç,  2012:  42).   
  The impact of organization on Ottoman provinces was not immediate, as 
“many   regions   of   the   empire,   including   wide   areas   inhabited   by   Arabs,   were   not  
touched   by   Istanbul’s   reform   measures   until   the   second   half of the nineteenth 
century”   (Kayalı,   1998: 23). Nevertheless we should not underestimate the 
achievements of the reforms. Although it was not immediate the impact of the 
reforms was appreciable.  
If we compare the empire of 1870 with what it had been in 1820, there is no 
doubt that methods of administration and justice had changed; the non-
Muslims were freer; provinces as far away as the Hijaz and Tripoli of Africa 
were once more controlled from Istanbul; the provincial administration had 
been reformed and the area of cultivation was growing; a certain idea of 
Ottoman   ‘nationhood’   was   spreading;;   the   amenities   of   life   at   least   in   the  
larger cities and sea-ports had been improved (Hourani, 1981: 14). 
 
Indeed, the Ottoman Arab provinces had been opened up to Western influences, 
which accelerated their modernization, via European merchants long before the 
Tanzimat.      With   the   intellectual   guidance   of   Rafi‘   al-Tahtawi and the political 
authority of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1837-1859), the governor of Egypt, who was 
originally assigned by the Ottoman government to strengthen its authority after the 
French occupation (1798), Egypt started its own version of the Tanzimat introducing 
wide range of reforms in education, bureaucracy, tax system, irrigation, manufacture, 
and trade  (Kayalı  1997;;  Hourani,  1991).  Tunis  under  the  leadership  of  Khayr  al-Din 
Pasha, a high-level  bureaucrat,  similarly  issued  various  reforms  including  “security,  
civil liberty, regular taxation, and conscription, the right of Jews and foreigners to 
own land  and  carry  out  all  kinds  of  economic  activity”  (Hourani,  1991:  274).  There  
were  also  advocates  of   the  Tanzimat  under  Istanbul’s  control.  Yusuf  al-Khalidi, for 
instance,   is  considered  “a  Palestinian  representative  of   the  Tanzimat”  whose  family  
had a close relationship with the Tanzimat  elites  (Kayalı,  1998:  23). Khalil Ghanem, 
a   Maronite   Christian   Arab   from   Beirut,   who   was   working   in   Beirut’s   provincial  
administration, also had close links with the Tanzimat reformers.  
 With the formation of modern institutions and the penetration of European 
states into the Ottoman economy, the social and economic structure of the empire 
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greatly altered. Beyond the ruling elites, who profited most from the new ways of 
government, the new policies favored merchants particularly that of Europeans, local 
Christians and Jews who had access to the European market and credit from banks. 
On the other hand, such groups as ulema who used to control the legal system before 
the formation of the new legal codes and notable families who had long been 
mediators between government and urban population were excluded from share of 
power. Furthermore, local industries suffered from the competition of goods 
imported from Europe particularly in the Arab provinces (Hourani, 1991). 
The dislocation of the economy, the loss of power and influence, the sense of 
the political world of Islam being threatened from outside: all these expressed 
themselves in the middle of the century in a number of violent movements 
directed against the growing influence of Europe, and in some places against 
the local Christians who profited from it. In Syria, these came to a head in 
1860. In the mountain valleys of Lebanon there was an ancient symbiosis 
between the main religious communities, the Maronite Christians and Druzes 
(Hourani, 1991: 277). 
 
Due to these violent movements the Tanzimat period was characterized by 
political instability. Another characteristic of the Tanzimat period was the growing 
financial problems. To gain the support of the British against Muhammad Ali, 
Mahmud II had to sign the Ottoman-British Trade Agreement in 1838 completely 
opening the doors of the empire to the British traders, which was a fatal stroke to the 
local industry and trade (Karpat, 2012). Another deadly stroke to the Ottoman 
finance came from the Crimean War (1853-6), which brought nothing but suffering 
particularly for the Ottomans who for the first time in their history had to borrow a 
loan. The empire allied with European states again for the first time with the Paris 
Treaty   (1856)   after   this   war   (Çakır,   2001).   Moreover,   foreign   debt   continuously  
increased   during   Sultan   Abdulmecid’s   (1861-1876) reign whose ambition was to 
have a strong navy regardless of the cost. Enormous expenses of the Crimean War 
and constantly growing fiscal deficit culminated in Public Debt Administration 
(Duyun-u Umumiye),  which  was  created  in  1881  and  “governed  by  a  board  on  which  
sat  representatives  of  the  holders  of  Ottoman  government  bonds  in  Europe”  (Zürcher,  
2003: 88).  
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This era was also characterized by the development of ideological movements 
within the Ottoman society. Aiming to materialize the sense of Ottoman citizenship, 
which was officially declared in the Tanzimat, reformers in this period advocated the 
idea of Ottomanism to maintain the territorial integrity as well as stability of the 
multiethnic and multi-religious Ottoman society.  Ottomanism became the Ottoman 
‘official   ideology’   during   the   Tanzimat.   However,   nationalist   movements  
culminating in the disintegration of Balkans seriously damaged the notion of 
Ottomanism, which was later refurbished by Abdulhamid II and then by the Young 
Turks  who  “blended  it  with  Turkish  nationalism”  (Hanioğlu,  2006:  19).   
In   this   era   nationalist   feelings   aroused   among   the   empire’s   Christian  
communities.  
Starting with the Serbian revolt of 1804-1817 under the influence of 
nationalistic trend occasioned by the French Revolution (1789), this process 
went on by the succeeding revolts in Greece (1821-29), Wallachia and 
Moldavia (1856-66), Serbia and Montenegro (1856-67), Crete (1866-69), 
Bulgaria (1867-76) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1875) (Yetim, 2011: 1).  
 
In addition to the influence of the French Revolution nationalist movements were 
also   a   result   of   the   European   states’   intervention   into   the   empire   in   favor   of the 
Christian groups; e.g., the Paris Treaty between the Ottoman and the European 
powers proposed the Rescript of Reforms (Islahat  Fermanı) in 1856 to ensure the 
equality for non-Muslim communities of the empire. As an unintended consequence, 
the Rescript of Reforms accelerated nationalist sentiments among these groups and 
widened the economic gap between the Muslims and the Christians of the empire 
(Karpat, 2012). 
In this context an opposition group, called the Young Ottomans, emerged as a 
reaction to the interference of the European powers in the domestic affairs of the 
empire   and   the   government’s   superficial   imitation   of  Europe.  Among   them  Namık  
Kemal and his friends who endeavored to accommodate European liberalism and 
Islamic tradition believed that the  solution  “lay  in  the  introduction  of  representative,  
constitutional and parliamentarian government in the empire, thus instilling a true 
feeling of citizenship and loyalty to the state among all Ottoman subjects, Muslim 
and non-Muslims”   (Zürcher,   2003: 71).   Meanwhile   Russia’s   Pan-Slavic feeling 
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reached its peak and once Istanbul Conference failed she declared war on 24 April 
1877   on   the   Ottomans.   As   a   result   of   the   empire’s   disastrous   defeat,   Romania,  
Montenegro and Serbia gained their independence, Bulgaria became autonomous, 
and Cyprus was occupied by Britain, and Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria later in 
1908 (Karpat, 2012).  
Under  these  circumstances  Sultan  Abdülhamid  II  (1842-1918) came to power 
in 1876. He suspended the constitution and closed the parliament in 1878. 
Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the constitutional experiment of 1876-78 has a 
significant place in the late Ottoman history. The idea of constitution and parliament 
had become the basis of opposition to Abdulhamid II until 1908. The first parliament 
was a kind of realization of the Ottomanist ideal: provincial deputies from different 
parts of the empire including Arab world came together for the first time to deal with 
the wide range of issues including provincial reorganization, the official language of 
the  empire,  tax  collection,  Westernization,  and  freedom  of  press.  Moreover  “deputies  
of the Arab provinces were some of the most vocal, and often critical, in the 
Chamber   of   Deputies”   (Kayalı,   1998:   24). Arab delegates such as Yusuf Ziya al-
Khalidi,  Khalil  Ghanem,  Nafi‘  al-Jabiri,  Sa‘di  and  Manuk  of  Aleppo,  ‘Abd  al-Razzaq 
of  Baghdad,  and  Nikula  Naqqash,  Nawfal,  and  ‘Abd  al-Rahim Badran of Syria were 
some of the active participants in the parliament. However these Arab deputies did 
not use ethnic  or  nationalist  discourse  in  their  critiques.  According  to  Kayalı,  “there  
were  no  clear  common  interests  or  an  “Arab  idea”  that  unified  and  distinguished  the  
Arab   deputies”   (Kayalı,   1998:   31). They seemed to identify themselves as the 
representatives of the Ottoman Empire rather than merely perceiving themselves as 
representatives of the Arabian Peninsula.  
Although the constitution and the parliament were suspended, the 
modernization process continued in the following 30 years of the Hamidian regime; 
in fact all the efforts of the Tanzimat period reached their fruition in the Hamidian 
era (Lewis, 1967: 179). In this period the most impressive improvements took place 
in military and education particularly in higher education. The Mülkiye, the Harbiye 
were   established,   the   first   university   of   Turkey,  Darülfunun, was founded, modern 
elementary education was provided, the first idadi  high schools as well as military 
schools were established in various provinces (Lewis, 1967; Eraslan, 1981). 
Moreover, reforms continued in judiciary bureaucracy, communication, press, and 
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transportation. Railway construction was also greatly extended in this period. Such 
technologies as telegraph, press and railway rendered administration more efficient 
as they were used as instruments of centralization by the sultan.  The press of the 
Hamidian Era also contributed to the modernization yet the censorship was 
reinforced and extended to most of the printed media.  
 Abdulhamid   II’s   centralization   policies   particularly   targeted the Arab 
provinces.  As  Ardıç, in reference to Hourani, points out,  
Sultan   Abdülhamid   was   largely   successful   in   his   two-pronged policy of 
manipulating tensions between European powers and promoting Islamic unity 
through the Caliphate. In this way, he not only kept his empire out of large-
scale military conflict with imperialist powers, but also mobilized Muslims as 
far   away   as   India   for   the   Caliphate’s   cause   by   successfully   identifying  
Ottoman and Muslim interests, especially drawing on such symbols of Islam 
as the  holy  shrines  in  the  Hijaz  (Ardıç,  2012:  190;;  cited  from  Hourani,  1983:  
106).  
 
As part of his grand strategy of İttihad-ı   Islam,  Sultan  Abdülhamid   invested   in   the  
Arabian Peninsula exemplified by the project of Hejaz Railway from Istanbul to 
Mecca to improve the economic and political integration of the distant Arabian 
provinces into the Ottoman state, to centralize administration, and also to facilitate 
the   transportation   of   pilgrims   and  military   forces   (Ardıç,   2012).  He   paid   a   special  
attention to the Arab provinces not only because of the idea of Ittihad-ı   Islam but 
also   because,   “the  Ottoman  government  was   interested   in   exercising   direct   control  
over the international commercial centers of Aleppo and Damascus and the port 
cities of the eastern Mediterranean”   (Kayalı,   1998:   35). In order to provide a 
counterweight   to   the   imperialist   ambitions   of   the   European   states,   Abdulhamid’s  
another strategy was to improve the diplomatic relations with Germany (Eraslan, 
1995; Karpat 2012).  
 The policy of Ittihad-ı   Islam was quite relevant in the increasingly Muslim 
populated Ottoman Empire. In addition to migrations from Crimea and Caucasia, 
around two million Muslims migrated from the Balkans to Anatolia in exchange of 
120.000 Armenians and Greeks and 70.000 Bulgarian to the Balkans. Consequently 
the Ottoman population increased from 19.865.800 in 1875 to 27.299.500 in 1893, of 
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which 74,7 % was Muslim in 1897. While the state was trying to modernize its 
institutions and administration, radical demographic changes reinforced its Islamic 
characteristic (Karpat, 2012).  
In general, though, Abdulhamid II was popular among the large majority of 
the Muslim population, he was not quite so with the Ottoman intellectuals, and new 
generations of bureaucrats and officers, who had   graduated   from   the   sultan’s  
expanded educational institutions. Aiming to restore the constitution and parliament, 
the first organized opposition, İttihad-i  Osmanî  Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society), 
emerged in 1889 in Military Medical College. Some members were arrested but 
others could escape to Paris. They collaborated with the Ottoman constitutionalist 
émigrés,   including   Ahmed   Rıza,   under   whose   leadership   they   “founded   a   small  
committee called İttihat   ve   Terakki   Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, 
CUP) and published the newspaper Meşveret   (Consultation), in both Ottoman and 
French, from   1895   onwards”   (Zürcher,   2003: 91). The group named itself Jeunes 
Turks  (Young  Turks)  in  Paris,  but  it  also  “included  Arabs  among  its  membership,  as  
well as Kurds, Albanians, Russian Turks, and members of other ethnic   groups”  
(Kayalı,  1998: 51). 
After  his  arrival  in  Paris,  Mizancı  Murat became president in 1896.  But then 
Abdülhamid’s   agents   convinced   him   and   some   other  Young  Turk   leaders   to   come  
back  to  Istanbul  to  “help  him  in  his  reforms”  (Zürcher,  2003,  p.  92).  So  Ahmed  Rıza  
again became the leader of the CUP until the arrival of Prince Sabahettin a liberal 
who believed in minimal government and the idea of free enterprise as a solution to 
regenerate   the   empire   in  1899.  Ahmed  Rıza  on   the  other  hand  became  more  of   an  
Ottoman   nationalist   (Zürcher,   2003).   This   differentiation   led   to   a   split in the 
movement   as   the   Prince   founded   the   ‘Society   of   Ottoman   Liberals’   and   then   the  
Teşebbüs-ü  Şahsi  ve  Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (Society for Private Initiative and 
Decentralization) in 1906.  
The Young Turk movement expanded between 1902 and 1906 and branches 
appeared in Geneva, Cairo, Istanbul, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Macedonia, and Damascus. 
The committee that was formed by the officers of the Third Army Corps in 
Thessaloniki was the most significant of them. The Young Turk movement received 
a new impetus with defeat of the European but autocratic Russia by the Oriental but 
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constitutional Japan. Subsequently, Russia and Persia introduced constitutional 
regimes. Meanwhile there was an increasing discontent within the army because of 
the high inflation and unpaid salaries in the Ottoman Empire. In July 1908 the 
Unionist Officers of the Third (Macedonia) and Second (Thracian) Army decided to 
act   and   forced   Sultan   Abdülhamid   to   reinstate   constitution   on   23   July   (Hanioğlu,  
2008). The common reaction of the public to the revolution was joy and relief. 
Restoration of the freedom of expression paved the way for the emergence of various 
publications, political demonstrations as well as labor unrest. After the revolution, 
the CUP members returned to Istanbul from exile but the committee in Salonika 
remained to be the center of political power. Interestingly, the CUP officially left 
politics with the present cabinet under Grand Vizier Sait Pasha. It chose to watch out 
the constitutional system and involve in politics whenever it felt necessary. The 
CUP’s  position  as  a  secret  society  exercising  political  power  with  no  formal  structure  
would  become  a  destabilizing  factor  in  the  coming  years  (Zürcher,  2003).   
Meanwhile, Prince Sabahettin and his followers set a political party, the 
Osmanlı  Ahrar  Fırkası (Party of Ottoman Liberals) and contested the first election, 
which   ended  with   the   victory   of   the   CUP.   Propagating   against   the   CUP’s   secular  
policies conservative religious groups that organized themselves as the İttihad-i 
Muhammedi (Muhammadan Union) were also strongly opposing to the CUP. The 
CUP’s   position   was   weakened   with   the   Bulgaria’s   declaration   of   independence;;  
Austria’s  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Crete’s  unification  with  Greece.  
Finally, on 12 April 1909 religious groups supported by the liberals revolted in the 
name of restoration of  Islam  and  Şeriat.  The  Unionists  were  seriously  shaken  by  this  
revolt but soon reinforced their authority under the indisputable leadership of the 
commander of the Third Army,  Mahmut  Şevket  Pasha  (Lewis,  1967).  They  replaced  
Abdulhamid   II   with   a   weak   Sultan,   Mehmed   Reşad,   who   could   only   appoint   the  
grand   vizier   and   the   Şeyhülislam.   Central   authority   was   strengthened   with   the  
declaration of the restrictive laws on associations, public meetings, brigandage, 
strikes,  and  press  (Zürcher,  2003;;  Ardıç,  2012).   
These restrictions could not prevent the formation of new political parties 
such as the Mutedil   Hürriyetperveran   Fırkası (Party of Moderate Liberals), the 
Islahat-i Esasiye-i  Osmaniye  Fırkası  (Party of Fundamental Ottoman Reforms), the 
Ahali  Fırkası   (People’s  Party),   and   the  Hizb-i Cedid (New Party), which criticized 
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the CUP. The outbreak of a sweeping insurgence in Albania and the occupation of 
Tripolitania by Italy strengthened the opposition.  The major opposition groups 
united under the Hürriyet   ve   İtilâf   Fırkası (Freedom and Alliance Party) in 
November 1911, which won a by-election in Istanbul, defeating the CUP candidate 
(Zürcher,   2003).   In   January   1912 the  CUP   dissolved   the   parliament   and  with   ‘the  
big-stick  election’  it  guaranteed  its  majority  in  the  new  parliament.  But  soon the new 
CUP government had to resign as it was threatened  a  military  coup  by   the  “Savior  
Officers”   (Halaskar Zabitan). The new obedient chamber, which included 
representatives from all the opposing factions, was not sufficient to maintain order 
and stability in the empire. Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria allied and 
issued an ultimatum to the Porte and demanding wide-ranging reforms on 2 October 
1912. These demands ended up in the Balkan War, which was of two sessions and in 
the end of its first phase Albania became an independent state Istanbul and the straits 
were left to the Ottomans. While the negotiations were held in London, the Unionists 
plotted a coup, and removed the exiting cabinet in Istanbul. In the second phase of 
the war the Ottoman army fought under the command of Enver Pasha who retook 
Edirne from Bulgaria. Although this relative achievement more or less restored the 
CUP’s  prestige,  the  Balkan  Wars  were  disastrous  for  the  empire  in  terms  of  human,  
cultural and economic losses. The Ottomans lost most of their territories and 
inhabitants   in  Europe.  Moreover,   “the   areas   lost   (Macedonia,  Albania   and  Thrace)  
had been core areas of the empire for over 500 years. They were the richest and most 
developed provinces and disproportionate part of the Ottoman ruling elite hailed 
from  them”  (Zürcher,  2003: 113).  
However, in domestic politics, the CUP became unchallengeable after the 
January   1913   coup   d’état,   as   the   multiethnic   and   multi-religious structure of the 
empire turned into a Turco-Arab core  and it had to agree to make reforms, 
accommodating demands of decentralization in the  Arab  provinces   (Kayalı,   1998). 
Accordingly, the size of Arab representation in the parliament dramatically increased 
in this period.  Moreover, as a result of demographic transformation Ottomanism was 
redefined by underscoring Islam as a binding force. So, the Unionist government 
propelled an intensive Islamic propaganda emphasizing the anti-imperialist 
sentiments  (Kayalı,  1998). On the other hand, small scale insurgencies in the Arabian 
Peninsula particularly in the tribal areas almost routinized because of high taxes. 
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Reform committees in Beirut and Damascus prepared reform proposals demanding 
the use of Arabic in government offices and assignment of provincial functionaries 
from the local populace. In April 1913 the central government approved the use of 
Arabic in law courts, in official communication and in schools as the medium 
language.   The   government’s   positive   response   stabilized   the   relations   between  
Istanbul  and  Arab  provinces  for  a  while  but  the  probability  of  the  Ottoman’s  collapse  
was still present, which had kept the Arabs worried about their future. Moreover, the 
CUP’s  centralization  policy   included  Turkish  nationalist  overtone   rather   than   those  
of Islamic unity, which led to the alienation of Arab elites and the heightening of 
nationalist sentiments among the Arabs (Khalidi, 1991; Kayalı   1998). Meanwhile, 
some Arab intellectuals such as al-Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, and al-Afghani, revived 
the notion of Arab caliphate as binding force, which would organize the Arabs 
politically  (Ardıç,  2012).   
The doctrine of the Arab Caliphate was at the center of the intrigues of the 
European states, particularly Britain and France, modern Islamic thought, and Arab 
nationalism. Britain and France supported activities of the Arab nationalists as in the 
organization of the first Arab Congress in which the Arab   nationalists   “demanded  
greater autonomy for the Arab provinces, greater representation of Arabs in the 
Parliament, and restricting the deployment of Arab troops in the Ottoman army to 
Arab   lands  only”   (Ardıç,  2012:  92).  Since   the   late  1870s  both  British officials and 
press   had   been  propagating   the   “illegitimacy”   of   the  Ottoman  Caliphate.  This  was  
one of the canons of the British foreign policy which determined its way of dealing 
with   the   ‘Eastern  Question   (Ardıç,   2012).  Furthermore,   the   idea  of  Arab  Caliphate 
was   an   instrument   for   the   British   “divide   and   rule   policy”   in   the   Middle   East.  
Therefore, as in the case of the Arab Revolt (1916-18) Britain was involved in all 
potential conflicts between the Arab provinces and the Ottoman government. The 
Treaty of Constantinople (March 4-April 10, 1915) ratified between France, Britain 
and Russia and the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain show that for 
the European powers creation of an Arab Caliphate under their control was necessary 
to destroy the Ottoman  Caliphate  (Ardıç,  2012).   
The relationship between the Ottoman government and the Arab provinces 
took  a  new  shape  with  the  breakout  of  World  War  I.  Aiming  to  regain  the  empire’s  
political and economic independence, the Unionists allied with Germany, and 
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immediately   proclaimed   the   Capitulations’   abolition   and   the   termination   of   the  
privileges   given   to   the   Western   states   (Çiçek,   2012).   Aiming   at   instigating   the  
uprisings   of   the   Muslim,   who   were   under   the   Entente’s   rule   (Çiçek,   2012),   the  
Unionist leaders,  as  part  of  Germany’s  plan,  propagated  the  Muslims’  liberation  from  
the rule of Entente States and therefore the Ottoman caliph declared a jihad against 
the Entente.  
In  November  1914,   the  Ottoman  Caliph  declared   the   ‘Great   Jihad’   (Cihad-ı  
Ekber). According to the fatwa it is a religious duty for the Muslims to join the war 
on   the   side   of  Ottoman   and   those   fighting   against   the   caliph’s   army   and  his   allies  
would be punished in the hereafter. In the meantime, the CUP via Ottoman secret 
service (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa)   organized   ‘revolutionary   societies’   to   instigate  
insurgences  in  the  Muslim  territories  colonized  by  the  Allies  (Ardıç,  2012).  The  jihad  
fatwa was spread all over the Muslim world and even in the end of the war Britain 
attempted to occupy Istanbul and destroy the Ottoman Caliphate but could not 
succeed   because   of   the   strong   resistance   by   the   Indian   Muslims   (Özcan   1997;;  
Qureshi, 1999).  “Already  stirred  to  action  by  the  Teşkilat-ı  Mahsusa and  the  caliph’s  
Jihad fatwa during the war, Muslim and Hindu nationalists protested Britain both in 
India   and  London”   (Ardıç,  2012:  245).  As  a result of these protests Britain had to 
withdraw from Istanbul.   
In addition to these war strategies, the CUP sent Cemal Pasha to Syria as the 
Governor General and the Commander-in-chief of the 4th Army after the 
proclamation of the war. Before his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha was 
appointed to the sub-governorate   of  Üsküdar,   the  Governorate   of  Adana,   and   then  
Baghdad and finally as the military governor of Istanbul. He was an authoritarian and 
he   considered   all   sorts   of   opposition   as   a   threat   for   the   Ottoman   Empire   (Çiçek,  
2012).  Management of the expedition against Egypt and maintaining peace and 
order in Syria were the major tasks of Cemal Pasha, who also made a notable 
contribution   to   the   Syrian   province’s   modernization   in   terms   of   education,   public  
institutions and infrastructure.  
Intending to pose a threat for the British in the Canal, to instigate an uprising 
in Egypt, and even to conquer Egypt, the Ottoman troops under the command of 
Cemal Pasha embarked the first but unsuccessful expedition (14-15 January 1915) to 
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the Canal. Cemal Pasha did not give up his aim of conquest of Egypt and for the 
second expedition he made a great deal of preparations as part of which the 
construction of railway and carriage roads was accelerated.  However, a second 
larger expedition could not be actualized as the policies of the Ottoman government 
and Germany differed and the wartime conditions in Syria hardened. 
As part of his second task, maintaining peace and stability in the region, 
Cemal Pasha prosecuted the Arabist party members based on the documents seized 
from the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut disclosing the negotiations 
between the French consuls and reformist Arabs   (Çiçek,   2012).   Deeming   those  
documents as proof, he punished the party members harshly by sending some of 
them into exile to the Anatolian cities and executing others.  
During his governorate in Syria, Cemal Pasha also tried to modernize the 
region by municipal developments and producing ideal citizens for the empire. 
Intending to regulate mass education he in co-ordination  with  Halide  Edip  Adıvar  
reorganized the educational system and established new institutions ranging from 
girls schools to the agricultural,  industrial  and  commercial  schools  (Çiçek,  2012). 
On the other hand, as World War I continued, the Hejaz, the holy place for 
the Muslims, had become a focal point both for the Ottoman Empire and Britain. In 
order to enhance central authority in the region, the Ottoman government modified 
Medina’s  administrative  status  from  a  sancak of the Hijaz vilayet to an autonomous 
sancak  (Kayalı,  1998). As a powerful agent in the region, Sharif Hussein, sharif of 
Mecca, who was appointed after 1908 Revolution by the CUP, regarded this as a 
challenge. Thus, the conflict between Sharif Hussein and the governor of Medina 
was endemic. Meanwhile, ethnic insurgencies and separatist movements became 
widespread in the region while fiscal difficulties of the empire increased. Moreover, 
as the Ottomans began to be defeated in almost all fronts from the second half of 
1916,  the  Entente  powers  started  negotiating  the  Ottoman  territories’  future  after  the  
prospective demise of the empire. With the Constantinople Agreement in April 1915 
Russia, Britain, and France agreed on the formation of independent Arab rule in the 
Arabian Peninsula.    
This agreement provided the basis for the secret correspondence that took 
place between the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, 
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and Sharif Husayn between July 1915 and January 1916. Deceptive and 
controversial as the terms offered to Sharif Husayn were, the McMahon-
Husayn exchange resulted in an alliance of the sharif and Britain against the 
Ottoman  government  (Kayalı,  1998: 214). 
 
Consequently,  Cemal  Pasha’s   relentless   rule   coupled  with   the  constraints  of  
the war, famine and the intrigues of France and Britain led to the alienation of the 
Arab population from the Ottoman government. Motivated by the ambition of 
strengthening his power in the Hejaz, Sharif Hussein and his sons attacked the 
positions of the empire in Mecca in June 1916. To justify his revolt Sharif praised all 
the Ottoman sultan-caliphs and condemned the Unionist government for decreeing 
secular reforms, restricting  the  sultan’s  authority  and  allowing  the  executions  of  Arab 
leaders  in  Syria  (Kayalı,  1998;;  Ardıç,  2012).  In  his  “Proclamation”  of  independence,  
which was published on June 27, 1916 in his media organ, the Qibla, Sharif Hussein 
stated: 
It is well known that of all the Moslem Rulers and Emirs of Mecca, the 
favored City, were the first to recognize the Turkish Government. This they 
did in order to unite Moslem opinion and firmly establish their community, 
knowing that the great Ottoman Sultans (may the dust of their tombs be 
blessed and may Paradise be their abode) were acting accordance with the 
Book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet (prayers be unto him) and were 
zealous to enforce the ordinances of both these authorities. With this noble 
end in view the Emirs before mentioned observe those ordinances 
unceasingly. I myself, protecting the honor of the (Ottoman) State, caused 
Arabs to rise against their fellow Arabs in the year 1327 (1909) in order to 
raise the siege of Abha, and in the following year a similar movement was 
carried out under the leadership of one of my sons as is well known. The 
Emirs continued to support the Ottoman State until the Society of Union and 
Progress appeared in the State and proceeded to take over the administration 
thereof and all its affairs.  
The result of this new administration was that the State suffered a loss of 
territory, which quite destroyed its prestige, as the whole world knows, was 
plunged into the horrors of war and brought to its present perilous position, as 
is patent to all. This was all done for certain well-known ends, which our 
feelings forbid to dilate upon. They caused Moslem hearts to ache with grief 
for the Empire of Islam, for the destruction of the remaining inhabitants of 
her provinces –Moslem as well as non-Moslem- some of them hanged or 
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otherwise done to death, others driven into exile. (Hussein, 1916: 234-235 
quoted  in  Ardıç,  2012)   
 
Accusing  the  CUP  of  destroying  the  Ottoman  Caliph’s  power  Sharif  Hussein  made  a  
pledge to restore the sharia and protect the Holy Land: 
We leave the whole Mohammedan world from East to West to pass judgment 
on this contempt and profanation of the Sacred House. But we are determined 
not to leave out religious and national rights as a plaything in the hands of the 
Union and  Progress  Party.  (Hussein,  1916:  237  quoted  in  Ardıç,  2012)   
 
Although  Sharif’s  Revolt  is  deemed  as  the  turning  point  for  the  development  
of  Arab  nationalism,  other  than  the  reference  to  the  “land”  and  its  independence,  it  is  
hard to find nationalist elements in the proclamation. As the Hejaz lacked secular 
education and professional groups, which enabled the spread of nationalist ideas, it 
was  more  appropriate  to  derive  a  justification  from  Islam  (Oschsenwald,  1993;;  Ardıç  
2012). Therefore, the ideological  basis  of  Sharif’  declaration  was  a  combination  of  
Islamism and tribalism. As an extremely influential actor in the region Britain played 
a  key  role  in  the  Arab  Revolt’s  success  by  propagating  against  the  Ottoman  Caliphate  
and  arming  the  Sharif’s   forces  (Ardıç,  2012).  World  War  I  ended  with  a  disastrous  
defeat of the Central Powers including the Ottoman Empire. This meant the end of 
the Ottoman authority, which had begun in the 15th century, in the Arabian 
Peninsula. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION in the MEMOIRS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Aiming to introduce the five Arab intellectuals, Muhammad Izzat Darwaza 
(1888-1984), Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-
1935), Salim Ali Salam (1868-1938), and Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), this 
chapter outlines the memoirs of these intellectuals by analyzing the narratives in 
them.   The   memoirs   reveal   that   Arab   intellectuals’   attitudes   were   not   uniform   but  
varied towards Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula between 1908 and 1918. They 
differ from each other in terms of ideological and political stand. In this regard, while 
an Arab nationalist Izzat Darwaza and Ottomanist Amir Shakib Arslan represent two 
opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, the rest are located at different points 
across the spectrum. In this chapter the five Arab intellectuals are arranged according 
to their levels of affiliation to Arab nationalism and Ottomanism.  
There are various factors that led to this differentiation. Holding a political 
position such as being representative in the Ottoman parliament or having close 
relationships with Ottoman elites plays a significant role in moderating the 
ideological stands of the Arab intellectuals. Furthermore, other than that of Rashid 
Rida, the memoirs were written after the disengagement of the Arabian Peninsula 
from the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the new positions of these Arab intellectuals after 
the disengagement may have been influential in the transformation of their 
standpoints. 
For instance, Izzat Darwaza, who uses a strong nationalist discourse in his 
memoir, could not receive higher education, because of financial problems, in 
Istanbul or Beirut where students from well-to-do Arab families had access to 
schooling. He became a post-officer and worked in Nablus from 1903 to 1914 and 
then in Beirut. Thus he could not establish close relationships with the Ottoman elites 
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in Istanbul. He could only be able to receive information about the central 
government’s  operations   through  his   friends  who  were   studying   in   Istanbul.  As he 
could not complete higher education and had to remain in Nablus as a post-officer he 
deeply felt alienated among his fellow friends who were studying law, political 
science or medicine in Istanbul (Darwaza, 2007: 203). Therefore, Darwaza could not 
get an opportunity to be involved in the multiethnic and multireligious circles of 
Ottoman elites. In contrast, Amir Shakib Arslan and Salim Ali Salam had strong ties 
with Ottoman elites, including the CUP members such as Enver Pasha and Cemal 
Pasha, due to the political positions they held. Though these two demanded reforms 
in the Arab provinces they never thought of separating from the Empire. Unlike Izzat 
Darwaza these intellectuals were in positions that led them to nurture their Ottoman 
identity as much as the Arab one. Moreover, being both in the inner circle of the 
Central government and Arab communities provided an opportunity for them to view 
from both perspectives. In the meantime, they often had to reconcile these 
perspectives and even at times bargain with the representatives of them. Now, let us 
briefly examine these actors and their memoirs before embarking on an analysis of 
their narratives.  
 
2.2. Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984) 
 
Izzat Darwaza whose Arab nationalist sentiments are the strongest among the 
five Arab intellectuals analyzed in this research, was born in Nablus where he also 
spent most of his life. As an autodidact person he wrote around fifty pamphlets on 
Arab literature and history as well as Islamic sciences. He met with the idea of Arab 
nationalism in his early ages and kept dealing with issues related to the Arabian 
Peninsula particularly Palestine until the end of his life. Furthermore, during the 
reign of the CUP he was affiliated to Hurriyet   ve   Itilaf   Fırkası   (Freedom and 
Alliance Party) and Hizb al-Lamarkaziyah al-Idariyah al-Uthmani (The Ottoman 
Administrative Decentralization Party) and joined some political movements 
including Beirut Islahat Hareketi (Beirut Reform Movement) and Jam’iyat   al-
Arabiyah al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society), known simply as Al-Fatat. Struggling 
against the Zionist settlements in Palestine and for the independence of Greater Syria 
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he kept being politically active after the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the 
Ottoman Empire as well. 
As   for   Darwaza’s   memoir   covering   mostly   the   Palestinian   issue   until   the  
establishment of Israel in 1948, it consists of six volumes some parts of which are 
devoted to his observations about daily life in Nablus in the first decades of the 
twentieth century,   the   CUP’s   practices   as   well   as   the   development   of   Arab  
nationalism. This research takes into consideration these three parts of his memoirs 
in order to examine his approach towards the Ottoman Empire under CUP rule. In 
these specific parts he first gives a great deal of details about daily life and traditions 
in an Ottoman-Arab city, Nablus, and then explains political developments before 
and   after   1908   Revolution;;   finally   he   elaborates   on   Cemal   Pasha’s   policies   and 
operations   during  World  War   I   and   Sharif   Hussein’s   Revolt   in   1916.   As   an  Arab  
nationalist  Darwaza  highlighting  Arab  rights,  constantly  criticizes  the  CUP’s  policies  
in   his   memoirs.   Reacting   particularly   against   what   he   perceived   as   the   CUP’s  
“Turkification”   policies   he   sometimes   puts   forward   a   distorted   story   of   historical  
events such as famine in Lebanon during World War I. Moreover, as the editor 
(Mertoğlu,  2007:  XI)  of  the  memoirs  underscores,  the  way  of  his  justification  of  the  
1916 Arab Revolt manifests the extent of the mixed feelings that he has. On the one 
hand, he acknowledges Sharif Hussein to be right and believing that the revolt can be 
deemed as a milestone in the development of Arab nationalism; on the other hand, he 
argues that it was indeed Britain that planned the Arab Revolt manipulating Sharif 
Hussein’s  network  and  political  power  to  realize  its  plan.     
 Unlike   the   other   four   intellectuals  who   reflect   both   Istanbul’s   and   the  Arab  
provinces’   social   and   political   atmosphere,   Darwaza’s   memories are generally 
restricted to the events and issues at the local level. Not only does he provide readers 
with an insight about the social structure in Nablus, but he also gives an idea about 
the organization of the CUP and the FAP in the countryside. Darwaza does not say 
much about Sultan Abdulhamid II, other than associating his reign with 
denouncement, bribery, and tyranny. Before the 1908 revolution he did not have any 
connection with the CUP, which was then an underground organization against 
Sultan Abdulhamid II (see Chapter 1 for details). Once the Constitution was 
reinstituted in 1908, Darwaza like many others became a member of the CUP which 
launched branches in the countryside. At these branches people used to gather to sing 
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marches and listen to enlightening speeches in order to celebrate the promulgation of 
the constitution in the Ottoman Empire. Apparently restoration of the constitution 
caused rejoices in the Arab provinces. In the early years of the 1908 Revolution 
Darwaza was relatively satisfied with the freedom that offered by the new 
government. However, he (Derveze, 2007: 252) also noticed the growing of Turkish 
nationalism among the Turkish youth and statesmen as well as the Turkification of 
the  government  personnel  with  the  1908  Revolution  (see  also  Kayalı,  1998).   
As an Arab nationalist seeking decentralization, Darwaza was also close to be 
affiliated to the Freedom and Alliance Party, which was established in 1911 and he 
and his friends launched a club of this party in Nablus in early 1912. Darwaza was 
also influenced by renowned Arab nationalist Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi’s   book  
Kitab Umm al-Qura he even wrote a novel Vüfudü'n-Nu'man ala Kisra Enuşirvan  
through which run the theme of Arab nationalism. In his memoir Darwaza identifies 
himself as an Arab nationalist and often uses the term Arab Movement referring to 
the organization of Arabs to become independent. Regarding Arab nationalism, 
Darwaza (2007: 210) like many other Arab scholars argues that Turkish nationalism 
which gained strength with the proclamation of Kanun-i Esasi in 1908 that led to the 
development of Arab nationalism. In this connection, he underscores the nationalist 
policies of the CUP as well as the strong ties between Jews and members of the CUP 
both in Thessaloniki and Istanbul. Based on the information he received from 
Turkish and Arab newspapers as well as from his friends who were studying in 
Istanbul, he argued that Turks in Istanbul were insulting and looking down on the 
Arabs. Moreover they did not appoint anyone other than Turks to the critical 
administrative positions. Thus, in order to protect Arab rights some Arab students 
and representatives established organizations such as Ihau’l-Usmani Cemiyeti and 
Munteda al-Edebi in Istanbul. All these developments in Istanbul raised his and his 
friends’   awareness   about   the   necessity   of defending Arab rights (Derveze, 2007:  
263). They began to spread the idea of equal treatment of Arabs, who then 
constituted the fifty percent of the population in the empire, with Turks particularly 
in the parliament. Moreover, they demanded Arabic being the medium language in 
education and in government offices.  
In 1912 Hizb’ul   al-Lamarkaziyah (The Party of Decentralization) was 
established under the leadership of Rafiq al-Azm and with support of Rashid Rida in 
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Egypt. This party was in solidarity with the FAP in Istanbul, which was a liberal 
party proposing decentralization in the empire. In 1914 Darwaza and his friends 
decided to launch a branch of the Party of al-Lamarkaziyah in Nablus but as World 
War I broke out and Cemal Pasha was appointed as governor in Syria they could not 
realize it. The program of the Party of Decentralization has sixteen articles, the three 
of which summarize its message. 
Article I. The Ottoman State is a Constitutional State with a representative 
parliamentary Government. Every one of its provinces is an inseparable part 
of the Sultanate, which is itself indivisible under all circumstances. But the 
local administration of every province will be on the basis of decentralization, 
it being understood that the Sultan will appoint the Governor and the Chief 
Judge. 
Article XIV. Every province will have two official languages. Turkish and the 
“local”  language  of  its  inhabitants.   
Article XV. Education in every province will be in language of the 
inhabitants of that province (Zeine, 1958: 83).  
 
As the articles above manifest Darwaza and his friends were asking for 
decentralization and the use of Arabic in the public domains. Though Darwaza was 
quite clear about his demand of decentralization in his memoir he does not clarify his 
position about the separation of the Arab provinces from the empire.  
According to Darwaza, World War I and   Sharif  Hussein’s   revolt  were   two  
major opportunities for the members of the Arab movement to realize the above 
objectives (Derveze, 2007: 327). As he underscores members of the Arab movement 
were  deeply  disappointed  with  the  CUP’s  attitudes  who  did  not keep their promise of 
making reforms in the Arab provinces. Moreover, the CUP adopted moderate 
policies after the Arab Congress of 1913 but with the outbreak of World War I it 
began  to  rule  with  an  iron  fist  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula.  Cemal  Pasha’s  appointment, 
as a governor of Syria in 1914 whose ruthless policies alienated Arabs from the 
Ottoman government was a significant event in the development of Arab movement. 
According to Darwaza, the CUP was aware of the fact that as World War I broke out 
members of Arab movement were out to act against the Ottoman rule in the Arabian 
Peninsula. In order to prevent this they appointed Cemal Pasha who, on the basis of 
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the documents seized from the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut disclosing 
the negotiations between the French consuls and reformist Arabs, executed twenty 
one prominent Arab figures and also exiled hundreds  of  Arabs  (Kayalı,  1998;; Çiçek,  
2012).  
As the CUP and Cemal Pasha recognized the possible threat that could come 
from armed Arab youth, they sent the Arab troops who took part in the Canal 
Expedition   to   the   Çanakkale   front.   Moreover,   as   mobilization   (seferberlik) was 
declared, a troop consisting of more than two hundred educated young Arab soldiers 
most of whom were Arab nationalists gathered in Damascus. Once again seeing them 
as a threat to the central authority Cemal Pasha dissolved them. Thus, a possibility of 
a military movement against CUP authority was destroyed (Derveze, 2007: 327). 
According to him the second and maybe the most important attempt was the Arab 
Revolt, which started in Mecca on June 10, 1916, under the leadership of Sharif 
Hussein and with the military and financial support of Britain (Derveze, 2007: 404). 
Darwaza explains the whole process of the Revolt by referring to the memoirs of the 
King Abdullah, son of Sharif Hussein, who intermediated between the Sharif and 
British Lord Kitchener, General Storrs, and finally with Sir Henry MacMahon. 
Darwaza thinks that because of his lineage as well his characteristics Sharif Hussein 
was the strongest Arab leader in the region and therefore the British selected him to 
cooperate with against the Ottoman Empire, which had joined the Great War on the 
side of Germany (Derveze, 2007). 
 Supporting   Sharif   Hussein’s   Revolt   fully   Darwaza   asserted that for Arabs 
rebelling against the CUP government was a historical imperative as well as a 
national responsibility. This is because, if the CUP gained a victory in the war, it 
would be more aggressive than ever towards Arabs and it would strike a blow to 
them in order to solve the so-called Arab issue. Moreover, by awakening the Arab 
nation the Revolt was an important instrument for reaching the national ideals of 
Arabs. As Sharif Hussein claims in his published declaration (Derveze, 2007: 410-
411).  Darwaza  too  argues  that  Cemal  Pasha’s  execution  of  the  second  group  of  Arabs  
on May 6, 1916 was a significant factor that led to the Revolt against the CUP 
government. For him if the Arab nation were strong enough to get their rights after 
the war, the British had to keep its words that it promised to Sharif Hussein before 
the Revolt.  
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 It is striking that Darwaza did not hold the Ottoman Sultan or the Caliphate 
responsible  for  Arabs’  exiting  problems  but  squarely  blamed  the  CUP,  Cemal  Pasha  
in particular.   Sharif   Hussein   too   started   his   revolt   against   the   CUP’s   “unIslamic  
policies”  rather  than  the  Ottoman  Sultan-Caliph (Mehmed V), though he would later 
declare  his  own  Caliphate  in  1924,  albeit  with  no  success  (see  Ardıç  2012).   
 
     2.3. Muhammad Kurd Ali (1876-1953) 
Muhammad Kurd Ali who can be positioned in the middle of the ideological 
spectrum, was born in 1876 in Damascus to a family that consists of a Kurdish father 
from Sulaimaniyah and a Circassian mother and spent most of his life in Cairo and 
Damascus working as a journalist. He learned both Turkish and French other than his 
mother tongue. During his lifetime he witnessed a wide range of events including the 
political transformation of the Arabian Peninsula after World War I. His memoir 
consists of four volumes one of which is devoted to his childhood, his occupation, 
the development of Arab nationalism, and also his relationships with Cemal Pasha. 
In this volume, which this research focuses on, he provides readers with anecdotes 
about the social and political context in the Arab provinces during the first decades 
of the 20th century.  
As oppression against the freedom of expression escalated during the last 
years  of  Sultan  Abdulhamid  II’s  reign,  Kurd  Ali,  like  some  other  Syrians,  moved  to  
Egypt where he got in touch with pro-reformists including Muhammad Abduh whom 
he admires, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tahir al-Jazairi, Salim al-Bukhari and 
Jamaleddin a1-Qasimi. Thus, in general he was close to the circles that were 
demanding reforms in the Arab provinces. He was also quite critical about  the  CUP’s  
Turkification   (“Tatreek”)   policies.   However,   his   activities   both   in   Damascus   and  
Cairo were mainly concentrated on cultural realm rather than on politics. He 
supported the idea of Arabic as the medium language in schools and law courts in the 
Arab provinces and underscored the necessity of appointing governors who knew 
Arabic   to   the   Arab   provinces.   According   to   Kurd   Ali’s   testimony,   the   CUP  
government did not welcome these demands as they feared that other ethnic groups 
in the empire could demand the same for their communities. 
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As the 1908 Revolution was declared in Istanbul Kurd Ali moved back to his 
hometown where he began to publish the first daily newspaper of Damascus, al-
Muqtabas, which was funded by Cemal Pasha during the war.  Later in 1916-18 he 
published another daily newspaper, al-Sharq, in 1916-18 in Damascus with the 
financial assistance of Germany and the CUP. During the First World War he wrote 
only two books: one was about the travel that he had with a group of Arabs 
Çanakkale and  Istanbul   to  propagate  Cemal  Pasha’s  policies  and  practices  in  Syria;;  
the  other  book  was  on  Enver  Pasha’s  trip  to  Hejaz  in  1916.  As  he  (2006:  376)  wrote  
in his memoirs he did not believe much of what he had written in these two 
propaganda books that were  aiming  to  support  the  CUP’s  position  in  the  war  and  to  
unite  the  region’s  Muslims.     
Muhammad Kurd Ali found World War I period very much critical for the 
Arabian Peninsula thus he did not affiliate to any movement that could lead to a 
disintegration in the region. During the war adhering to the idea of Ittihad-ı  Uthmani 
Kurd  Ali   did   not   support   Sharif  Hussein’s   revolt   and   even   criticized   it   both   in   his  
own newspaper al-Muqtabas and   Germans’   al-Sharq. Furthermore, he was never 
involved in organizations or activities that could mean to destroy the unity of 
Ottoman. As far as political experience is concerned he thought that in that particular 
period Arabs were not mature enough to be independent. However, in terms of 
cultural issues his contribution to the development of Arab nationalism is substantial. 
During the Great War he supported nationalist Arab youth in Istanbul logistically by 
sending Arabic publications to them. After the war he wrote many books to raise 
awareness about Arabic among Arabs. Furthermore, aiming to save the Arabic 
heritage and to preserve the Arabic language he played a significant role in the 
establishment of Arab Academy of Sciences in Damascus and Academy of the 
Arabic Language in Cairo after 1918.  
Regarding the Committee of Union and Progress, he never had good relations 
with it because of its nationalist, centralist, and oppressive policies. In his memoir he 
tells   some   anecdotes   to   demonstrate   the   extent   of   the   CUP’s   hatred   towards   him  
because of his writings in al-Muqtabas against   the   Central   government’s   policies.  
The   CUP   closed   Kurd   Ali’s   newspaper,   al-Muqtabas, many times on the plea of 
simple  reasons.  Finally  it  closed  it  because  of  his  article  on  women’s  headscarf.  Kurd  
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Ali did not print al-Muqtabas until World War I when Cemal Pasha convinced and 
assisted him to publish it again. 
 During his governorate in Syria Cemal Pasha was quite kind to Kurd Ali 
because of a favorable evidence that was revealed during the inspection of French 
consulate in the early years of the war. In 1912 a French agent came to Kurd Ali and 
tried to induce him to take a more positive approach in al-Muqtabas towards the 
French  policies  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula.  Kurd  Ali’s  response  was  negative.  He  told  
the agent that the relationship between Turks and Arabs could be traced back to the 
early years of Abbasid Empire when Turks converted to Islam. Moreover, only 
difference between them was language. He also said that Turks with Kurds made 
great sacrifices for Arabs during the middle age against the crusades. Thus, there is 
no way for Arabs to cooperate with French who were different from Arabs in terms 
of religion and ethnicity and also who have been assimilating and oppressing 
Muslims  in  Tunis  and  Algeria.  He  finalized  his  words  by  saying  that  “Arabs  can  only 
be  with  the  Ottomans”.  This  conversation  was  reported  and  preserved  at  the  French  
Consulates which was seized during the Great War. Based on this report, which 
proved  Kurd  Ali’s  patriotism,  Cemal Pasha respected and favored him until the end 
of his governorate of Syria. But for Kurd Ali, Cemal Pasha and even another CUP 
member Enver Pasha who was close to Amir Shakib Arslan (see below) indeed were 
nice to them because they needed them for propaganda. 
Having lived under the rule of Sultan Abdulhamid II, the CUP, and finally the 
French occupation, Kurd Ali was quite pragmatist and favored by Ceamal Pasha 
during the Great War and also by the French mandate under which he would serve as 
a minister of education for six years (1920- 1922 and 1928-1932). Although he was 
not  satisfied  with  the  CUP’s  policies  towards  the  Arabian  Peninsula  particularly  with  
the   executions   of   prominent   Arab   leaders   some   of   whom   were   Kurd   Ali’s   close  
friends, he did not get involved in any reformist or separatist organization or political 
party other than the liberal FAP. Positioning himself on the side of the Ottoman 
Empire against the intrigues of British and French diplomats during the war, he did 
not champion the idea of disengagement from the empire. However he (2006: 31) 
thought that Turks never liked Arabs and gave their dues to them since they 
conquered the Arabian Peninsula. According to Kurd Ali (2006: 82), the Ottoman 
centralization like that of France was quite intolerant and oppressive. On the other 
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hand, he thinks that in terms of politics and military Turks are better than Arabs. In 
his memoir he (2006: 170-171 also mentions some Turkish intellectuals, Suleyman 
Nazif,  Cenab  Şehabettin  and  Ahmet  Cevdet  who  happened  to  be  friends  of  Kurd  Ali.  
Based on his friendship with them Kurd Ali appreciates Turkish scholars because 
they were critical about the CUP and its nationalist policies. As an Arab intellectual 
Muhammad  Kurd  Ali’s  contradictory  statements  which  are  given  above  manifest  the  
very fact that he, like many other his contemporaries, had mixed feelings and 
thoughts about their future and also the developments around them including the war, 
famine,   intrigues   of   the   Allies,   policies   of   the   CUP’s   as   well   as   those   of   Cemal  
Pasha. 
In his memoirs Kurd Ali identifies himself neither Arabist nor Ottomanist. 
Indeed he does not mention the term Arab movement throughout his memoir. He did 
not support the CUP but as he was against a mandate government in the region and 
also as he wanted to secure himself under the chaotic conditions of the Great War he 
preferred to maintain good relationship with the CUP in general and Cemal Pasha in 
particular. Furthermore, Kurd Ali has also an ambiguous stance towards 1916 Arab 
Revolt.   Even   though   Sharif   Hussein’s   son   Amir   Faisal,   who   after   the   war   first 
became the king of Syria for a short period and then Iraq for twelve years, was Kurd 
Ali’s   best   friend,   he   persistently   avoids   giving   even   a   brief   explanation   of   the  
emergence and aftermath of the revolt.  
As earlier highlighted he is concerned about the Arab culture and civilization, 
however, he indeed does not overlook the political aspect of Arab nationalism. He 
does not openly defend the activities of Arab nationalists some of whom were Kurd 
Ali’s   close   friends   such  as  Abdulwahhab al-Inkilizi, Shukri al-Asali, and Salim al-
Jazairi. These three outstanding Arab intellectuals were executed by Cemal Pasha in 
1916 based on the evidences that were obtained during the inspection of foreign 
consulates early in the war. As if subscribing to their cause subtly Kurd Ali calls his 
friends as Arab freedom lovers (Arap   Hürriyetperverleri) rather than Arab 
nationalists and but also blames them for being careless. He thinks that they had to 
be more prudent and cautious in their relationships with foreigners particularly with 
the European consuls.  
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Moreover, complaining about the Jewish settlements in Palestine, Kurd Ali 
(2006: 278) refers to a critical conversation he had with Amir Faisal ibn Hussein 
after the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire. In this dialog 
he says to Amir Faisal that, 
You said that all the Arab provinces will be united under one state. We were 
pleased and delighted. Our youth served to your father Sharif Hussein in 
order to realize this objective. Then you said that Hejaz, Syria and Iraq will 
be respectively independent. We gave our consent to it involuntarily. Now we 
are collecting everyone in Syria and evacuating Palestine and you say that 
“you  Syrians  are  equal  to  Palestine”  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 278). 
 
As it is clear in this conversation Kurd Ali did not take part in the Arab Revolt 
personally but was pleased with idea of uniting Arabs under an Arab state. In the 
meantime,   apparently   he   was   disappointed   with   the   revolt’s   unexpected   outcomes  
such as the emergence of Jewish settlements in Palestine and a mandate system in the 
region. Indeed his social network reveals ideological stance of Muhammad Kurd Ali 
who had close relationships both with Amir Shakib Arslan and Rashid Rida. While 
Shakib Arslan is a pure Ottomanist the latter is more likely to be an Arab nationalist. 
Thus, as a cultural nationalist Kurd Ali was somewhere in the middle of the 
ideological spectrum mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.  
 
2.4. Muhammad Rashid Rida ibn Hussein (1865-1935) 
Syrian-born intellectual  and   journalist  Rashid  Rida’s  memoirs  consist  of   the  
notes taken during his visits to Syria, Istanbul, India, and the Hejaz after the 1908 
Revolution. As travel books like memoirs provide readers with a great deal of 
information about their authors,  Rashid  Rida’s  travel  notes,  which  were  published  in  
his al-Manar (an influential periodical that he published for over 35 years; see 
Kavak, 2011) reveal impressions that he had in these four centers of the Muslim 
world and demonstrate his intellectual transformation as well as his social networks. 
His travel notes are selected by the editor to be compiled based on the period (1908-
1918) they cover as well as the content they include.  
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A pupil of Jamaladdin Afhgani and Muhammad Abduh, Rida is a pioneer of 
the modernist interpretation of Islam, which refers to a search for a reformed 
(”authentic”)   Islam   cleansed   of   the   “tradition”   and   an   attempt   to   reconcile   it   with  
modern values (see Moaddel, 2002; Mertoğlu,  2012).  Yearning  the  pure  Islam  of  the  
early period of the Islamic history, Rashid Rida thinks that Muslims deviated from 
Islam throughout history therefore there is a need to make reforms in their 
understanding of Islam as well as political and social institutions. Referring to these 
necessary reforms he  uses  the  concept  of  “ıslah”(reform, correction) which had been 
the main issue in his renowned journal, al-Manar. According to the statement that he 
made in his later life, in setting up his project of ıslah  Rashid Rida was influenced by 
his master in Tripoli, Hussein al-Jisr who believed in the necessity synthesizing 
Islamic sciences with modern ones. As influential factors he also refers to Imam 
Ghazali’s  Ihya’u  Ulumuddin as well as the journal of Urvet’ul  Vuska    published by 
Abduh,  Ibn  Khaldun’s  Muqaddima,  Ahmed  Cevdet  Pasha’s  History,  and  others.   
Aiming to spread the notion of ıslah  Rida wanted to establish institutions for 
religious education. In order to realize this objective he never kept approaching to 
political leaders to gain assistance. As the Ottoman Empire rapidly broke apart in the 
early 20th century, actors in the region shifted their political affiliations. Looking for 
a political patronage for his project of ıslah Rashid Rida also had to shift his stance 
promptly. Therefore, he first approached to Abdulhamid II, the Committee of Union 
and Progress then to the leader of 1916 Arab Revolt, Sharif Hussein, and once he 
was disappointed with Sharif Hussein he came close to Mustafa Kemal, then Shia 
Imam Yahya of Yemen, and finally to Wahhabi-Saudi   administration   (Mertoğlu,  
2005).   Furthermore,   as   the   editor   of   Rashid   Rida’s   memoir   underscores   in   the  
introduction his relationships with the British, who had occupied Egypt since 1882, 
needs to be studied respectively. 
Rashid Rida was born in Syrian province, near Tripoli in al-Qalamoun, in 
1865. He was influenced by the ideas of Jamaladdin Afghani and Muhammad 
Abduh. He sent a letter to al-Afghani to become his disciple but as Afghani passed 
away in Istanbul in 1897 in Istanbul he moved to Cairo in the same year to benefit 
from the wisdom and experience of Muhammad Abduh with whom he worked until 
Abduh’s  death  in  1905.  In  1898  he  founded  a  journal,  titled  al-Manar,  with  Abduh’s  
support. From its establishment until the 1908 Revolution Rashid Rida did not 
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criticize Abdulhamid II openly in his journal. Rather he generally praised and 
complimented the sultan as the caliph of all Muslims in his writings. However, in 
this period he was influenced by the arguments of some proto-Arab nationalist 
Syrian intellectuals, namely Rafiq al-Azm, Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi and 
Muhibbuddin al-Khatib, according to whom increasing centralization of the Ottoman 
Empire meant to the ignorance of the Arab provinces (Kavak, 2007).  
As the 1908 Revolution broke out Rashid Rida transformed into an advocator 
of the CUP as well as democracy. As the concept of ıslah was the basis of Rashid 
Rida’s   all   intellectual   and   political   activities   his   journeys   were   too   for   the   same  
purpose. He stayed in the province of Syria from September 1908 to March 1909 and 
observed the positive impact of the Kanun-i Esasi’s   promulgation   in   many   cities,  
including Damascus and Beirut. People were celebrating the restoration of the 
parliament and the constitution. During his stay in Syria he met with CUP members 
as well as salafi scholars such as Abdurrazzak al-Baitar, Jamaladdin a1-Qasimi, and 
Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi. In this period advocating the CUP he appears to be an 
Ottomanist who is against the separation of the Arabian Peninsula from the empire. 
Moreover, according to Rashid Rida the idea of decentralization was not applicable 
in the Arabian Peninsula because Arabs lacked of political and intellectual 
experience to govern themselves. Therefore, they had to stick to the Ottoman Empire 
under CUP rule. In Syria, he advised the Arabs to maintain good relationship with 
Turks and cooperate with them. According to him, Arabs and Turks were bound by 
Islam thus they both have to do their best for the survival and wellbeing of the 
empire. Moreover, in order to spread the spirit of constitutionalism and democracy 
they have to assist to the CUP.  
After Syria, having two major objectives in his mind Rashid Rida went to 
Istanbul where he stayed almost a year. His first objective was to mend fences 
between Turks and Arabs. Championing the idea of Ittihad-i Uthmani (Ottoman 
unity) he published articles in his friend Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi’s  Arabic  newspaper  
al-Haddra and Iqdam in Istanbul. His second goal was to establish the School of 
Propagation and Teaching (Dava  ve  Irşad  Okulu) in the capital city of the empire. In 
order to realize this goal he contacted many Ottoman bureaucrats including the grand 
vizier and the shayk al-Islam but as he did not accept the idea of establishing a 
school that is directly under the authority of the government his project came to 
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naught and he left Istanbul. During this visit he not only met with the CUP members 
but he was also in touch with the Ottoman intellectuals from Sırat-ı  Mustaqim,  an 
influential Islamist journal published in Istanbul (see  Mertoğlu,  2001). Furthermore, 
Rashid   Rida   thought   that   Istanbul   was   not   prosperous   because   of   Abdulhamid’s 
autocracy. Drawing attention to the inability of the government to extinguish the fires 
regularly erupting in Istanbul, Rashid Rida argued that if this incapability continues, 
the political leaders in the empire will not show great governance.  
As he was not offered support by the Ottoman government for his projects, in 
1912 looking for a political and financial assistance he took a trip to India where he 
got   a   significant   financial   support   for   his   school   of   “Davet   ve   İrşad”   which   was  
started in Cairo as well as for his journal al-Manar. In India he also met with many 
outstanding Muslim scholars and administrators. On the way back to Cairo he 
stopped  by  at   the  Ottoman  Empire’s  southeast  frontiers,  Oman  and  Kuwait.  Finally  
he visited the Hejaz three months after the 1916 Arab Revolt had begun. In Mecca he 
came across with Turkish prisoners of war and there he also witnessed the formation 
of a new administration after the revolt. As Rashid Rida gave up hope from the CUP 
from 1913 onward, he first affiliated to the Party of Lamerkeziyya which basically 
demanded decentralization but in early World War I his thoughts gradually 
transformed  into  the  Arabian  Peninsula’s  separation  from  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Thus  
once Sharif Hussein revolted in collaboration with the British against the empire, he 
presumed  that  the  new  “Arab  King”,  Sharif  Hussein,  could  help  him  with  his  project  
of ıslah  and  advocated  that  the  Sharif  be  the  caliph  (see  Ardıç,  2012,  Ch.  5). 
 Therefore during his pilgrimage he declared his loyalty to Sharif Hussein and 
in  order  to  justify  the  Sharif’s  revolt  he  propagated  against  members  of  the  CUP  by  
blaming them as violators of Islamic rules as well as Turkish nationalists who ill-
treated Arabs, interfered the Kanun-i Esasi and who were also notoriously corrupt. In 
his propaganda for Sharif Hussein he cooperated with Muhibbuddin al-Khatib and 
Fuad al-Khatib who were journalists of the al-Qibla newspaper sponsored by the 
Sharif  as  well  as  with  renowned  Arab  intellectuals  as  ‘Aziz  ‘Ali  al-Misri and Kamil 
al-Qassab who were advocating   Arab   nationalism   (Rıza,   2007:   vii, 303). On 5th 
October 1916 Sharif Hussein issued the decree to form new Arab government in 
Mecca and soon after Rashid Rida arrived there and visited Sharif Hussein to talk 
about   the   form   of   the   new   government.   According   to   the   decree   the   Sharif’s   son  
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Abdullah was Foreign Minister and he was also acting Minister of Interior, 
Abdulaziz   bin   ‘Ali  was  Chief   of   the  General   Staff   and   also   acting   commander   in-
chief.  
Aiming  to  support  and  justify  the  Sharif’s  rebellion,  Rashid  Rida  also  gave  a  
sermon in Mina near Mecca, which was published both in al-Manar and in the 
memoir. In this sermon he first praised Arabs as being a nation from which the 
prophet was selected and the Arabian Peninsula particularly the Hejaz as being the 
birth place of Islam. Then he gave very brief information about the sultans of 
Ottoman Empire in the last century. Accusing the CUP leaders as being corrupt he 
claimed that they came to power with the  intrigues  of  Thessalonica’s  Jews  as  well  as  
with the help of Austria and Germany. He continued his speech with anecdotes to 
show   the   CUP’s   failures   in   the   Balkan  Wars   as   well   as   in   the   Great  War   and   its  
incapability to govern the empire since it captured the power in 1908. In a short 
period it brought the empire to the edge of abyss and since he was close to the inner 
circle of the central government Amir Hussein recognized it. As his power was 
limited he could only be able to rescue the Hejaz and its surrounding. According to 
Rashid Rida if Sharif did not rebel against the CUP, people of the Hejaz would die 
either because of poverty caused by the blockage or the relentless persecution made 
by Cemal Pasha. Most important of all protecting this region also means to protect 
the future of Islam. Therefore, Muslims have to be grateful to Sharif Hussein for 
what   he   did   for   Islam   and   for   the   Hejaz.   Rashid   Rida’s   Hejaz   notes   end   with  
appreciation and compliments to the new Arab king and support for his claim of the 
caliphate, which he announced in 1924. As the balance of power had changed in the 
Arabian Peninsula Rashid Rida who once an advocator of the CUP turned into an 
opponent of it. In brief, shifts in the positions of the political actors of the time led 
Rashid Rida to transform his attitudes towards them. Ironically, he would later call 
Sharif  Hussein  the  “devil’s  caliph”. 
As  Rashid  Rida’s  thoughts  transformed  promptly  between  1908  and  1918  it  is  
quite difficult to position him at a specific point on the ideological spectrum.  
According to his memoirs he was at the Ottomanist end of the spectrum in 1908 but 
unfolding events led him to slide towards Arab nationalism.  
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2.5. Salim Ali Salam (1868-1938) 
Playing significant roles both in the Ottoman politics and later in that of 
Lebanon under the French mandate, Salim Ali Salam is an outstanding figure in the 
recent history of the Middle East. As a notable, Sunni Muslim, he held influential 
positions in various organizations. He served as mayor of Beirut, president of 
Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions (al-Maqasid-i Khayriyya al-Islamiyya) and 
as deputy of Beirut in the Ottoman Parliament before the disengagement of the 
Arabian Peninsula from the Empire. He was also an executive member of the 1913 
Paris Arab Congress as well as the Syrian General Assembly and president of 
National Islamic Parliament (Milli   İslam   Meclisi). As the positions he held 
demonstrate, he was quite active both in politics and civil societal activities.  
Covering the period between 1908 and   1918,   Salim   Ali   Salam’s   memoirs  
shed light on a critical phase of the Ottoman history. In his memoir he provides 
valuable information on the last years of the Ottoman authority in Beirut, the 
Committee   of  Union   and   Progress’   policies   in   the   region,  Cemal   Pasha’s   attitudes  
towards the Arab nationalists, deliberations on the reforms and the issue of 
decentralization in Beirut as well as anecdotes about the Paris Arab Congress, the 
separatist trends appealing to the European powers, and also the relationships 
between Arabs and Turks in general. Furthermore, not only does the memoir consist 
of information about the political history of Beirut but also of the social and cultural 
atmosphere of it in early 20th century. Salim  Ali  Salam’s  memoir  was  prepared  by  
Dr.  Hassan  Hallak  based  on  Salam’s  manuscripts  protected   in   the  Beirut  American  
University. The memoir includes the original text written by Salam as well as 
Hallak’s   comments,   which   include   some   explanations   about   Salam’s   activities  
between 1918 and 1938, as well as photographs and relevant documents.  
Salim Ali Salam was born in 1868 to a Sunni notable family in Beirut. He 
could not get a regular education and once his father passed away he began to work. 
As he became a successful businessman he occupied certain administrative positions 
including being a representative at the Trade Court and also head of the Agricultural 
Bank (Ziraat  Bankası). Salam was not only engaged in trade and administration but 
also social issues particularly the activities to improve the education system in 
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Beirut. Thus, he made great contribution in the Muslim Society of Benevolent 
Intentions (al-Maqasid-i Khayriyya al-Islamiyya) during his tenure as its president. 
Salim Ali Salam begins his memoir by describing the unfavorable 
circumstances under which the Ottoman Empire was struggling to survive. For him 
due to the bad governance of Sultan Abdulhamid II who was concerned about 
nothing but his security, the empire lost its military and naval power. Moreover, for 
the same reason the empire was denigrated not only by the great powers but also by 
small states around it. While the sultan generously bestowed spies, the state was 
unable to pay the wages of soldiers and civil servant on time. According to Salam, it 
was due to these difficult conditions that people in different parts of the empire 
welcomed the 1908 Revolution with great joy (Selam, 2009: 82). 
Soon after the 1908 Revolution Salam was appointed as mayor of Beirut. 
Though the municipality fell from grace due to great financial difficulties he made 
significant improvements in the water supply network and the road maintenance. 
Requesting appropriation for the establishment of sewage system in Beirut he 
contacted with the central government which was then under the grand vizierate of 
Kamil Pasha. Though the government first appeared interested in the project, it did 
not do anything to realize it (Selam, 2009: 87). 
In addition to being mayor of Beirut Salam played significant role in the civil 
society. The Muslim Society of Benevolent Intentions, which promoted education 
among the Muslims of Beirut, was founded in 1909, when the governor of Beirut, 
Nazim Pasha, appointed Salim Ali Salam as its president. During his presidency, he 
made reforms to improve the quality of education and teachers   in   this   society’s  
schools. He also increased revenues of the society, which used to suffer from the 
burden of financial  deficit.  The  society’s  schools  had  gradually  acquired   reputation  
and in 1912 they became quite popular. Moreover, not only Muslims but also non-
Muslims such as Butrus Dagir Efendi funded it. However, an unexpected event led 
Salim Ali Salam to resign from his post in the Society, which lost its prosperity 
during the First World War. After 1920 it regained its popularity with the assistance 
of  King  Faisal,  Sharif  Hussein’s  son,  the  king  of  Iraq.   
As   Salam   exerted   himself   to   progress   in   Beirut’s   education   system   Italians  
attacked Tripoli in 1911 and managed to occupy it despite a strong resistance. In the 
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meantime they occupied Rhodes and surrounding islands. As the Ottoman navy was 
not as strong as that of Italia, Ottomans could not fight directly with Italians rather 
they provided people of Tripoli with munitions and military officers to maintain 
resistance within the province. Soon, Egypt, which was then under the British 
occupation began to preclude the Ottomans sending assistance to Tripoli. This was 
when Salim Ali Salam was in Egypt and appealed Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, who 
did not have good relations with the CUP, to let the Ottoman Empire help Tripoli 
against Italians. In February 1912 Italia attacked the two army divisions at Beirut 
port with the pretext that they were helping Tripoli. Civilian deaths in the attack led 
to chaos and the governor, Ebu Bekr Hazim Bey, proclaimed martial law in Beirut. 
In the same year aiming to share the Ottoman territories in Europe some Balkan 
states including Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia declared war on the 
Ottoman Empire (Arslan, 2009: 50). No one including the great powers of Europe 
presumed that the empire would be defeated but soon after the beginning of the war 
the Ottoman army was scattered and was heavily defeated. According to Salim Ali 
Salam these unexpected defeats led the Arab provinces to reconsider their situations. 
Beirut, in particular, was much more concerned about its existence due to its strategic 
geographical location. Regarding the future of Beirut some wished to joint Egypt 
which was under Britain, whereas others favored the French occupation (Selam, 
2009: 94).  
For Salam the empire was defeated because the CUP government had been 
replaced by that of the FAP, which had a profound impact even on the Arab 
provinces. Kamil Pasha, grand vizier of the new government, removed governor of 
Beirut Ebu Bekr Hazim from the office and reappointed the former governor Edhem 
Bey. People of Beirut were increasingly confused and some of them even began to 
look for alternatives to the Ottoman authority. In this critical period the French 
consul promised Nahle al-Tuveyni Bey, a friend of Salam, to support the people of 
Beirut with twenty thousand soldiers if they rebelled against the Ottoman Empire. 
According to Salam if the empire wanted to maintain its authority in the region it had 
to introduce extensive reforms. Insisting to form a committee in order to prepare a 
reform project the governor, Edhem Bey, sent a telegraph to the grand vizier Kamil 
Pasha. According to the grand vizier it was better to wait for the opening of the 
parliament under which they can plan the reforms. Nevertheless the governor and 
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Salim Ali Salam decided to embark on outlining broad reforms. A group that 
consisted of Kamil al-Sulh Bey, Ahmed Muhtar Beyhum, Ibrahim Sabit Efendi, and 
Petro Tarrad as well as Salam, outlined the reforms. In the meantime drawing 
attention to the indispensability of making reforms in Beirut, Salam sent a letter to 
al-Ittihad-i Uthmani, which was issued on December 22, 1912 (Selam, 2009: 96).  
On 14 January 1913 representatives from all groups gathered at Provincial 
Council to set up a reform project. The representatives were made up of fourty two 
Muslims and fourty four non-Muslims who were constituted by sixteen Orthodox 
Greek, ten Maroni, six Catholic Greek, two Protestant, two Assyrian, two Catholic 
Armenian, two Orthodox Armenian, two Latin, and two Jewish. Among these twelve 
Muslims, twelve Christians, one Jewish were selected first to plan and execute the 
reform project. The Reform Committee came up with a reform project proposing 
decentralization according to which there will be two levels of administration: the 
national level that deals with foreign affairs, army, customs, postal and telegraph 
administrations, law making, and taxing; the local level on the other hand engages in 
the local issues and activities. The project includes details about the rights and 
responsibilities of the national and local officers and institutions. Moreover, 
according to the project Arabic like Turkish will be an official language of the 
Ottoman parliament. One of the most controversial articles of the project is the 
article that proposes the Provincial Council consisting of fifteen Muslims and fifteen 
non-Muslim members. Aiming to present the reform project to the Ottoman 
government the committee decided to send a group to Istanbul (Selam, 2009: 112). 
As people of Beirut were dealing with making reforms to improve their 
relations with the Ottoman government, the conflict between the CUP and the FAP 
which was then governing the empire increased substantially in Istanbul. On 23 
January 1913 a group of CUP officers entered the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali) during 
the Cabinet was in session, killed the Minister of War, Nazim Pasha, and forced the 
grand vizier Kamil Pasha to resign.   With   this   coup   d’état,   known   as   the   Babiali  
Baskini, Talat Bey became Minister of Interior, Cemal Pasha became the commander 
of  Istanbul  and  while  Mahmud  Şevket  Pasha  was  appointed  both  as   the  minister  of  
war and as grand vizier of the new government under the CUP, and also Azmi Bey 
became chief police (Selam, 2009: 112). Soon after the coup the governor of Beirut 
Edhem Bey was replaced with the ex-governor Ebu Bekr Hazim Bey. The Reform 
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Committee first sent a telegraph to the new government to tell the process through 
which they set up a reform project then on 7th March 1913 they welcomed the new 
governor Ebu Bekr Hazim Bey. During the visit they reminded the fact that if the 
central government does not implement the reforms the enemies will interfere into 
the affairs of Beirut. They also remarked that their existence depends on the 
existence of the Ottoman Empire and they never wish to separate from it under any 
circumstances (Selam, 2009: 114).  
In the following days representing the Party of Decentralization Abdulkarim 
al-Khalil came from Egypt for asking the Committee to join the party. On 8th April 
1913 the new imperial decree was put in practice. In the meantime assuming that the 
Reform   Committee’s   some   demands   are   not   in   line   with   the   Kanun-i Esasi’s  
principles and the incentives that led to the formation of the Committee are no longer 
relevant, the Committee is rendered to be obsolete therefore the central government 
prohibited its members to gather henceforward. Members of the Committee and 
people of Beirut immediately responded to this memorandum and protested the 
governor by sending letters and telegraphs both to the governor and the central 
government and going for a general strike (Selam, 2009: 120). Some members of the 
Reform Committee were arrested after this telegraph but soon they were released.  
In 1913 Beirut was not chaotic only because of the aforementioned crisis but 
also because of the demands of non-Muslim population, which constituted around 
twenty percent of the general population. Because   of   the   reform   project’s   article  
proposing the Provincial Council be composed of fifteen Muslims and fifteen non-
Muslims heavily criticized Salim Ali Salam and his friends. Also non-Muslim 
groups’   demand   of   occupying   more   than   fifteen   seats   in   the   Council created 
disturbance among the Muslim population (Selam, 2009: 123). 
Under these circumstances a delegation which included three Muslims and 
three Christians went to Paris for the First Arab Congress which was held on 18th 
June 1913 with the participation of representatives from different Arab countries 
(Selam, 2009). Salim Ali Salam, a delegate from Beirut delegation, was elected as a 
member of Executive Committee of Congress. After four sessions the delegates came 
up with ten reform articles which demanded administrative decentralization, making 
Arabic an official language in the Arab provinces, granting greater authority to the 
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Arab provincial governments, and letting Arabs to do their military service in their 
home provinces except in times of war. A copy of congressional resolutions was 
presented both to the French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon and the Ottoman 
consul Mehmed Rifat Pasha in Paris. In early July 1913 the Beirut delegation 
including Salam visited Monsieur Margaret in Paris, the French officer who was 
responsible for the Eastern affairs, where Ahmed Muhtar Beyhum said to the officer 
that,  
We thank to the French government for helping us holding our congress in 
Paris. As it has close relations with our government, we hope the French 
government to give an advice to our government for implementing the 
reforms. We have heard that in order to gain personal benefit an unauthorized 
person came to you expressing his or her wish to put Syria under the French 
authority. We want to enunciate that we chose Paris to hold our congress only 
because France provides freedom and it holds freedom demanders in high 
regard and also because there is an established relationship between France 
and our government. Absolutely we do not want to change our government”.  
In  response  to  Muhtar  Beyhum’s  statement  the  French  officer  said  that,  “We  
do not have any ambitions on Syria and what we want most is you live in 
peace   under   your   government”.   Muhtar   Beyhum   then   asked   him   “Do   you  
allow me to announce this on behalf  of  you?”  The  French  officer’s  response  
was,   “By   all   manner   of  means!   Please   announce this on behalf us (Selam, 
2009: 129).  
As Hallak specifies, during the same visit Salim Ali Salam also tried to clarify their 
position by stating that, 
It is important for us you understand our feelings and thoughts about affairs 
of our state. Although we demand decentralization and the prerogatives that 
we lost, we are strongly attached to the reign of the commander of believers 
(amir al-mu’minin) the glorious caliph.  Refuting his sovereignty and asking 
you to come to our state and protect us never occurs to our minds (Selam, 
2009: 22). 
As they left the French office, Dr. Eyyub and Halil Zeyniyye, Christian members of 
both the Reform Committee and Beirut delegation, expressed their annoyance at 
Muhtar   Beyhum’s   statement   during   the   conversation.   Indeed   their   reaction   was  
understandable because according to the revealed documents during the inspection of 
the French consulate after World War I these two Christian members with four others 
namely Michel Tuveyni, Yusuf al-Hani, Petro Tarrad, Rizkullah Arkash gave a note 
to the French consul Monsieur Couget on 12 March 1913. In the note, which is 
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quoted   in   Salim   Ali   Salam’s   memoir,   they   first   listed   their   complaints   about   the  
Ottoman  Empire’s  policies  towards  Christians  in  Syria  and  then  their  ambitions  and  
demands. According to the note, Syrian Christians are strongly attached to France, 
which is admired the most by them. In the end of their letter they explicitly state that 
Syrian   Christians’   overwhelming   desire   is   the   France’s   conquest   of   Syria.   This  
appeal led to a deep disappointment among Muslim members of the Reform 
Committee.  
A group including Salim Ali Salam, Muhtar Beyhum, Sheik Ahmed, and 
Halil Zeyniyye was selected to go to Istanbul in order to negotiate the congressional 
resolutions with the Ottoman government and the government promised 
implementing all the articles that they agreed upon. As he was elected deputy from 
Beirut to the Ottoman parliament on 9th April 1914  Salim  Ali  Salam’s  activities  to  
make progress in the conditions of the Arab provinces gained momentum. The first 
thing he did in the parliament was trying to find a solution for the inefficiency of the 
railway between Beirut and Damascus but World War I interrupted all the works. 
Moreover, he strived to form an Arab Bloc to defend Arab rights in the parliament. 
He even intended to use the lower floor of his house in Istanbul for the meeting of 
the Arab deputies. As he writes in his memoir (2009: 142) the outbreak of the war 
disrupted everything. In the last pre-war session of parliament he gave a long speech 
about endemic problems of public education in the Arab provinces.  
As the Ottoman parliament was closed due to the outbreak of World War I 
the government had to suspend all its plans and projects. In the beginning of the war 
Ottoman government declared neutrality but soon it entered the war on the side of 
Central Powers composed of Germany, Austria-Hungary Empire, and the Kingdom 
of Bulgaria. Some deputies including Salim Ali Salam did not welcome this 
unexpected decision and decided to make a motion in the parliament. Salam then had 
a private talk with Talat Pasha on the factors that led them to come close to 
Germany. In this dialog Talat Pasha informed Salam that, 
Great  powers  many   times  promised   to  protect  our  state’s   territorial   integrity  
but whenever they get an opportunity they took some parts from it. They 
promised Iran to ensure its independence. But indeed they divided it into two: 
Russian Iran and   British   Iran.   For   so   long   Russia’s   ambition   is   to   occupy  
Istanbul,   Britain’s   target   is   Iraq   and   France’s   is   Syria.   There   is   no   way   to  
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deter them from these ambitions. Under these circumstances how can we trust 
their promises? If we stay out of the war, they will share these places inter se 
in the end of the war. Therefore we are obliged to share   Germany’s   fate  
(Selam, 2009: 148). 
Satisfied with the explanation above Salim Ali Salam withdrew the motion. As the 
Ottoman parliament was shut down one and a half month after its opening Salam 
returned to Beirut.  
The outbreak of the war led to a significant development in the Arabian 
Peninsula: appointment of Cemal Pasha who was then Commander of Naval Forces, 
as governor of Syria in the meantime as the Commander of Fourth Army. Cemal 
Pasha came to Syria with the mission of managing an expedition against Egypt. Soon 
after his assignment he ordered the arrest of Nahle al-Mutran Pasha and Esad Haidar 
Bey for cooperating with France against the empire. Salam requested their release 
but Cemal Pasha was quite determined to deal with separatist trends one of which 
Abdulkarim al-Khalil’s   plan   in   collaboration   with   Britain   to   rebel   against   the  
government in summer of 1915.  Abdulkarim informed Salam about this plan and 
Salam’s   response  was:   “O!  Abdulkarim! I recommend you to not get involved in 
these   things.   On   my   own   behalf   I   never   approve   these   activities”.   Soon   a   group  
including Abdulkerim al-Halil and Riza Bey was arrested for planning an insurgence 
against the government and they were trialed at Aley Martial Court.  On the other 
hand, Sharif Hussein and his sons were planning a revolt against the empire in order 
to establish an Arab state in the region. In August 1915 Salam was informed by 
Abdulgani al-Uraysi about it and soon on the basis of the documented evidences 
Salam was detained for questioning about his relationship with Party of 
Decentralization, which began to engage with French officers to form an Arab 
government. Cemal Pasha also asked Salam about his relationships with some of the 
reformists   including   Reşid   Rida,   Refik al-Azm, Riza al-Sulh, Abdulkarim and 
Abdulgani al-Ureysi. When he was in detention nine Arab reformists were executed 
at the martial court. Salim Ali Salam took the executions hard and thought that what 
Cemal Pasha wanted was to get rid of thoughtful Arabs to make them helpless.  
Having  these  feelings  he  decided  to  struggle  against  the  Cemal  Pasha’s  ruthlessness.  
While in Istanbul Salam was planning to call all Arab deputies for exchanging their 
views   on   the  Cemal   Pasha’s  policies, Abdulwahhab al-Inklizi and Abdulhamid al-
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Zahrawi were arrested in Syria. As Salam achieved no result in Istanbul due to the 
limited participation of Arab deputies, he returned to Beirut.  
After all these upsetting events Cemal Pasha was deposed from his 
governorate of Syria in 1918 and for the Commander of Fourth Army German Von 
Sanders  Pasha  replaced  him.  After  Cemal  Pasha’s  deposition  Salam  went  to  Istanbul  
and in cooperation with Amir Shakib Arslan exerted himself to let the exiled Arabs 
return to their homeland. After a long lobbying process in the Ottoman parliament all 
Arabs who were exiled to Anatolia returned to the Arabian Peninsula.  
Based on the information in his memoirs, Salim Ali Salam appears to be 
neither close to the CUP nor to France and Britain, which were then playing 
fundamental role in the Arab provinces. Though he was an advocator of radical 
reforms in the Arabian Peninsula, as he stated in his conversation with the French 
officer Monsieur Margaret, he never appealed to the idea of separating from the 
Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, as aforementioned anecdotes from his memoir 
demonstrate  he  never  supported  Cemal  Pasha’s  practices but he did prefer not to be 
involved in the revolt projects about which his reformist friends informed him. 
However, as the note written by the editor of the memoir (p. 198), asserts Salam took 
part in a Christian-Muslim movement, which advocated Syria’s  being  superadded  to  
Egypt. Moreover, though in the original text Salam did not clarify his position 
towards  the  Arab  Revolt,  according  to  Hallak’s  notes,  as  both  Cemal  Pasha  and  the  
Ottoman  government   kept   being   indifferent   to   the  Arabs’   reform  demands, Salam, 
who was indeed a strong pro-Ottomanist, did not appeal to the separatist ideas but 
supported the 1916 Arab Revolt.  
To conclude, it is safe to say that considering Arabs and the Ottoman Empire 
almost inseparable Salim Ali Salam was interestingly both pro-Ottomanist and Arab 
nationalist who advocated reforms in the Arab provinces to maintain the integrity 
between the empire and the Arabian Peninsula. Thus he can be positioned 
equidistantly to Arab nationalism and Ottomanism at the ideological spectrum.  
 
2.6. Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946) 
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A Druze origin Arab thinker, politician, journalist and poet, Amir Shakib 
Arslan played a significant role in the history of the modern Middle East. Having 
strong connections with the Ottoman rulers including Sultan Abdulhamid II, Enver 
Pasha, Talat Pasha and Cemal Pasha, he was a pro-Ottomanist actor. Furthermore, he 
was quite active in Egyptian Red Crescent sustaining close ties with high-ranking 
German officers between the two World Wars. Covering between 1869 and 1920, 
Shakib  Arslan’s  memoirs,  include  a  wide  range  of  details  about  the  events  that  took  
place in this period. Bearing witness to the late 19th and early 20th century he 
provides readers with profound insight into the crucial years of the Ottoman Empire 
under   the   CUP   rule.   He   was   a   member   of   the   CUP’s   administrative   board,   and  
together   with   some   other   Arabs   including   Abdulaziz   Jawish,   Salih   Şerif   el-Tunisi 
and  Ali  Başhamba,  was  also  a  prominent  member  of  the  Teşkilat-ı  Mahsusa.  
As a dedicated advocator of Ittihad-ı  Uthmani Shakib Arslan sided against the 
Arab nationalist trends, some of which were aiming to separate from the Ottoman 
Empire, considering nationalist   movements   as   the  Western   imperialism’s   tricks   to  
disintegrate the empire. Yet, Arslan fiercely criticized Cemal Pasha on the grounds 
that his violent policies towards Arabs were going to create hatred between Arabs 
and Turks (Arslan, 2009: vi). However, many Arab nationalists until today blame 
him for being a CUP member and betraying Arabs. Shakib Arslan was not 
disenchanted with the idea of Ittihad-i Uthmani until 1923, and thus continued 
working with prominent CUP members in Germany after World War I. But as the 
new Turkish government broke all the links with the Muslim world particularly with 
Arabs he understood that he would no longer able to maintain this ideal. Thus he 
began  to  struggle  for  the  unity  of  Arab  world  against  the  Western  states’  imperialist 
policies   towards   Arabs.   In   order   to   make   Arabs’   voice   heard   he   constantly   wrote  
articles in newspapers and journals leaving approximately twenty books covering 
wide range of issues. Moreover, he supported all the movements in the Muslim world 
against Western imperialism. Due to his political stance he was exiled to Switzerland 
by the French Mandate in Lebanon spending interwar years in Geneva.  
Amir  Shakib  Arslan’s  memoirs  consist  of  six  chapters,  in  the  first  of  which  he  
gave brief information about his early life in Beirut and described social and political 
circumstances in the Ottoman Empire under the reign of Abdulhamid II and the 
CUP. In the following chapters he shared anecdotes about the Turco-Italian War, 
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Balkan  War,  Paris  Arab  Congress,  World  War  I,  Cemal  Pasha’s  ruthless  policies  in  
Syria, famine in the Arab provinces during the World War I, and finally about 
aftermath of the war. Overall, he devoted a large segment of his autobiography to his 
relationship with Cemal Pasha, governor of Syria between 1914 and 1916.  
Shakib Arslan was born in Al Shouifat in Southeast Beirut to an influential 
Druze family. He studied Arabic Language and Literature with Sheikh Abdullah 
Bustani at Maronite Hekma School in Beirut. Then in 1866 he attended the imperial 
school in Beirut where he met with Sheikh Muhammad Abduh who was teaching 
Islamic law, Islamic doctrines and logic. Like Rashid Rida and others Shakib Arslan 
was profoundly influenced by modernist and reformist teachings of both Muhammad 
Abduh and his teacher Jamaladdin Afghani. After the death of his father in 1887 he 
was appointed as governor of Al Shouifat, and remained at this post for two years. In 
1908 he became Deputy Governor of the Shouf region in Lebanon and in 1913 
deputy of Horan in the Ottoman parliament remaining at his post until the end of 
World War I. 
Depicting the situation of the Ottoman Empire in early 20th century Arslan 
accused Sultan  Abdulhamid   II,   who  was   “indeed  merciful   and   generous”   (Arslan,  
2009; 28), of thinking of himself while the situation in Macedonia was getting worse. 
His bad governance was deemed by the public to be the source of all the problems in 
the empire. According to Arslan (2009: 29), even this assertion was correct to some 
extent the truth of the matter was that there were internal and external factors that led 
to troubles for the Ottoman Empire. First of all due to poor education people were 
overwhelmed by ignorance. Furthermore, having desire to form an independent state 
some ethnic and religious communities of the empire were included in activities that 
were   to   disintegrate   the   empire.   On   the   other   hand,   European   states’   ambition   to  
share the Ottoman territories was the primary external factor that caused inextricable 
problems. The empire was carved into numerous pieces but its Muslim population 
believed in the necessity of restoring Kanun-i Esasi which was suspended by 
Abdulhamid II in 1878.  After describing  the  empire’s  situation  during  the  last  years  
of   Abdulhamid’s   administration,   Arslan   explained   the   process   through   which   the  
CUP was formed and came to power. He also put emphasis on different desires of 
the  empire’s  non-Muslim communities. 
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When it comes to the Muslim groups in the empire, they have been bound by 
Islam for centuries but due to the bad governance and external pressure Arabs and 
Albanians, in particular, began to think of separating from the empire. Arslan (2009; 
35) asserted that tension between Arabs and Turks caused by various arguments put 
forward by both sides. Arabs thought that they were lack of the privileges that Turks 
enjoyed. On the other hand Turks asserted that Arabs were exempted from the 
responsibilities that they undertook particularly the military service. As the Ottoman 
government had weakened, the conflict between Arabs and Turks increased.  
Pledging them to form an Arab state in the Arabian Peninsula, Britain even before 
World War I succeeded to induce some Arab youth.  However, as stated by Arslan 
(2009; 36), those who were convinced by the British did not definitely constitute the 
majority of the public in the Arab provinces.  According to him (Arslan, 2009: 36), 
Arab   intellectuals   were   indeed   aware   of   the   Europeans’   plans to share the Arab 
lands.  
The CUP government was not only opposed by the Arab separatists but also 
by those in Istanbul who were against its secularist and nationalist policies. In a short 
period  the  CUP’s  opponents  increased  dramatically  and  attempting to kill prominent 
CUP members the opponents attacked the Ottoman parliament but as most of the 
CUP members escaped from Istanbul they could not achieve their goal. During this 
event   called   “the   31   March   Incident”   Shakib   Arslan’s   cousin   Amir   Muhammad  
Arslan who was deputy of Latakia was killed. Soon after the insurgence, 
commanding both the armies of Edirne and Thessaloniki Mahmud Shawkat Pasha 
came to Istanbul to take revenge. Consequently, the CUP regained the power and the 
first thing it did was to replace  Abdulhamid  II  with  Sultan  Mehmed  Reşad.  As  they  
lost a family member, Arslan family were deeply affected by the 31 March Incident. 
Providing details of the process through which Turco-Italian war broke out 
Arslan (2009; 45) disclosed France, Britain, and  Italy’s  plans  of  sharing  the  Ottoman  
territories.  France  and  Britain  consented  Italy’s  invasion  of  Tripoli  in  return  Italy  let  
them to invade Syria and Palestine. As soon as Italy got an opportunity it attacked 
Tripoli and Shakib Arslan, who thought that there was a close connection between 
the integrity of the empire and the unity of Muslims, rendered full assistance to the 
people of Tripoli. Arslan, together with Enver Pasha stayed in Tripoli for eight 
months, until August 1912. Moreover, he organized Druze volunteers and also 
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actively lobbied for assisting people of Tripoli. Thus he contacted with ex-Khedive 
Abbas Hilmi Pasha and Egyptian Red Crescent. Having the same purpose he also 
intermediated between the Senussi leaders and the Ottoman government.  
 During  Shakib  Arslan’s  visit  to  Egypt,  ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha asked 
him to remain in Egypt. According to the Khedive, as the Ottoman Empire was not 
promising anymore hence, aiming to draw their future, Arabs particularly 
intellectuals and leaders had to be organized. Acknowledging Abbas Hilmi Pasha, 
Rafik al-Azm  told  Arslan   that,  “We  are  not   in   the  position  of  striving   for  Tripoli’s  
deserts”.  Shakib  Arslan’s  response  was  “Those  who  cannot  protect  Tripoli’s  deserts,  
can never protect Damascus’s  gardens”  (Arslan,  2009: 48).  In his memoir (Arslan, 
2009;;  45)  he  says  that  “I  said  many  times  that  the  Turco-Italian War will lead to new 
wars   and   each   of   these   wars   will   be   greater   than   the   previous.”   During   the   war,  
Arslan together with Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemal joined some clashes of arms in 
Derne. In the meantime, aiming to motivate Muslims to assist the empire for the 
Tripoli War, he regularly sent articles to al-Mueyyed newspaper. As reflected in his 
memoir (Arslan, 2009: 48) he thought that consequences of neglecting Tripoli would 
be worse than what Muslims particularly Arabs thought. While Shakib Arslan was in 
Tripoli, Albanians rebelled against the Ottoman government and occupied with the 
insurgency in the Balkans the government made a treaty with Italians and submitted 
Tripoli to them. Shakib Arslan did not give up; he first contacted with the Senussi 
sheiks as well as the Egyptian Khedive and then went to Istanbul where he met with 
the officials to continue supporting Tripoli. But as the empire lacked of power to 
fight with both Italia and four Balkan states at the same time Tripoli was left to 
Italians (Arslan, 2009: 50).  
Similarly, when four Balkan states including Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and 
Montenegro, all motivated by Russia, declared war on the empire and more than 
hundred thousand of Balkan Muslims escaped to Istanbul from the oppression. 
Arslan not only organized aid to the war wearies through the Egyptian Red Crescent 
but also to the Ottoman garrison in Edirne which was occupied by the Balkan states. 
Soon, around two thousand Ottoman soldiers in San Stefano died because of 
epidemic cholera. The empire was disunited and not well prepared for the war. 
According to Shakib Arslan, though the troubles came one after another, it was 
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indeed  the  Ottoman  government’s  inefficiency  that  led  to  the  disastrous  defeat  of  the  
empire in the Balkan War (Arslan, 2009: 54).  
Soon after the war, Shakib Arslan together with several Turk and Arab 
intellectuals founded an organization, al-Cem’iyyetu’l   Khayriyyatu’l   Islamiyya, for 
the purpose of uniting all the communities of the empire under one roof. Arslan 
(2009, 60) claimed that if World War I did not break out they would contribute to the 
Ottoman’s   unity   through   this   organization.   As   Arslan   traveled   to   Egypt,   on   23  
January  1913  protesting   the  government’s  conceding   to  a  demand  by   the  European  
powers that Edirne should be handed over to Bulgaria, a group of CUP members 
entered the Sublime Port while the Cabinet was in session, killed the Minister of 
War,  Nazım  Pasha,  and  forced  the  grand  vizier,  Kamil  Pasha,  to  resign.  With  this  the  
empire began to be governed by Talat, Enver and Cemal Pashas.  
Not long after the Babıali   Baskını, Shakib Arslan traveled from Egypt to 
Palestine and then to Gaza, Jerusalem, Nablus, and finally to Damascus. During his 
visits he tried to solidify the Turkish and Arab unity by bringing counter arguments 
to the separatist ideas among the Arabs. He constantly warned them about the French 
and the British who intended to occupy the Arabian Peninsula. According to Arslan 
(2009, 63) despotic administrations in India, Sudan, Egypt and other places, which 
were colonized either by Britain or France, indeed demonstrated their exact intention. 
In  some  cases  Shakib  Arslan’s  arguments  were  well  received  by  the  Arabs,  in  some  
others he was accused of being a CUP member and making its propaganda. Arslan 
(2009, 63) swears in his memoir that he broke off relations with the CUP before the 
Turco-Italian War. During his visit to Lebanon and Beirut Arslan observed a strong 
anti-government movement and because of his pro-Ottomanist stance he was heavily 
criticized by his friends. In response to them he told that soon they will see days that 
would be darker than tar and then they will yearn for the Turkish administration 
about which they were complaining (Arslan, 2009: 64).  
As he left Beirut, a group of Arabs some of whom were Shakib Arslan’s  
friends such as Salim Ali Salam and Muhtar Beyhum organized the Arab Congress in 
Paris. According to Arslan (2009, 65) while the Ottoman government was striving 
against the Balkan states it was not appropriate to organize a congress in France 
whose aim was to capture Syria. Furthermore, he thought that anything detracting the 
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empire will ultimately detract all Muslims because in the eyes of Europeans all 
Muslims indeed were one nation. Thus, in collaboration with Mardinizade Arif Bey, 
the governor of Damascus, intellectuals, leaders of sects, patriarchs and bishops, he 
telegraphed to the central government declaring that they were not recognizing the 
Congress. As stated by Arslan (2009, 65) many people from all Syrian cities sent 
similar telegrams to Istanbul.  
As stated earlier, after negotiating with deputies of the Arab Congress one of 
whom was Salim Ali Salam, the Ottoman government invited a group constituted by 
Shakib Arslan, Muhammad al-Azm, Abdurrahman al-Yusuf Pasha, Abdul Muhsin 
al-Ustuvani, Amin al-Tarzi, Sheikh Asad al-Shokairi, Muhammad al-Mahzumi 
Pasha, and Dr. Hassan al-Asir in order to discuss the Arab issue and the demands of 
Syrians. During the Istanbul Congress Arab guests pointed out the need of giving 
greater authority to the Arab provinces as well as of putting more emphasis on 
Arabic. They also asked the government to establish a university in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Assigned by the government Shakib Arslan and Abdulaziz Jawish spent 
almost three months in Medina to establish a university (Arslan, 2009: 67). In 
addition to laying foundation of the university he also launched a branch of al-
Cem’iyyetu’l  Hayriyyatu’l  al-Islamiyya in Medina. Surprisingly, the other four Arab 
intellectuals analyzed in this research, mentioned neither the Istanbul Congress nor 
the project of establishing a university in Medina. Nor do they get enough attention 
in the historiography of the modern Middle East, particularly by those influenced by 
Arab nationalism, for these events seem inconclusive due to the secession of Arab 
provinces from the Empire, and thus largely ignored by modern historians. In 1914 
Arslan was elected as a deputy of Horan and selected as the only Arab to the 
commission, of  Kalem-i Umumi, which was functioning as a mediator between the 
parliament and the government. Headed by Talat Pasha, Minister of Interior, the 
commission performed quite well for a few months and the government gradually 
began  to  recover  but  World  War  I  disrupted  the  government’s  projects.   
When the Ottoman government was involved in the war, Shakib Arslan was 
in Beirut and gave speeches to calm the public down. Soon the commander of the 
Damascus   Army   attempted   to   seize   the   arms   of   Mount   Lebanon’s   Christians   but  
Arslan thought that this would cause fear and chaos among the Christians and 
persuaded him not do so. He (Arslan, 2009; 85) continued mediating between the 
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government and the Christians of Lebanon in order to avoid potential conflicts 
during the war. On the same days, aiming to gain information about   the   Arabs’  
connections with the foreigners in the Arab provinces the Ottoman government 
inspected the foreign consulates in the region. As discussed earlier, Cemal Pasha, 
based on the documents seized from the French Consulate exiled and executed some 
Arabs. Arslan indeed opposed seizure of the consulates for the reason that this would 
cause   the   Arabs’   alienation.      However,   he   underscored   the   fact   that   documents  
recovered from the French consulates in Damascus and Beirut disclosed significant 
information for the government (Arslan, 2009: 83).  
When in the early days of World War I Cemal Pasha was appointed as a 
governor of Syria and soon he embarked the first Canal Expedition. Shakib Arslan 
together with a hundred volunteer soldiers joined the expedition which was to no 
avail. On the way back to Beirut Cemal Pasha appreciated Arslan and telling him 
that,  “the  government  will  not  forget  the  services  you  rendered  to  the  state”  (Arslan  
2009; 92). Arslan was on good terms with him until Cemal Pasha appealed to the 
oppressive policies in Syria. As Shakib Arslan stated, almost two thousand Arabs 
were exiled to Anatolia in this period and the government carefully recorded the 
exiled   Arabs’   real   estates.   According   to   the   rumors   this   was   because   of   the  
government’s   plan to give same amount of property in Anatolia to the dislocated 
Arabs and to locate Turk families in place of the exiled Arabs. It was believed that 
the government aimed to break the aristocratic structure of the Arabian Peninsula 
thus it had exiled prominent Arab families (Arslan, 2009: 98).  
Shakib Arslan asserted that the reason behind the large scale expulsion and 
exile  was  Turkey’s  victory in the Dardanelles War (2009, 99).  For him the euphoria 
of victory led the CUP taking hasty decisions such as discharging   the   women’s  
obligation of veiling, making the Meşihat-ı   Islamiyye  a dysfunctional institution by 
taking the Shari’ah court from its supervision and putting under the judiciary. The 
CUP’s   another   impulsive   action  was  killing   the  Arab   spirit   in  Syria and it did this 
through Cemal Pasha who was then quite popular due to his military achievements. 
He attempted to Turkify the Syrian Arabs and eradicate Arab nationalism in the 
region. After beating the great armies in Dardanelles the Ottoman leaders thought 
that they could do everything they wished. Arslan (2009: 99) claimed that apparently 
Cemal Pasha promised them to overcome the Arab spirit in Syria and in return he 
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was allowed to have his druthers. Consequently, he adopted unprecedented policies 
in Syria.  
Shakib Arslan (2009; 99) associated not only the exiles with the Dardanelles 
victory   but   also   the   Cemal   Pasha’s   executions.   According   to   him,   Cemal   Pasha  
would never be able to execute Arabs if Turkey did not pull of a victory in the 
Dardanelles War.  Cemal  Pasha’s  despotism  would  be  justifiable  if  the  circumstances  
of the war were considered but his practices were not correct as far as politics was 
concerned. Giving full authority to Cemal Pasha in the region as well as trying of 
political offenders by court-martial was by no means a good politics to follow.  For 
Arslan,   Cemal   Pasha’s   ruthless   policy  was   one   of   the  most   dreadful   disasters   that  
happened to the Muslim world and the Ottoman Empire throughout history. As stated 
by Arslan (2009, 101), the central government was not informed about the 
executions before they were carried out. Nevertheless as they let him have a free 
hand Talat and Enver Pasha were also accountable for what happened in Syria during 
Cemal   Pasha’s   reign   (Arslan,   2009: 101).  Regarding   Cemal   Pasha’s   personality  
Arslan thought that with his ability of making quick and sharp decisions as well as 
his uncompromising and arrogant attitudes he might be a good commander but not a 
good politician.  
Shakib Arslan used every means possible to help the Arab detainees as well 
as   exiled   ones   during   Cemal   Pasha’s   governorate   and   afterwards.   He   not   only  
appealed to him personally but also managed to meet with Enver Pasha during his 
trip to Syria so as to appeal to him for the release of Arab detainees in Aley. But it 
was clear that Enver Pasha was unable to help. This was because, to be secured from 
the evils of the Turanist group, which supported Cemal Pasha, Enver and Talat were 
tolerating   Cemal’s   way   of   handling things in Syria. Furthermore, as the Ottoman 
army commanded by Cemal Pasha defeated the British army twice in Gaza during 
the  war,  the  central  government  became  more  tolerant  and  simply  sent  Midhat  Şükrü  
Bleda to negotiate with him for the exiled Arabs to return to their homeland. As 
another step the government sent a committee to Syria to propitiate the Syrian Arabs 
in  1916.  Thus,  Shakib  Arslan’s  efforts  remained   inconclusive  until   the  discharge  of  
Cemal Pasha from Syrian governorate toward the end of World War I. As the 
Ottoman army was defeated by the British in Palestine in 1917, Cemal Pasha lost his 
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popularity and resigned from his post both as Commander of 4th Army and Syrian 
governor.  
In the same year Arslan who was still deputy of Horan went to Istanbul and 
together with some other Arab deputies including Salim Ali Salam lobbied in the 
Ottoman Parliament for the exiled Arabs in Anatolia who were then put on regular 
salary by the Ottoman government (Arslan, 2009: 125). In the summer of 1917 he 
visited Germany at the request of Enver Pasha, where he met with high-ranking 
officials in the ministry of foreign affairs. In Munich he gave a lecture on the famine 
in Syria explaining how the Allies blocked all the sea roads going to Syria, which 
was not self-sustained in terms of food production (Arslan, 2009: 146). In his speech, 
he  referred  to  the  Ottoman  government’s  appeals  for  humanitarian  aid  in  the  wake  of  
the famine in Syria. Arslan and Enver Pasha sent a letter to the Pope stating that if 
the Papacy managed to bring food and aid materials to Syria, the Ottoman 
government would pay for it and if the Papacy had a suspicion that the Ottoman 
government using up the aid materials, it would give a pledge not to touch  the aid. 
But they could not get any response from the Pope. Moreover, the food aid sent by 
Syrians in America failed to reach the Syrians as the British forces laid siege to 
Beirut and the Jew American consul in Beirut alleged poor excuses.  Based on these 
evidences, Shakib Arslan (2009, 148) asserted in his memoirs that, it was indeed the 
Entente Powers that caused the death of tens of thousands of Syrians during the 
famine.  Furthermore, emphasizing the pathetic situation of the Syrians Arslan sent a 
report to the Pope demanding food aid for the Syrians at least for the Christians in 
Syria and Lebanon.  
When the war ended, Shakib Arslan was in Germany and soon Talat, Enver, 
and Cemal Pashas left the empire and came to there.  In a few years of time they all 
were assassinated by Armenian assasins. Arslan only referred to Enver Pasha as 
martyr among them. Shakib Arslan, still believing in the Ittihad-ı  Uthmani, was in 
touch with both Talat and Enver Pashas before they were assassinated.  
Arslan did not mention the Arab Revolt until the very end of his memoir. He 
referred  to  it  in  examining  the  consequences  of  the  Cemal  Pasha’s  practices.  He  did  
not agree with the argument that if Cemal Pasha did not carry out the executions, 
Sharif Hussein would not rebel against the Ottoman government. He opposed this 
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argument because he asserted that Sharif Hussein had connection with the British 
even before the CUP rule and his idea of revolting against the government could be 
traced  back  to  the  Sultan  Abdulhamid’s  period  and  the  sultan  was  aware  of  it.  Thus, 
as the CUP members replaced Sharif Ali, then Amir of Makka, with Sharif Hussein 
in  1908,  Sultan  Abdulhamid  said  that,  “I  know  this  man  very  well  and  I  do  not  accept  
responsibility for what   he   will   do”   (Arslan,   2009: 192).   Arslan’s   memoirs   also  
contain information  on,  Sharif  Hussein’s  negotiations  with  the  British  before  World  
War I.  
Referring to Cemal Pasha Arslan (2009, 194) asserted that even if Cemal 
Pasha’s  oppression  did  not  lead  to  the  Arab  Revolt,  it  gave  an  excuse  to  those  who  
preferred European administration to the Ottoman one in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Furthermore, Arslan (2009, 194) admitted that among Arabs there were definitely 
some   who   disregarded   Muslim   unity   and   considered   the   British’s   victory   as   the  
victory of Arabs. However, he disapproved   the  Cemal  Pasha’s   justifications  for  his  
policies arguing that, those who were purely Turkish nationalists like Cemal Pasha 
had no right to punish the Arab nationalists. Overall, during his life time Shakib 
Arslan played multilateral role in attempting to unite the Muslims to stand against 
foreign  colonialism.  Associating  the  Muslims’  unity  with  the  Ottoman  Empire  he,  in  
spite of the aforementioned critiques he made, supported the empire until the very 
end of it thus he is positioned on the pro-Ottomanist edge of the spectrum. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ANALYZING the DISCURSIVE TRANSFORMATION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In this part of the research I compare the five Arab intellectuals and their 
memoirs in terms of the themes they covered and issues they prioritized.  As the 
description   in   the   previous   chapter   demonstrates,   the   Arab   intellectuals’   attitudes  
were not uniform towards Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula between 1908 and 
1918.  Even though these intellectuals, namely Izzat Darwaza, Muhammad Kurd Ali, 
Rashid Rida, Salim Ali Salam, and Amir Shakib Arslan, wrote about the same period 
in their memoirs, they not only concentrated on the different events but also 
evaluated the same issue differently. However, there are certain points upon which 
all of them agreed as well.  
As   it   was   pointed   out   earlier,   discrepancies   among   the   Arab   intellectuals’  
attitudes may be explained with reference to the differences in the ideologies and the 
positions they held and the perspectives they adopted, the regional contexts they 
grew up, the social networks they engaged in, as well as the age group they 
belonged. Holding a political position such as being representative in the Ottoman 
parliament (Dawn, 1998) or having close relationships with Ottoman elites plays a 
significant role in articulation of their ideological positions. According to Ernest 
Dawn, in the case of Syria Arabs who benefitted from the Ottoman Empire tended to 
be pro-Ottomanist whereas those who did not were more likely to be nationalist. 
Moreover, he indicated that Arab nationalists more likely to be younger than pro-
Ottomanists (Dawn, 1998; 178). Accordingly, the youngest among the five Arab 
intellectuals that I analyze in this research, is Izzat Darwaza (1888-1984) who could 
not get an opportunity to acquire a bureaucratic or political position. He was 
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positioned on the Arab nationalist edge of the ideological spectrum that I illustrated 
to classify the Arab intellectuals. 
The  main  point  on  which  all   the  Arab   intellectuals  agreed   is  Cemal  Pasha’s  
policies towards the Arabs. Although they all had different views on the CUP, 
without any exceptions all the Arab intellectuals were severely critical of Cemal 
Pasha’s   policies,  which  were   deemed   to   be   ruthless.   Shakib  Arslan   and   Salim  Ali  
Salam, in particular, who had close connections with the Ottoman elites, tried every 
possible means to prevent the exiles and executions. With the exception of Shakib 
Arslan all the intellectuals many times underscored the need of substantial reforms 
for the improvement of the Arab provinces. Though he was very much concerned 
about   the  empire’s  unity  and  progress,  Arslan  did  not  use   the   term  “reform”   in  his  
memoirs. Moreover, in general they all stood against the foreign (referring to France 
and Britain) administrations in the Arabian Peninsula. Even, Darwaza and Arslan, 
due to their opposition to the mandate regimes, had to live for a period outside the 
Arabian Peninsula after 1918. Among the five only Rashid Rida appreciated the 
European states particularly Britain on all occasions and referred to British soldiers 
as  kind  (Rıza,  2007: 253), the British people as perfectly decent   (Rıza,  2007: 190), 
and Britain as the best political  model  to  follow  (Rıza,  2007: 125).  
Furthermore, as it was described earlier in this chapter they all severely 
criticized  the  CUP’s  nationalist  policies  towards  the  Arabs.  Except  Salim  Ali  Salam  
and Rashid Rida, all   the   intellectuals   referred   to   the  CUP’s   so-called Turkification 
policies towards the Arabs as well. Among the three Arslan argued that Cemal 
Pasha’s  exiles  and  executions  were  part  of  the  CUP’s  Turkification project (Arslan, 
2009: 119). Moreover, regarding the use of Turkish in public domains Darwaza 
(2007, 186) emphasized that before the reinstitution of Kanun-i Esasi in 1908, all the 
primary school books were published in Turkish for all communities in the empire. 
According to Darwaza unlike the CUP administration the government did not aim to 
Turkify the other nationalities by imposing Turkish as a medium language. In 
contrast, with the proclamation of Kanun-i Esasi in 1908, Turkish nationalism and 
Turanism rapidly flourished among the Ottoman leaders, according to whom other 
groups needed to be assimilated.  
Regarding the issue of Turkification  Hasan  Kayalı  argues that,  
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The question of Turkification was an extension of the centralization-
decentralization debate and became an issue when Hamidian autocracy 
crumbled and the social groups dominating the revolutionary government 
prepared to establish a centralized government buttressed by a national 
economy.……Those  Arabs  who   found   the   centralizing   policies   of   the  CUP  
unpalatable for political, socioeconomic, or cultural reasons increasingly 
identified with the decentralist camp and found in the charges of Turkification 
a weapon to fight Unionist centralization and to produce a shift in the pro-
CUP Arab public opinion (Kayalı,  1998:  126). 
 
Contrary to what Kayalı  asserted,  in  the  account  of  both  Hanioğlu  and  Zürcher,  who  
indeed did not refer to the term of Turkification, Young Turks were committed to 
Turkish  nationalism  even  before  1908  (Zürcher  1992,  Hanioğlu,  2008).   
Another common feature they all shared is that in the memoirs none of the 
intellectuals referred to the concept of the (failed) Arab caliphate, which was a hotly 
debated issue in the first quarter of the 20th century among the Arabs. As explained in 
Chapter 1, Arab intellectuals such as Kawakibi, Rashid Rida, and Afghani revived 
the notion of the Arab caliphate not only as a means for the Arabs to get organized 
politically but also as an inherently religious and historical right. Since the late 1870s 
both British officials and press had been propagating   the   “illegitimacy”   of   the  
Ottoman Caliphate. This was one of the principles that shaped the British foreign 
policy   towards   the   ‘Eastern   Question   (Ardıç,   2012).   Moreover,   as   the   Treaty   of  
Constantinople and Sykes-Picot Agreement demonstrate, for Britain, France and 
Russia formation of an Arab Caliphate under their control was necessary to abolish 
the   Ottoman   Caliphate   (Ardıç, 2012). It is striking how none of the five Arab 
intellectuals overlooked such an important issue. This silence might be due to the 
fact that successive attempts to create an Arab Caliphate by Sharif Hussein and 
others (such as King Fuad of Egypt) all failed and consequently strengthened 
European rule (instead of Arabs) in the Middle East while helping weaken the 
Ottoman Empire.  Izzat Darwaza (2007, 424) once referred to the Ottoman Caliphate 
as  “so-called”.  Furthermore,  except  Salim  Ali  Salam  and  Shakib  Arslan  none  of  them  
recalled the Ottoman Caliph with reverence.   
As emphasized earlier, the five Arab intellectuals concentrated on different 
issues in their memoirs. For instance, among the five only Shakib Arslan stressed the 
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significance of the issue of famine. Arslan (2009, 147-152) allocated seven pages of 
his memoirs to explain its causes. In 1917 he gave a lecture to the high-ranking 
German officers on the famine in Syria and Lebanon. He strongly argued that the 
major factor that led to it was the Allies blocking of all the coasts of Syria during the 
Great War. Interestingly, the other four did not pay much attention to it.  While 
Salam did not even mention of it in their memories, Rashid Rida, during his sermon 
in  Mina,  claimed  that  as  the  CUP’s  armies  were  located  in  the  Hejaz  the  Allies  had  to  
subdue the coasts, which led to the destitution of the people   in   the   region   (Rıza, 
2007: 327). In this regard standing exact opposite of Arslan, Rashid Rida blamed the 
CUP rather than the Allies who blocked the coasts to prevent Syrians receive the 
humanitarian aid.  Similarly, Darwaza put the blame on Camal Pasha and claimed 
that Cemal Pasha blockaded Lebanon, which was mostly populated by Christians, 
and prevented them to get food from outside. Consequently, Christians and Muslims 
in Lebanon had faced starvation for two years (Derveze, 2007: 401). In contrast, 
Kurd Ali (2006, 246) stated, in his memoirs, that as Lebanon began to suffer from 
lack of food during World War I Cemal Pasha provided sufficient amount of wheat 
to Lebanese. Some archbishops together with prominent religious (Christian) 
functionaries held half of the wheat for their own account and sold it and they mixed 
the remaining half with soil to distribute. The poor who consumed the wheat mixed 
with soil perished. Even though the Maronite Patriarch was aware of the whole 
process, Christians spread the rumor that Cemal Pasha intentionally let Christians die 
of starvation. Kurd Ali also underlined that the Patriarch, which owned one fourth of 
all residential properties in Lebanon, could help Christian community but it did not. 
These   two  contrasting  attitudes  and  Salam’s  silence on famine are an indication of 
how  ideological  positions  shape  the  intellectuals’  reading  of  recent  history.     
The five intellectuals had also different views on Sultan Abdulhamid II. 
Interestingly, those who are positioned on the pro-Ottoman edge of the spectrum did 
not   have   a   positive   view   on   Abdulhamid’s   reign.   Arslan   depicted   not   only   the  
unfavorable  conditions  under  the  Hamidian  rule  but  also  the  Sultan’s  generosity  and  
kindness towards people (Arslan, 208: 28). Salim Ali Salam as the second most pro-
Ottomanist   after   Shakib   Arslan   among   the   five,   presented   Abdulhamid’s  
administration as corrupt (Selam, 2009: 81, 164). In contrast, Izzat Darwaza, who 
had a strong nationalist discourse, tempted to regard Abdulhamid II neutrally. He 
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even appreciated both his policies towards the European powers (Derveze, 2007: 
171) and his efforts to prevent a Jewish settlement in Palestine (Derveze, 2007: 273). 
Likewise, anti-CUP Kurd Ali did not say anything negative about the sultan in his 
memories.   This   differentiation   implies   that   their   view   of   the   “Ottoman   rule”   was  
heavily conditioned by their experiences and views of the CUP administrations 
during 1908-1918.  
  By the same token, these intellectuals differed in how they saw the CUP. 
Arslan, the most pro-Ottomanist among the five, had close ties with the CUP 
leadership and even was a member of the Teşkilat-ı  Mahsusa, the secret organization 
directly attached to the CUP. Even though he was quite critical of the CUP due to 
Cemal  Pasha’s  oppressive  policies   in   the  Arab  Provinces,  Arslan,   in  general,  had  a  
positive view of the former. Unlike Arslan, Darwaza was always critical about the 
CUP in spite of the fact that he affiliated to its Nablus branch soon after it came to 
power (Derveze, 2007: 244).  On the other hand, Rashid Rida initially supported the 
CUP and even hoping to establish his dream project, Islamic Institute, in the imperial 
capital, he paid a visit to Istanbul after the 1908 Revolution. As he was not satisfied 
with its policies he soon lost his faith in the CUP administration and finally in 
collaboration with Sharif Hussein he totally turned against it. Having a relatively 
moderate position, Salim Ali Salam and Kurd Ali had hopes in the CUP but the 
pressure exerted by it gradually alienated them. Kurd Ali particularly had hard times 
with the CUP due to his critiques in al-Muqtabas newspaper towards it.   
Therefore, there is also a discrepancy among the Arab intellectuals in their 
views of the Ottoman Empire in general. For Shakib Arslan Muslims could only be 
united under the Ottoman rule thus he persistently pinned his hopes on the empire 
until mid-1920s. According to Arslan, survival of the empire was the only way to 
stand against the European colonialism in the Muslim world. Hence, he supported 
the empire through every possible means. Similarly, politician and bureaucrat Salim 
Ali Salam was also deeply bound up with the Ottoman Empire thus he struggled for 
bringing structural reforms particularly administrative decentralization across the 
Arabian Peninsula rather than allying with the foreign powers to separate from the 
empire.   Thus,   Salam’s   Arab   nationalist   sentiments   did   not   hinder   him   being   pro-
Ottomanist. On the other hand, considering the possibility of more than one caliph at 
the same time, Darwaza (2007, 425) justified to collaborate with the opponent groups 
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such as Britain against the Ottoman Empire so that the Arabs could gain their 
independence. Darwaza prioritized the Arab rights over everything else and thus took 
part in separatist organizations such as al-Fatat to   struggle   against   the   CUP’s  
nationalist practices in the Arab provinces. Adopting a kind of cultural nationalism, 
Kurd Ali thought that the Ottoman Empire had assimilated the Arabs for centuries 
therefore he strained for the revival of Arabic as the dominant language in the region. 
Even though he wished that Arabs would have an independent state in the region he 
was not involved   in   organizations   championing   the   Arabs’   separation   from   the  
empire. On the other hand, Rashid Rida, once declared his loyalty to Sultan 
Abdulhamid II and then to the CUP, did not openly argued against the Ottoman 
authority   until   Sharif   Hussein’s   revolt in 1916. Though, appreciating the previous 
Ottoman  sultans  in  his  sermon  in  Mina  Rashid  Rida  justified  the  Sharif’s  rebellion  on  
the grounds that the CUP was incompetent and secularist, as well as nationalist. It 
was indeed the CUP administration that was fiercely criticized by the Arab 
intellectuals rather than the Ottoman Empire in general.  
When  it  comes  to  the  1916  Arab  Revolt  that  supposedly  led  to  the  Peninsula’s  
independence, the Arab intellectuals also adopted different attitudes. Standing 
against it, Arslan devoted the issue only one and a half page of his 198 page of 
memoirs. In contrast, Rida and Darwaza fully supported the revolt putting forward 
various   factors   to   justify   the  Sharif’s   rebellion  against   the  empire.  Although  Salam  
did not openly support the revolt in his memoirs, its editor Hassan Ali Hallak argues 
(Selam, 2009: 198) that he lent his support to the Arab Revolt. On the other hand, 
Muhammad Kurd Ali, who indeed had a desire of having an independent Arab state 
in the region, did not reflect himself as a supportive of the revolt.  
Furthermore, out of the five intellectuals only Shakib Arslan was against the 
1913 Paris Arab Congress. He together with many other prominent Syrians even 
declared that they did not recognize the congress and attended instead the alternative, 
pro-Ottoman congress held in Istanbul. Furthermore, Arslan also attributed great 
importance to the Tripolitan War, thus he not only organized volunteers from 
Lebanon to fight against Italians in Tripoli but also spent eight months in Derne. 
Salam, Darwaza, and Rida also devoted parts of their memoirs to the Tripolitian 
War.  On   the   other   hand,   it   is   hard   to   find   any   reference   to   this  war   in  Kurd  Ali’s  
memories which mainly focused on the press and cultural issues.  
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Overall, the five intellectuals put an emphasis on specific issues implicitly or 
explicitly   considered particular events as turning points in the relationships between 
Arabs and the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1918. According to Shakib Arslan, 
for instance the  Tripolitian War, Balkan War, and the First World War, which broke 
out one after another, were to be deemed as milestones in the determination of the 
Arabs’  attitudes  towards  the  empire.  Moreover,  Cemal  Pasha’s  policies  increased  the  
Arabs’  hatred  of  Turks.  Arslan  also   referred   to  France’s  and  Britain’s  ambitions   to  
occupy the Arabian Peninsula as well as their tendencies to construct plots against 
the empire. On the other hand, Darwaza, the only intellectual among the five to use 
the  terms  of  “Arab  movement”  and  “Arab  rights”  in  his  memories,  considered  both  
the   Great   War   and   the   Sharif’s   revolt   as   the   milestones   for   the   Arab   movement.  
Unlike the previous two, Kurd Ali did not specify any watershed event for the 
relationships of Arabs and Turks in the first quarter of the 20th century but he 
persistently   referred   to   the   CUP’s   and   Cemal   Pasha’s   nationalist   and   oppressive  
attitudes particularly in terms of freedom of speech as a factor that increased the 
Arabs’  alienation  from  Turks.  On  the  other  hand,  according to Salim Ali Salam, the 
most important factor that led Arabs to look for alternative future projects by 
excluding   the   empire   was   the   Ottoman   government’s   unreliability   as   well   as  
reluctance to carry out structural reforms due to overwhelmed political instability 
during the CUP rule. Like the other Arab intellectuals, he also called attention to the 
Cemal   Pasha’s   exiles   and   executions.  As  Arslan   did,   Salam   too   stressed   upon   the  
secret plans of the foreign powers, in collaboration with Syrian Christians, to capture 
the political power in the Arabian Peninsula. Finally, Rashid Rida, based on the 
observations during his trip to   Istanbul,   remarked   the  CUP’s   political   incapability.  
Furthermore,   aiming   to   justify   the   Arab   Revolt   he   severely   criticized   the   CUP’s 
policies. It can be said that he took World War I and the Arab Revolt as watershed 
though he did not specify it in his travel notes I examine in my thesis.  
As the analysis of the memoirs in the previous chapter revealed, each of the 
five Arab intellectuals located in different regions mainly in the Arabian Peninsula 
and exposed to issues that were not similar. Furthermore, having different social 
background, occupation, and ideological standpoint each of them had a different 
experience. Yet they all somehow went through an ideological transformation during 
the  CUP  administration.  The  variables   that   led   to   the  “emergence”,   referring   to   the  
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Foucaultian concept, of Arab nationalism as a viable alternative to Ottomanism, 
which increasingly became obsolete, for the Arab intellectuals were varied. Thus, it 
is difficult to identify a specific threshold, utilizing the Foucaultian concept, after 
which they all shifted their postures. Rather, as the above comparison of the 
discourses demonstrates each of the five was deeply influenced by different 
developments.  However,   based   on   the   analysis   of   the   five  Arab   intellectuals’   own  
evaluations, it is safe to say that there were four major historical turning points 
between  1908  and  1918  in  determining  the  Arab  intellectuals’  attitudes  towards  the  
Ottoman  rule  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula.  The  first  was  the  transformation  of  the  CUP’s  
policies from being relatively libertarian to oppressive in ten years of time; the 
second was the outbreak of World War I and the impact of European colonialism; the 
third  turning  point  was  Cemal  Pasha’s  policies  during  his  governorate  in  Syria;;  last  -
but not least- breaking point was the 1916 Arab Revolt.  
Before examining these four major factors, it is necessary to shed light on a 
few issues to prevent any misconception. We should not forget that national or ethnic 
identities such as Turk and Arab did not exist as we understand them today, Arabness 
and Turkishness were still becoming in this era. Moreover, this study does not make 
any claim on the intellectuals rather it aims to demonstrate the changes took place in 
their ideological discourses. Except Darwaza none of the Arab intellectuals I 
examine in this research identify themselves as Arabist or Arab nationalist in their 
memoirs thus I also prefer not to call them so.  
The period between 1908 and 1918 was right before the beginning of nation-
state building process both in the Arab provinces and Ottoman center, Turkey. As the 
Arab intellectuals I analyze lived in this transition period their political discourses 
were extremely complex and hybrid. Thus, they involved different elements some of 
which were in conflict. On the other hand, the main characteristic of their discourses 
in this period was that they had gradually gained Arab nationalist tones.  
In order to explain the transformation of the attitudes of Arabs towards the 
Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1918, Rashid Khalidi (1991) utilizes the terms 
Ottomanism, Arabism, and Arab nationalism. For him, before 1914 Arabism referred 
to emphasizing Arab elements of identity although it included Islamic, Ottoman, and 
regional loyalties (Khalidi, 1991: 61).   Thus,   he   argues,   “for  most   of   its adherents 
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before 1914, Arabism did not mean Arab separatism, nor did it conflict with loyalty 
to the Ottoman Empire or its religious legitimizing  principle”  (Khalidi,  1991: 62). He 
(1991) also argues that between 1908 and 1914 Arabism referred to some measure of 
local autonomy and administrative decentralization; it also implied opposing the 
CUP’s   nationalist   and   repressive   policies   and   strong   centralization,   as   well   as  
manipulation of all sorts of means for its own  benefit  (see  also  Kayalı,  1998). Same 
goes true for the five Arab intellectuals I analyze in this research, as highlighted 
earlier in this chapter and Chapter 2, whether the Arabs should remain part of the 
empire was not an issue until 1914.  
Even though, Ottomanists and Arabists had ideological differences, which 
basically involved concrete political matters including the issue of centralization 
versus   decentralization,   the   primary   objective   of   the   both  was   “preservation   of   the  
region  from  external  encroachment  under  the  Ottoman  umbrella”  (Khalidi, 1991; 63) 
but they contradicted on how to realize this goal, which led to most of the conflicts 
between them. According to Khalidi, Arabists turned into Arab nationalists after the 
CUP shuttered the Arab opposition in 1913-1914 and World War I broke out 
(Khalidi, 1991: 63).  
Likewise, Ernest Dawn (1998, 167) underscored that the Arab movement, 
which spread through reform associations in Basra and Beirut until 1912-1913, 
reached its peak at 1913 Arab Congress and finally, with World War Arab nationalist 
leaders adopted armed resistance against the empire. The revolt organized by Sharif 
Hussein, who indeed was a conservative Ottomanist (Wilson, 1991), was part of this 
process. Dawn also argues that between 1919 and 1920 82% of the prominent Arab 
nationalists in Syria were not nationalist before 1918 basically because as the 
Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I Arab elite did not have any option 
except Arab nationalism (Dawn, 1998; 176-192).  
 
 
 
3. 2.  The  CUP’s  Policies  and  the  Arab  Intellectuals   
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All of the Arab intellectuals I analyze, like most of the groups in the empire, 
pinned their hopes on the constitution reinstated by Abdulhamid II after the 1908 
Revolution. But, as the CUP gained the power, the government encountered multiple 
internal and external challenges including international complications, plots, revolts, 
and wars. As a reaction to these challenges, the CUP government adopted restricting 
policies after the 31 March Incident, the first internal threat against its authority. 
Soon, it cracked down on the dissidents some of whom were Arabs demanding 
comprehensive reforms in the Arab provinces. According to the narratives in the 
memoirs,   transformation   of   the   CUP’s   policies   from being relatively liberal and 
inclusive into oppressive, centralist, and nationalist led to the alienation of the Arabs 
from the Ottoman government. In the meantime, political instability caused by 
internal political turmoil and heavy defeats in Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars created 
an unreliable image of the empire in the eyes of the Arabs, which led them to search 
for administrative alternatives to the empire. In this part of the thesis I examine the 
process through which the relationship between the CUP government and Arabs 
deteriorated and how   the   five   Arab   intellectuals’   discourses   were   transformed  
accordingly.  
Relationship between the Young Turks and Arabs particularly Arab 
intellectuals   can   be   traced   back   as   early   as   the   late   1870s   (Hanioğlu,   1991).  
Prominent Arab leaders such as Amir Amin Arslan and Khalil Ghanim, founders of 
the Turkish-Syrian Committee, which joined the CUP in 1896, had close ties with the 
Young  Turks  in  early  on  (Hanioğlu,  1991).  As  the  CUP  was  quite  popular  among  the  
personnel of the 5th Army based in Syria, between 1895 and 1897 most of its 
activities concentrated in Syria between 1895 and 1897.  It was supported by the Sufi 
leaders such as Sheikh Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi, civil servants, and notables and 
representatives of the leading families in Syria.  As these groups, who were in 
contact with Armenian organizations and British representatives as well, had 
revolutionary plans, the Palace took their activities in Syria seriously. Consequently, 
the  CUP’s  largest   local  organization  was dismantled but it was not totally uprooted 
from   the   region   (Hanioğlu,   1991).   Thus,   the   CUP   was   not   alien   to   the   Arab  
intellectuals except for Darwaza who was around 12 year old living in Nablus when 
the CUP was popular in Syria. 
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After a decade championing   “Liberty,   Equality,   Fraternity   and   Justice”   the  
Young Turks, whose primary objective was to maintain the integrity of the empire 
(Zürcher,   1992;; Zeine, 1966), overthrew the Hamidian administration in 1908. 
Celebrating   the   sultan’s   reinstatement   of   the   constitution, people including Arabs 
participated   in  demonstration   in   the  empire’s   cities.  The   ten   years  of   the  CUP  rule  
can be divided into three major phases: 1908-1909, 1909-1913, and 1913-1918 
(Karpat, 2012). In these three phases the CUP gradually hardened its measures to 
defend the empire in the face of internal and external threats and consequently 
turning into authoritarian, centralist and nationalist.  
In the first stage, the CUP decided not to take over the government but to 
influence it behind the scene. The new government introduced a program of wide 
range of individual rights guaranteeing equality and justice for all Ottomans 
regardless of religion and ethnicity. Consequently, numerous political parties, ethnic-
based cultural and political clubs as well as newspapers and periodicals blossomed 
(Shaw,   1977),   but   soon   the  CUP’s   vision   of  Ottoman  unity   of  Ottoman   came   into  
conflict with the propagandas of these organizations.  
The first external blow to the constitutional government came from Austria, 
which annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, then Bulgaria proclaiming its independence, 
and finally Greece annexing Crete in 1908-1909. As the territories were rapidly lost, 
the old divisions and conflicts replaced the euphoria and hope.  The Muslim citizens, 
who presumed that Constitution would prevent the European intervention, turned to 
the   sultan   again.   On   the   other   hand,   “the   minority   nationalists   saw   in   the  
government’s  anguish  at  the  loss  of  these  territories  a  denial  of  their  own  hopes  for  
autonomy or even independence”   (Shaw,   1977: 277). Following the order of the 
government the Arab provinces boycotted the Austrian goods (Derveze, 2007).1 
In November-December 1908 the first (and last) fair elections of this period 
were held and resulting in a contention between the ethnonational communities and 
the  CUP  over   the  method  of   representation   (Hanioğlu,  2008).  The  CUP  comprised  
the majority in the first Chamber of Deputies in which the Turks gained 147 seats, 
                                                          
1 Rashid Rida, during his sermon in Mina after the 1916 Arab Revolt, would interestingly 
claim that the empire lost Bosnia-Herzegovina because the CUP cooperated with Austria.  
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while 60 seats won by the Arabs, 27 by Albanians, 26 by Greeks, 14 by Armenians, 
10   by   Slavs,   and   4   by   Jews   (Shaw,   1977;;   278).   Regarding   the   Arab   deputies’  
attitudes   in   the   parliament   Kayalı   claims   that   they   did   not   raise   any   issues  
particularly related to the Arab provinces rather they were quite concerned about the 
empire   in   general   (Kayalı,   1998).   Indeed,   Arab   deputies’   speeches   on   Jewish  
settlement  in  Palestine  (Kayalı;;  1998)  as  well  as  Salim  Ali  Salam’s  long  speech  on  
the inefficiency of education in the empire given in 1914 (Selam, 2009) support this 
argument.  
By 1909 the number of CUP branches multiplied from 83 to 360, while 
membership increased approximately from 2,250 to 850,000 across the empire 
(Hanioğlu,  2008: 160). Izzat Darwaza indicated in his memories that CUP branches 
were launched even in countryside such as Nablus. Apparently, there was a 
remarkable appeal to the CUP among the people from all walks of life (Derveze, 
2007). All of the five Arab intellectuals had hopes from the 1908 revolution thus 
Darwaza  affiliated  to  the  CUP’s  Nablus  branch  while  Kurd  Ali  returned  to  Syria  and  
began to publish the first daily newspaper in Damascus which severely criticized the 
new  government’s  practices  as  being  incompatible  with the Kanun-i Esasi. Similarly, 
hoping to realize his dream of ıslah project in Istanbul, Rashid Rida took trips to 
Syria and Istanbul and propagated the CUP policies in his journal al-Manar. Salim 
Ali Salam and Shakib Arslan too saw the revolution as the beginning of a new phase, 
which would improve the conditions both in the center and the periphery. For 
instance, calling the CUP leaders the best ever in the Ottoman politics, Salam 
published an open letter in the Ittihad-i Uthmani journal on December 22, 1912, in 
which he underscored the necessity of undertaking radical reforms in the Arab 
provinces if the central government wanted to maintain the integrity of the empire 
(Selam, 2009: 97). Likewise, influenced by the 1908 Revolution, Arslan and a group 
of eighty prominent leaders of Mount Lebanon representing all sects and groups 
gathered and demonstrated pressuring on Yusuf Franko Pasha, the governor, to 
declare Constitutionalism in Mount Lebanon, which was a semi-autonomous 
governorate in the empire (Arslan, 2009). 
 Having little chance to succeed the new regime got easily shattered soon after 
the elections as the CUP began to be criticized by almost all groups who pinned hope 
on the revolution to realize their ambitions. While liberals were complaining of its 
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heavy-handedness, bureaucrats had plans to refurbish the Sublime Porte. On the 
other   hand,   nationalist   and   protonationalist   societies   disliked   the   CUP’s   narrow  
understanding of Ottomanism while Islamists were disappointed with the secularist 
tendencies of the government. In the meantime, increased centralization and 
withdrawal of the privileges given by the old regime caused the frustration of some 
local groups including the Arabs. The old elites including the Armenian Amira class, 
the Kurdish, Albanian, and Arab notables had been given imperial privileges by 
Abdulhamid II in return for their loyalty to the empire. The CUP regime abolished 
the privileges of not only these groups but also the religious establishments. 
Supporting  Hanioğlu’s  argument,  Rashid Rida (2007) underscored in his memories 
that a conflict emerged in Syria between the CUP and the Arab elites who could not 
gain immediate rewards in the new regime. Furthermore as  Hanioğlu  observes,   
The new elites empowered by the installation of a parliamentary system in a 
multinational empire were, for the most part, secular nationalists. It was 
mostly Turkish members of the CUP who rose to positions of prominence in 
the army and bureaucracy, while non-Turkish nationalists came to the fore as 
parliamentary deputies or regional leaders of separatist movements 
(Hanioğlu,  2008: 200).  
The second phase of the CUP administration began with the 31 March 
Incident,   which   was   said   to   be   organized   by   the   CUP’s   opponents   demanding  
restoration of the sultan-caliph’s   authority. As a response to the incident the CUP 
leaders cracked dawn on the opposing groups and imposing a series of restraining 
measures   to   curb   the   fundamental   liberties.  As  Ardıç   puts,   “the   suppression   of   the  
counter-revolution not only crushed the opposition, but also initiated the period of 
“Unionism”  (İttihatçılık), characterized by the oligarchic rule of the military and its 
allies  in  the  civil  bureaucracy”  (Ardıç,  2012;;  150).  Furthermore,  the  Unionists  used  
the abovementioned incident to justify their secular  reforms  (Ardıç,  2012).   
As the opposition reemerged around the Freedom and Alliance Party, winning 
a by-election in Istanbul in late 1911, the CUP took strict measures to win the 1912 
“elections   with   the   stick”.   Threatened   a   military   coup   by   the   “Savior   Officers”  
(Halaskar Zabitan) the new CUP government had to resign and was replaced by the 
Great Cabinet, which included representatives from all the opposing factions. The 
opportunity for the CUP to regain the power came with the First Balkan War that 
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resulted  in  the  loss  of  the  empire’s  all  European  territories  in  1912.  On  January  23,  
1913, a group of Unionist officers raided the cabinet meeting, shot the war minister 
and compelled the government to resign. Marking the beginning of the third phase 
the incident,  known  as  the  “Bab-ı  Ali  Coup”,  restored  the  CUP  to  power  until  the  end  
of World War I, led by Unionist trio of Enver Pasha, Talat Pasha, and Cemal Pasha, 
who were behind the scenes until then. As the CUP government began to impose 
strict censorship particularly after 1913, the opposition, which challenged the CUP in 
the early period, was silenced (Shaw, 1977).   
In order to realize the aim of preserving the multinational empire, the CUP 
leaders adopted a policy of inclusiveness. But,  as  Hanioğlu  indicates,  “the  inclusion  
of diverse population groups with little in common within the ranks of a single party 
inevitably led to ideological   incoherence”   (Hanioğlu,   2008: 161). As a vague and 
varying interpretation of Ottomanism was not strong enough to bind all segments of 
the empire, the CUP eventually depended on the army to control the opposition with 
a  strong  belief  that   it  was  the  only  way  of  preserving  the  empire  (Hanioğlu,  2008).  
The CUP did not only become authoritarian but in the meantime centralist and 
nationalist   throughout   its   rule.  The  CUP’s   centralization  and  nationalism  were   two  
major conflicting points on which the Arabs and the Young Turks disagreed. Indeed, 
CUP leaders were aware of the complications of the Arab provinces, but believed 
that “the parliamentary regime would enable fair regional representation in 
government and thus protect regional interests within the framework of a unified 
government whose primary aim was the preservation of a united   Ottoman   state”  
(Kayalı,   1998:   88). Consequently, Arab intellectuals, like Darwaza, were affiliated 
with the FAP, established in November 1911, promoting decentralization. 
Furthermore, the very name of the Party of Decentralization with which some Arab 
intellectuals including Darwaza were affiliated, demonstrates how the issue of 
centralization turned into a serious bone of contention between the CUP and the Arab 
intellectuals.  
As part of the issue of centralization, the use of Arabic as a medium language 
in the public domains in the Arab provinces became a highly politicized matter of 
conflict between them. The enforcement of Ottoman Turkish as the state language in 
all spheres of public life was an essential aspect of the Unionist program of 
centralization   (Kayalı,  1997).  According   to   the  Arab   intellectuals   the   imposition  of  
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Turkish as a state language was a nationalist (Turkist) measure rather than a 
centralist one. Thus, in the 1913 Paris Arab Congress as well as in the Beirut Arab 
Committee the prominent Arab leaders demanded from the Ottoman government 
making Arabic the official language in the Arab provinces. As highlighted earlier in 
this chapter, even though before 1908 all the primary school books were in Turkish, 
the communities including the Arabs did not consider this practice as a means of 
Turkification. The imposition of Ottoman Turkish as the state language began to be 
considered as an aspect of nationalism after the Kanun-i Esasi was reinstated 
(Derveze, 2007). Thus, the intellectuals particularly Kurd Ali (2006: 121) Darwaza 
(2007: 263), and Salam (2009: 127) were very much concerned about the recognition 
of Arabic as the medium language in the public domains particularly in schools, 
courts, and the parliament.  
At this point it is necessary to underscore the fact that policy of centralization 
was not unique to the CUP government. Modernization efforts strengthened the 
centralization and bureaucratization of the Ottoman government which had a strong 
desire of centralization as early as the late 20th century.  As  Hanioğlu  states  “in 1795, 
the government launched a major reorganization of Ottoman provincial 
administration designed to strengthen central control over the periphery...But lacking 
adequate military and fiscal powers of enforcement, that goal remained an 
unattainable   ideal”   (Hanioğlu,   2008: 50). For the government, centralization 
remained to be one of the top issues throughout the 19 century. Sultan Mahmud II (r. 
1808-39) embarked certain institutional changes to maintain integrity of the empire. 
Reforms   known   as   the   Tanzimat   “accelerated   the   processes   of   centralization   and  
Westernization  in  the  empire”  (Kayalı,  1998: 19). Reform-minded group of officials 
of the Tanzimat hoped   that  “centralization would arrest the demands for autonomy 
and bring all imperial possessions under Istanbul’s  direct rule for firmer political and 
economic   control”   (Kayali,   1998: 19). Abdulhamid II maintained the same policy 
and as earlier stated his centralist policies targeted particularly the Arab provinces. 
Except for a brief period after 1908 Revolution the CUP government continued 
adopting centralist policies toward the Arab provinces and this became the very 
contention point between the Ottoman government and Arab intellectuals including 
the ones that I examine in this research. Indeed, this contention is not something 
unique rather such conflicts have become part of nation-building processes in 
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multiethnic societies such as Turkey.  
Complaining   of   the   CUP’s   nationalist   policies   soon   after   the   revolution,  
Darwaza claimed that as the CUP government increasingly became nationalist after 
1909 the Arab rights came to be an issue among the Arab deputies and students in 
Istanbul.  As  they  were  informed  about  the  Unionists’  “Turanist”  attitudes  in  Istanbul,  
Darwaza and his friends in Nablus were disappointed and thus they formed the Arab 
Science Association aiming to improve the education in the region (Derveze, 2007: 
265). Darwaza also underlined that soon after it captured the power in 1908, the CUP 
government removed the governor of Nablus Amin al-Tarzi who was from 
Damascus and appointed a Turkish Unionist (Derveze, 2007: 247). Furthermore, as 
the CUP government lost its tolerance of criticisms, Muhammad Kurd Ali, tired of its 
strict censorship, had serious troubles with the government, which closed his 
newspaper al-Muqtabas on the pretext of simple reasons. Constantly threatened by 
the CUP agents he escaped to Egypt a few times. Later when he gained Cemal 
Pasha’s  trust  as  he  refused  to  cooperate  with  French  foreign  officers,  Kurd  Ali  had  a  
relatively easy time during World War I. But, still both al-Muqtabas and al-Sharq, 
his German-sponsored newspaper in   Syria,   were   rigorously   monitored   (Kürd   Ali,  
2006). As will be explained in following sections, even the pro-Ottomanist Arab 
intellectuals such as Salim Ali Salam and Shakib Arslan were alienated due to Cemal 
Pasha’s  draconian  and  “Turkist”  policies.   
Indeed the Ottoman government attempted to make reforms in the Arab 
provinces as the empire dramatically enshrined and came to be a Turco-Arab state 
after the two Balkan Wars. The Kamil Pasha government advised the general council 
of the provinces to meet and discuss measures for reform but, as underlined by 
Kayalı,   
Such vague encouragement for reform proposals did little to excite the 
proponents of change at a time when the outbreak of the Balkan War and 
swift Ottoman defeats shook the confidence of Arabs in the capability of the 
Ottoman state to survive the military, economic, and political crisis 
aggravated by the war or to protect its Arab-populated provinces against 
external threats. Advances by the armies of the Balkan states toward the 
capital created the fear that the seat of the caliphate  might  fall  (Kayalı,  1998:  
140).  
79 
 
Even though they were disenchanted with the government, the reform committees in 
Beirut and Damascus still issued their projects immediately after Bab-ı  Ali  Coup  to  
the   Mahmud   Şevket Pasha Government. The government change in Istanbul had 
substantial implications for the reform movement and the unfolding events in Syria. 
Instead of giving its assent to the reform projects proposed by the provinces, the new 
government promulgated the Provincial Law in March 1913 that involved 
decentralizing measures. Although these measures were in line with their general 
tendency, the Arab reformists particularly those of Beirut not wanting to compromise 
their specific demands, spread their campaign across  Syria  and  Cairo  (Kayalı  1998, 
cf. Selam 2009). The decision of Hazim Bey, the governor of Beirut, to close the 
Reform Committee triggered strong reactions. People of Beirut protested the decision 
by going on strike and appealing to the central government. On March 20, 1913, 
Mahmud  Şevket  Pasha  sent  a  threatening  telegraph  in  which  he  ordered  those,  who  
“opposed   to   the   law”,   to   be   court-martialed.   The   government’s   uncompromising  
attitude precipitated the protests and many Arab notables, including Salim Ali Salam, 
a member of provincial administrative council, resigned from their positions (Selam, 
2009).  
The closure of the Reform Committee caused a bitter disappointment for the 
Arab intellectuals particularly for Salam and Darwaza. The strong reactions led the 
government to respond to the reform demands, however: in April 1913 Istanbul 
issued an Imperial Decree approved the use of Arabic in law courts as well in schools 
as medium language. Interestingly, except for Rashid Rida (2007: 158), none of the 
five Arab intellectuals mentioned this decree in their memories. This might be 
because of the fact that they were not satisfied with what the government offered in 
Provincial Law, which was planned to be an alternative to the reform projects of the 
Arab provinces. Regarding the Provincial Law, which would have had to settle the 
conflict between the decentralist trend in the Arab provinces and the CUP, Kayalı  
argued that the government indeed took the welfare of the Arab provinces serious 
albeit  “its  efforts  were  haphazard  and   rarely  backed  by   legislation” (Khalidi, 1980: 
204). 
In   addition   to   the   CUP   government’s   autocratic,   centralist,   and   nationalist  
policies  the  empire’s  loss  of  credibility  in  the  eyes  of  the  Arab  intellectuals  played  a  
significant role in transforming  the  Arab  intellectuals’  attitudes  towards  the  Ottoman  
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rule. The empire lost vast territories first in the Tripolitanian War and then Balkan 
Wars after which the Arab periphery all of a sudden came to be the only significant 
extension of the empire outside its Anatolian core. Since the empire was not able to 
defend itself even against the second-tier European states, some Arabs thought that 
independence from it might rescue them   from   perishing   (Kayalı,   1998). As 
emphasized in Chapter 2, according to Salim Ali Salam, the losses in the 
aforementioned wars led some provinces to reconsider their situations. Due to its 
strategic geographical location Beirut was much more concerned about its existence 
and this led some prominent leaders to search for alternatives such as French 
occupation and joining Egypt, which was under Britain (Selam, 2009: 94).  
Moreover, rapid changes in the government and political turmoil caused by 
such events as 31 March Incident and Bab-ı   Ali   Coup   caused   insecurity   and  
confusion among the Arabs particularly the Arab intellectuals. For instance, after the 
1912 election Kamil Pasha, grand vizier of the new government, removed governor 
of Beirut Hazim Bey from the office and reappointed the former governor Edhem 
Bey. But soon after the Bab-ı   Ali   Coup,   Edhem   Bey   was   replaced   with   the   ex-
governor Hazim Bey. People of Beirut were increasingly confused due to these 
changes took place in a short period of time in the local administration and 
consequently becoming much concerned of their future (Selam, 2009).  
Furthermore,  because  they  upset  the  government’s  priorities,  political  turmoil  
and disastrous wars disrupted the ongoing reform projects in the Arab provinces. For 
instance, when he was the mayor of Beirut, Salim Ali Salam insistently telegraphed 
to the central government under Kamil Pasha requesting appropriation for the 
establishment of a sewage system in Beirut. Soon after he got a response, the Bab-ı  
Ali Coup broke out and the Kamil Pasha government was replaced by that of 
Mahmud  Şevket  Pasha  Government. Subsequently, the sewage project together was 
put aside with many other projects. Similarly, when he was deputy of Beirut after the 
1914 elections Salam made all the bureaucratic and technical preparations to solve 
the inefficiency of the railway between Damascus and Beirut but the outbreak of 
World War I interrupted all reform projects (Selam, 2009). Consequently, the 
intellectuals like Salam, who tried to maintain the Ottoman authority in the Arabian 
Peninsula by advocating reforms in the Arab provinces, got tired of the 
administrative discontinuity and the state of deadlock due to the abovementioned 
81 
 
disruptions.  
The   Arab   intellectuals   were   not   frustrated   only   by   the   CUP   government’s  
oppression and their inconclusive reform efforts but also by the government’s  
inconsistency in terms of its attitudes towards the Arabs in general Arab nationalists 
in particular. Shakib Arslan, who in spite of its shortcomings supported the Ottoman 
government until the mid-1920s, complained of its incoherent practices, which 
disappointed him several times. For instance, in 1910 the Ottoman government sent a 
brigade under the command of Sami al-Faruqi  Pasha  against  Havran’s  Druzes.  After  
a brief conflict Pasha announced that anyone who surrendered would be released; 
then some of the prominent Druze leaders surrendered trusting him. The leaders were 
released on bond but soon they were court-martialed and unexpectedly executed by 
command of Sami Pasha disappointing Druze tribes and Shakib Arslan who trusted 
Pasha’s   promise.   The  Ottoman government in general and Pasha in particular lost 
credibility in the eyes of both the local people and Arslan considering the 
unprecedented  event  as  the  government’s  betrayal  to  them  (Arslan,  2009).   
The second issue that disappointed Arslan with the government was the wavy 
relationship between the CUP and Abdulhamid al-Zahrawi (1855-1916), an Arab 
journalist, who was born in Homs and lived in Istanbul and Cairo. As he was bitterly 
critical   of  Abdulhamid’s   regime   as  well   as  Ottoman   caliphate   he   had to escape to 
Egypt where he regularly wrote for al-Mu’ayyad,  al-Jarida, and al-Manar. During 
the CUP administration he was the deputy of Hama for four years and also headed 
the 1913 Arab Congress in Paris. After the congress he was called by the government 
to Istanbul to negotiate the reforms. The Imperial Decree on the use of Arabic in the 
local courts relatively satisfied him; nevertheless, he had to wait for the execution of 
the   other   demands   “swaying   between   ‘despair   and   hope’”   (Tarabein,   1991).   On  
January 4, 1914 Zahrawi together with six other Arabs was appointed as a member of 
the Senate (majlis al-ayan). The reason his acceptance of the post offered by the 
government was his belief that it was better for the Arabs to cooperate with the 
Unionists who had a strong will to regenerate the strength empire. This was because 
the Arabs lacked a well-organized association except for the Decentralization party 
and the Reform Committee of Beirut to defend Arab rights. At this juncture it is 
necessary to take note of the fact that some Arab reformists such as al-Zahrawi 
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hoped regeneration of the strength of the empire as late as 1914. But by the end of 
1913 he left Istanbul for Cairo as it became clear that it was almost impossible to 
reach compromise with the CUP. According to Tarabein, he was disillusioned with 
the government because of its half-hearted attempts at enforcing the reforms. Hence, 
edging toward the idea of separation from the empire he affiliated to the Party of 
Decentralization 1913 onward (Tarabein, 1991). Tarabein also claims that, the 
deadlock between the Arab leaders and the CUP was caused by the CUP because it 
reached an agreement with the Arab leaders to carry out the demands issued in the 
Arab  Congress  yet  “its  evasive  conduct  after  this  agreement was concluded provoked 
suspicion and skepticism among the Arabs  in  general”  (Tarabein,  1991: 108).   
In 1916, Zahrawi was prosecuted, then court-martialed and finally executed 
in   public   on   May   6,   1916.   Finding   the   government’s   policies   incoherent   and 
confusing,   Arslan   argued   that   the   government’s   first   mistake   was   to   nominate  
Zahrawi to the Senate in spite of his pro-Arabist attitudes which was a kind of 
encouragement for the idea of Arab independence. Its second fault was executing 
him and then exiling his father three years after this appointment (Arslan, 2009). The 
radical  changes  in  the  government’s  attitudes  towards  Zahrawi  as  a  prominent  Arab  
politician   and   intellectual   demonstrated   the   CUP’s   inconsistency   and   unsteadiness  
due to the rapidly transformed internal and external circumstances.  
To make an overall evaluation, although it consisted of only ten years, the 
Second Constitutional Period witnessed several political crises, three major wars, and 
constant domestic insurgencies. While all communities including Arabs were 
demanding radical solutions for their complications in the face of nationalism and 
European colonialism, the CUP government, having little experience, was trying to 
maintain its authority both in the center and periphery while also developing 
strategies to deal with the three disastrous wars. As Shakib Arslan indicated in his 
memories, while the government was fighting for survival in the Balkan War, the 
prominent Arab leaders including Salam and Zahrawi, held a congress in France 
demanding reforms from the government. That is to say, there was a great difference 
between the priorities of the CUP government and those of the Arab intellectuals. 
Moreover, while the latter were demanding radical administrative reforms, the 
central government, having a hectic schedule due to the aforementioned reasons and 
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also lacking a desire for real change (Tarabein, 1991), could only be able to come up 
with palliative measures.  
Furthermore, in the Second Constitutional Period the government under the 
CUP  changed  its  way  of  dealing  with  the  empire’s  religious  and  ethnic  communities.  
Unexpectedly, the existing tensions intensified with the relative liberty of the first 
years after the 1908 revolution. The CUP received a strong reaction as it introduced 
an aggressive centralization and withdrew all privileges of non-Turkish Muslim 
groups. Furthermore, as the CUP increasingly accommodated Turkist ideas, 
“Ottoman”   and   “Turkish”   became   increasingly   indistinct.   This   led   non-Turks, 
particularly Arabs, to feel less comfortable and to gradually appeal to alternatives 
proposed by ethno-nationalist   organizations   (Hanioğlu,   2008).   Hanioğlu   also  
underlines   the   fact   that   “this   was   primarily   a   struggle   among   overrepresented  
intelligentsias; it did not yet infect the more established classes within many of the 
non-Turkish   communities”   (Hanioğlu,   2008: 167). The five Arab intellectuals, 
Darwaza, Salam, Kurd Ali, Arslan, and Rida, were among the intelligentsia, who as 
Hanioğlu   indicated,   reacted   to   the   CUP’s   policies. As explained above, having 
different positions and backgrounds each of the five had a different relationship with 
the CUP government and thus each had a different experience between 1908 and 
1918. Yet, all were somehow alienated from the government as it changed its 
policies under the dramatically changing internal and external circumstances.   
 
3.3. The Impact of World War I and European Colonialism  
on the Arab Intellectuals 
 
All of the Arab intellectuals attributed great importance to World War I 
(1914-1918) in their memories, as it became the turning point for the emergence of 
the modern Middle East (Tauber, 1993a). The war involved various significant 
events  and  secret   treaties   that  determined   the  people’s   future   in   the  Arab  provinces  
drawing new borders and creating new states in the former Ottoman territories. In the 
context of the Arabian Peninsula there were three major actors, including the Arab 
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nationalists, the CUP government, and the Allies, all of whom did not only influence 
the course of events but were also influenced by them during the war. The 
developments that took place in the realms of these three actors had a profound 
impact on the Arab intellectuals, some of whom ideologically repositioned as a result 
of the radical power shifts in the region. In this part of the thesis I survey these 
developments   with   an   emphasis   on   several   themes:   Arab   nationalists’   revolt  
attempts,   the   CUP’s   Islamicized   discourse   and   secular   policies,   the   Allies’   secret  
agreements to divide up the empire and their propaganda against it to heighten the 
tension between the Ottoman government and the Arabs, and finally the fatal famine 
caused by number of political, economic and natural factors.  
The outbreak of World War I triggered the rebellious activities against the 
empire in the Arabian Peninsula because many Arab nationalists in the region 
considered the war as an opportunity to form an independent Arab state (Derveze 
2007; Selam   2009).   In   addition   to   Sharif   Hussein’s   revolt,   which   was   the   only  
attempt that resulted in success, there were various attempts to rebel that were 
planned   in   the   Arab   provinces   during   the   war.   According   to   Tauber,   “the   war  
rebellions were planned throughout Syria, Mount Lebanon, and also in Iraq. But their 
common denominator was their failure, either because they failed to reach the stage 
of  execution  at   all  or  because   they  expired  soon  after   they  began”   (Tauber, 1993a: 
244). For instance in the early period of the war some Arab nationalists including 
Abdulgani al-Uraysi (1891-1916), one of the founders of al-Fatat and a Beiruti 
member of the Decentralization Party, collaborated with the French to rebel against 
the empire (Derveze, 2007; Selam, 2009). The French officers in Cairo promised the 
members  of  Decentralization  Party  “20.000 rifles, three warships to cover the rebels, 
and French officers to direct  the  action”  (Tauber,  1993a: 15). 
Al-Uraysi shared his plan with Salim Ali Salam who did not approve any of 
such attempts in the beginning of the war. The circumstances that emerged following 
the  outbreak  of   the  war   changed  Salam’s   ideological   position.  While  his   discourse  
included elements of both Ottomanism and Arabism, he shifted to the latter after 
1915. Following their French partner the British administration in Cairo was also 
involved in negotiations with the Arabs who needed financial and military support to 
revolt against the Ottoman government. For instance, it provided 1,000 Egyptian 
pounds to Rashid Rida and Rafiq al-‘Azm  to  send  emissaries  to  the  Arab  provinces  
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in order to instigate a revolt (Tauber, 1993a). In addition to these revolt attempts, 
Syrian officer Amin Lutfi al-Hafiz, the former president of the Literary Club Abd al-
Karim al-Khalil, and sons of Nuri al-Sha’lan,   the   chief   of   the  Ruwalla   tribes   also  
took part in different revolt attempts in the Levant (Tauber, 1993a). In the meantime, 
as the war continued the secret correspondence between Sharif Hussein and 
MacMahon began and culminated in the 1916 Arab Revolt.  
The war was a watershed not only for the Arabs but also for the CUP 
administration, which signed a secret treaty with Germany after its appeals to ally 
with the Entente Powers were denied. The secret decision that was taken by a small 
group  of  the  CUP  leaders  “signified  the  beginning  of  the  monopolization of political 
power by a narrow circle  within   the  CUP”  (Kayalı,  1998: 204). The Unionists had 
four major expectations to realize during the war. They thought that Germany would 
protect the empire against European and Balkan powers. They also hoped to 
reestablish full control over the autonomous regions such as Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Najd. They even expected to recover the losses caused by both 
Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars. Finally, at the outset of World War I they wanted to 
denounce the foreign capitulations and of all the four only the final hope was 
fulfilled  (Hanioğlu,  2008).   
The war years, which also the last years of the CUP administration as well as 
the  Ottoman  authority   in   the   region,   included  major  changes   in   the  CUP’s  policies  
towards the Arab provinces on account of wide-ranging internal and external factors. 
The compromises made by the government after the widespread public reactions 
against  the  government’s  decision  to  close  the  Beirut  Reform  Committee  failed  due  
to Cemal Pasha’s  strict  policies  in  Syria  particularly  after  the  failed Canal Expedition 
(Kayalı,   1998). As earlier highlighted, the CUP government introduced the 
Provincial Law involving a measure of decentralization. Its attempts to reform the 
provincial administration continued during the war. Moreover, it intensified its 
secularizing   policies   (Zürcher,   2003),   which   disturbed   both   Shakib   Arslan   and  
Rashid  Rida.  Complaining  the  CUP’s  secular  policies  Arslan  told  that  “Dardanelles  
victory caused euphoria among the Unionists. Due to this euphoria they took 
extraordinary  decisions.  Discharging   the  women’s  obligation  of  veiling was one of 
them”   (Arslan,   2009: 118). He was also displeased by their making the Meşihat-ı  
Islamiyye a dysfunctional institution by withdrawing the Shari’ah court from its 
86 
 
authority and locating under the judiciary (Arslan, 2009: 98). As the judicial and 
education systems were increasingly secularized the position of the ulema was 
further   undermined   (Zürcher,   2003;; Ardıç,   2012).   Between   1913   and   1917   radical 
secularizing  changes   took  place   in   the  Civil  Code   (Zürcher,  2003).  Associating   the  
government’s   hasty   decisions  with   the   euphoria   of   the  Dardanelles   victory,  Arslan  
complained of the Unionists secularizing measures. Similarly, for the first time in his 
memories   he,  mainly   because   of  Cemal   Pasha’s   executions   and   exiles,   he   accused  
them of Turkifiying the Arabian Peninsula (Arslan, 2009: 119). Furthermore, as 
quoted in his memories during his sermon in Mina in the end of 1916 Rida used the 
CUP’s   secular practices to justify the 1916 Arab Revolt. Complaining about the 
Unionists’  attitudes  towards  Islam  Rida  stated  that  “they  are  the  ones  who  go  against  
the religion and also undermine the religion (Rıza,  2007: 326). 
On the other hand declaring a holy war against the Allies, it heavily utilized 
Islamic discourse aiming to stir up trouble for the Allies among the colonized 
Muslims and also to gain the loyalty of the Ottoman subjects, the majority of whom 
were   Muslims   (Kayalı,   1997).   Confirming   Hanioğlu’s   argument   that   “the CUP 
tended to appeal to Islam when it was convenient  to  do  so”  (Hanioğlu,  2008: 187) at 
the end of 1913, the Unionists began to promote Islam as the most important aspect 
of its ideology appreciating the fact that their loosely defined Ottomanism was not 
strong   enough   to   maintain   the   empire’s   territorial   integrity.   After   the   Istanbul  
Congress, which was to be an alternative to the Paris Arab Congress, the first thing 
the government did was assigning Shakib Arslan and Abdulaziz Jawish, who worked 
for the Teşkilat-ı   Mahsusa, to propagate in the Arab provinces particularly in the 
Hejaz. They wrote a report after the celebrations of the groundbreaking for an 
Islamic  University   (Kayalı, 1998; Arslan, 2009). As earlier emphasized, except for 
Arslan none of the Arab intellectuals mentioned these efforts of the CUP to refresh 
its authority in the region.  
Reinforcing the official Islamic outlook Enver Pasha took a trip to Syria 
during the war to strengthen the ties  between   the  Arabs  and   the  government   (Kürd  
Ali, 2006: 199).  Kurd  Ali  was  asked  to  write  a  propaganda  book  about  this  trip  (Kürd  
Ali, 2006).  Moreover, the CUP heavily used the press in the Arab provinces 1914 
onward. As Abdulhamid had done before, the government subsidized a number of 
newspapers in Syria including al-Muqtabas, Muhammad   Kurd   Ali’s   daily  
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newspaper,   which   was   closed   several   times   before   the   war   by   the   CUP   (Kayalı, 
1998; Kürd  Ali, 2006).  
As  part  of  the  CUP’s  inclusive  policies  towards  Arabs, in the 1914 elections 
there was a significant increase in representation of the Arab provinces. Salim Ali 
Salam became the deputy of Beirut while Amir Shakib Arslan continued to be the 
deputy   of   Horan.   Amir   ‘Ali   ‘Abd   al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri   was   elected   as   the vice 
president of the new parliament. Prominent reformists such as Shukri al-‘Asali  and  
‘Abd  al-Wahhab al- Inkilizi, who were executed together with al-Zahrawi by Cemal 
Pasha during the war, were appointed as provincial civil inspectors. Furthermore, as 
Kayalı  underscores,  “the  CUP  adopted   in  1914  a  noticeably   lenient  attitude   toward  
its former  Arab  opponents”  (Kayalı,  1998: 199). Kurd Ali was among those Arabists 
who received pardon after 1914. As described in the previous chapter, his loyalty to 
the empire was highly appreciated by Cemal Pasha, thus he had relatively easy time 
during  the  war  supporting  the  CUP’s  Islamic  propaganda.  After  the  outbreak  of   the 
war the CUP government did not renew its efforts to befriend only the Arab 
intellectuals but also Arab tribal sheikhs, particularly Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid. It 
also strengthened its relations with Sharif Hussein maintaining his prerogatives while 
on the other hand trying to increase centralization in the Hijaz through the governor 
of Medina (Kayalı,  1998).  
The last but most important actor was the European powers for whom World 
War I was a great opportunity to expand into the Ottoman Middle East, which was 
the only Muslim region that effectively retained its independence (Fromkin, 2001). 
On the eve of World War I, European nations were looking for new regions to 
expand as they already divided up much of the world including the African 
continent, Western hemisphere, Southeast Asia, and Subcontinent among themselves 
(Fromkin, 2001). Because World War I was directly related to the Ottoman 
territories,   it   dramatically   changed   the   empire’s   destiny   bringing   the   end   of   its  
authority in the Arabian Peninsula, which was the only extension it had outside 
Anatolia, and finally causing its collapse. Though some Arab intellectuals 
particularly Salam and Arslan did not support the idea of joining the war mainly 
because it would cause great losses, they believed that the Ottoman Empire did not 
have many options to maintain its existence as the European powers already made 
agreements dividing up its territories among themselves (Arslan, 2009: 74, 171). 
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While Kurd Ali and Rida did not make any point on the issue, Darwaza, Salam, and 
Arslan agreed upon the fact that the empire had to join on the side of Germany as the 
Allies led by Britain, France, and Russia either attacked or occupied the Ottoman 
frontiers long before the war and they also had longstanding ambitions over the 
Ottoman territories including the Arabian Peninsula. It is striking that, being critical 
of the policies of the empire in general and the CUP government in particular 
towards the Arabs did not hinder the Arab intellectuals, except Rida who deemed 
Britain  “as  the  ‘protector’  of  freedom  in  its  colonies”  (Ryad,  2010: 280) before and 
during the World War I,   recognizing   the  European  powers’   longstanding  ambitions  
over the Ottoman territories. 
During the Britain and France, the two major Entente powers that had been 
present in the region for so long for the purpose of trade and missionary activities 
(Derveze, 2007), did not only render their financial and military support to the revolt 
attempts but also intensified their anti-Ottoman  propaganda  weakening  the  empire’s  
authority among the Arabs. In this period France strengthened its links with those 
who were not satisfied with the existing conditions intensifying its missionary 
activities   in   Syria   (Kayalı,   1998). On the other hand, aiming to inhibit Egyptian 
nationalism, British newspapers published articles to instigate animosity between 
Turks and Arabs pretending to be supportive  of  Arab  unity  (Kayalı,  1998).  
Most importantly, in this period the European powers particularly Britain, 
which  “since  the  late  18th  century  had  been  involved  in  discussions of  the  Caliphate”  
(Ardıç,  2012: 197),   intensively  used  the  notion  of   the  Arab  caliphate  as  part  of  “its  
approach   to   the   ‘Eastern   Question’”   (Ardıç,   2012: 198) to propagate the 
“illegitimacy”  of  the  Ottoman  Caliphate.  The  idea  of  an  Arab caliphate, which was a 
strong blow to the empire that refreshed its Islamic discourse during the war, 
strengthened  Britain’s  hand  because  as  the  empire  seemed  to  be  close  to  collapse due 
to disastrous defeats, and political and economic crisis, some Arabs including Sharif 
Hussein, Rashid Rida, Salim Ali Salam, and Izzat Darwaza entertained the idea of 
forming an Arab state led by an Arab caliph under British supervision. In this regard, 
they considered the concept of Arab caliphate as the only viable political 
arrangement that diverse Arab populations  could  agree  on  (Kayalı,  1998: 142). The 
Arab Caliphate project, which was soon aborted, was closely connected with Al-
Jami‘a  al-‘Arabiyya (Arab League), a secret organization founded by Rashid Rida in 
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Cairo with the purpose of uniting the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire (Tauber, 1993b). As part of this mission Rida financially 
supported by the British administration   in  Cairo,  and  sent  his   representative,   ‘Izzat  
al-Jundi,  to  Ibn  Saud,  Imam  Idrisi  and  Imam  Yahya  (Kayalı,  1998).   
Even though, they did not mention of it in their memoires the Arab 
intellectuals except Shakib Arslan seem to have been somehow influenced by 
Britain’s  propaganda  of  the  Arab  caliphate. Seeing the war as an opportunity for the 
Arabs to form an independent Arab state by rebelling against the empire (Tauber, 
1993), Rashid Rida did not only think that an Anglo-Arab alliance could assure Arab 
independence  but  he  also  “worked   for the re-establishment of an Arab caliphate to 
replace   the  Ottoman   one”   (Ryad,   2010: 270).  Moreover,   he   “informed   the   British  
authorities that he was ready to mediate between Britain and Arab rulers when the 
war spread to   the  Middle  East”  (Ryad,  2010: 270).  Considering  Rida  a   ‘visionary’,  
“British  officials  in  Egypt  (probably  except  Mitchell-Innes) did not hold his political 
ambitions   in   high   esteem”   (Ryad,   2010: 280). Consequently, he could not get the 
support from the British that he expected in the long run. Rida was disappointed not 
only with the British but also with Sharif Hussein (Arslan 2009, Kurd Ali 2006). 
Therefore, after the war he radically changed his discourse and began to refer to 
Britain as a greedy colonial  power  (Ryad,  2010)  while  Sharif  Hussein  as  ‘caliph  of  
devil’  (Kürd  Ali,  2006;;  see  also  Mertoğlu  2005).   
During the war, the Allies did not only launch a campaign weakening the 
ties between the Ottoman Empire and Arabs but also entered into negotiations to 
determine the future of the territories of the empire, which was about to collapse. 
Consequently, they reached secret agreements including the famous Sykes-Picot 
agreement, to divide up the empire among themselves. Some of these agreements, 
particularly those involving the Zionists and the Arab nationalists were conflicting; 
thus,  “the  promises  were  successful   in  securing  effective  wartime  support,  but   they  
gave rise to new conflicts and bitterness in the  postwar  world”   (Shaw,  1977: 320). 
During the war, in addition to the MacMahon-Hussein correspondence promising an 
Arab state in the Arabian Peninsula and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 pledging a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine, they signed three major agreements for the postwar 
partition of the Ottoman Empire: the Constantinople Agreement, the Treaty of 
London, and the Sykes-Picot  Agreement  (Ardıç,  2012: 193-197).  
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The Constantinople Agreement settling the issue of controlling Istanbul 
reached by Britain, Russia, and France on March 18, 1915. Leaving Istanbul as a free 
port   for   the  Allies   the  agreement   satisfied  Russia’s  desires  of  capturing   the  Straits.  
Furthermore,  “Mecca  and  Medina  and  the  rest  of  Arabia  and  the  Arab  world  would  
be detached from the Ottoman Empire and placed under independent Arab rule. The 
division of Iran between Russia and Britain, as agreed on originally in 1907, would 
be  continued”  (Shaw,  1977: 320). Based on this provision the secret correspondence 
between Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt and Sharif 
Hussein  took  place  from  July  1915  to  January  1916  (Kayalı,  1998).   
The Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) signed between the Allies and Italy 
consenting the latter to be full sovereign in the Dodecanese Islands. Finally, the most 
important agreement among the three was reached on May 16, 1916, between Sir 
Mark   Sykes   and   Georges   Picot   representing   Britain   and   France   “adjusting   their  
claims to the Asiatic portions   of   the   Ottoman   Empire”   (Shaw, 1977: 321). As 
underlined earlier, during the war aiming to gain their support against the empire 
Britain negotiated with the Zionists assuring a homeland in Palestine and also with 
Sharif Hussein of Mecca promising to recognize Arab national aspirations. While 
Britain made contradictory provisions, France assured that its plans over the Levant 
were not sacrificed. Moreover, embarrassing the Allies Russia after the Bolshevik 
Revolution revealed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (November-December 1917) that 
was made to divide up the Ottoman Empire.  
 While the war led to the rearrangement of the realm of politics, people both in 
Syria and Lebanon faced disastrous famine and other calamities stemmed from it 
such as epidemics, inflation,   and   devaluation   of   currency.   According   to   Çiçek,  
“neither  Cemal  Pasha’s  rule  of   terror  nor  the  rigors  of   the  battles  that  took  place  in  
the Sinai front became as influential in the change of the attitude of the Syrians 
against the Ottoman Empire as that of famine and its consequences”   (Çiçek,  2012: 
337).  This is mainly due to the fact that almost 500.000 Syrians died of starvation 
and epidemics during the war.  
There are conflicting arguments in the literature as well as among the Arab 
intellectuals’  discourses  on  Syrian  famine.  While  some,  including  George  Antonius  
(1979),  Darwaza,  and  Rida  accused   the  empire  of  “trading  grains  at  high  prices  on 
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the   black  market”   (Çiçek,   2012: 337), others like Cemal Pasha and Shakib Arslan 
hold the Allies responsible as they blockaded all the costs in the region and did not 
allow entry of any food aid.  In his memories Cemal Pasha asserts that even though 
the locust plague damaged the harvest in 1915 he managed to secure sufficient grain 
for the Arab provinces. But as Arab Revolt broke out he had to distribute the grain to 
the Bedouins in order to assure their loyalty to the Ottoman government. In addition 
to the food scarcity within the peninsula, Syrians could not receive any aid from 
outside during the war on account  of  the  Allies’  blockade  on  the  costs  and  all  these  
led to the deadly starvation, which lasted for years (Cemal,  Paşa  2001;; Arslan, 2009).  
On the other hand, providing considerable amount of detailed information 
Schilcher (1992) holds three actors, the   empire,   the   Allies’   blockade,   and   Sharif  
Hussein, as responsible from the famine. According to Schilcher, the empire had 
problems with handling the famine. The Allies blockaded not only the costs but also 
even the interior parts of Syria preventing the flow of grain from the Persian Gulf 
and Baghdad (Schilcher, 1992).  
Agreeing  with  Schilcher,  Çiçek  (2012)  asserts   that   the  famine  occurred  as  a  
result   of   intertwined   factors   including   the   Canal   expedition,   the   Allies’   blockade,  
natural disasters, bad governance, inflation and devaluation. Unlike Schilcher, 
however,   Çiçek   draws   attention   to   the   expedition   against   Egypt   as   an   important  
factor influencing the famine. Both the Ottoman government and Cemal Pasha gave 
great   importance   to  Egypt’s  conquest   and  both thought that the war would not last 
long  therefore  they  mobilized  Syria’s  all  material  and  human  sources.    Because  this  
goal kept being the very first priority of Cemal Pasha during 1915 all foodstuffs were 
dispatched to the troops and the civilians were not   taken   into  consideration  (Çiçek,  
2012).  
How   the   issue   of   famine   reflected   in   the   Arab   intellectuals’   discourses  
deserves to be examined. With the exception of Salam all my primary sources 
discuss it, though they have contradictory views on the issue. First of all, the famine 
had  a  significant  place   in  Arslan’s  pro-Ottomanist discourse. Utilizing this topic as 
discursive   material   to   solidify   his   criticism   against   the   European   states’   policies  
towards the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular Arslan put the blame on 
the Allies, which did not only blockade the Syrian costs but also precluded people in 
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Syria  and  Lebanon  from  receiving  food  aids.  Arslan  argued   that  “it  was   indeed   the  
British who prevented the aids by besieging Syria. They thought, in this way people 
(Syrians) were going to be desperate and so shift to the  Britain’s  side”  (Arslan,  2009: 
148). 
Likewise, having an Ottomanist discourse during the war, Kurd Ali drew 
attention   to   the  Maronite   Patriarchs’   intrigues   to  make   profit   out   of   the grain that 
were given by Cemal Pasha to be distributed to the Christian public. The Christians 
in Lebanon died of the grain mixed with soil that was distributed by the Maronite 
Patriarchs  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 246). On the contrary, having an Arab nationalist view 
Darwaza argued that the Christians starved because Cemal Pasha had blockaded 
Lebanon and prevented entry of food aid. Likewise, Rashid Rida, who was at Sharif 
Hussein’s  service,  manipulated  the  issue  and  came  up  with  an  interesting  argument:  
“because the CUP’s  troops  were  deployed  in  the  Hejaz  the  Allies  had  to  subdue  the  
coasts, which in turn led to the extreme poverty”  (Rıza,  2007: 327). To put it more 
precisely, Rida used the issue of famine to justify the Arab Revolt holding the CUP 
responsible for  the  people’s  destitution  in  the  region.   
It  is  clear  that  the  Arab  intellectuals’  politico-ideological positions influenced 
their discourses on the famine. On the other hand, the process of famine was 
influential   in   shaping   their   discourses   too.   For   instance,   European   states’   ruthless  
blockade to win   the   war   at   the   expense   of   500.000   Syrians’   death   strengthened  
Arslan’s   pro-Ottomanist   and   Islamist   discourse.   Similarly,   Kurd   Ali’s   pro-
Ottomanist stance during the war seems to be strengthened by the anecdote regarding 
the famine he told in his memoires  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 246). 
If we make a general evaluation, the   five   Arab   intellectuals’   discourses  
somehow were influenced by the outbreak of World War I mainly because it 
involved  various   significant  developments   such  as  Cemal  Pasha’s  appointment,   the  
famine,   the   Arab   Revolt,   and   European   powers’   anti-Ottoman campaigns that 
directly affected the Arab provinces. Even though it is hard to trace in his travel 
notes the process through which he transformed his ideological discourse, it is quite 
clear   that   Rashid   Rida’s   pro-CUP discourse radically changed and turned into a 
separatist one in the early stages of the war. Championing the idea of organizing all 
the Arabs around the notion of an Arab Caliphate, Rashid Rida, who was once a 
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strong supporter of the Young Turks, negotiated with the British officers in Cairo to 
receive support. Thus, Rida was one of the Arab intellectuals who made radical 
changes in their ideological discourses after the outbreak of the war. We can observe 
this change if we compare his pre-war and post-war discourses. In his notes taken 
during his trip to Damascus in 1909 Rida told that,  
I expressed to the people that having hatred towards Turks is the one of the 
most damaging evils for the Arabs given the fact that they live in a period 
when   they  are   in  need  of  being  sincerely   loyal   to   the  Turks….Arabs  should  
not forget their attachment to the Turks and they should never trust the 
others…In  these  days  we  are  supposed  to  help  the  Committee  of  Union  and  
Progress  with  spreading  the  spirit  of  constitutionalism  (Rıza,  92-93).  
 
World   War   I   broke   out   and   as   Tauber   observes,   “Rashid   Rida   saw   this   as   an  
opportunity for Arabs to launch a revolt against the Ottomans and to liberate their 
countries from the  empire’s  yoke”  (Tauber,  1995: 107). He wrote in his periodical al-
Manar that,   “the   interest   of   the  Arabs   is   that   they   will   have   an   independent state 
(Tauber, 1995: 112). Accordingly, during the sermon he gave supporting the Arab 
Revolt  he  asserted  that,  “the  destruction  and  corruption  happened  since  the  beginning  
of   the   empire’s   weakening   is   more   insignificant   than   those   happened   after   the  
Unionists  came  to  power”  (Rıza,  2007: 325). As it is quite obvious in the quotations 
there   is  dramatic  change  between  Rida’s  pre-war and post-war discourses. In early 
World War I he negotiated with the British administration in Cairo and by its 
financial help he took part in a revolt attempt against the empire (Tauber, 1993a). He 
also supported the Arab Revolt by all means, e.g. when he took a trip to the Hejaz in 
1916 to demonstrate his submission to the  “king  of  Hejaz”  (Rıza,  2007: VII-VIII).   
Likewise, the war had a considerable impact also on Darwaza’s   ideological  
discourse.  If  we  recall,  he  was  a  member  of  the  CUP’s  Nablus  branch  in  1909  and  as  
he  was  disappointed  with  the  CUP’s  restrictive  and  nationalist  measures,  he  and  his  
friends launched the branch of the FAP, which promoted decentralization, in Nablus 
in early 1912. Accordingly, he supported the articles of Paris Arab Congress that 
demanded decentralization. He was then affiliated to al-Fatat, a secret association 
established in Paris in 1911, which like the FAP promoted decentralization, and after 
1913 to the Decentralization Party led by Rafiq al-Azm, Haqqi al-Azm, and Rashid 
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Rida based in Cairo. With the outbreak of World War I he supported the revolt 
attempts aiming to separate from the empire to form an independent Arab state in the 
region.  Thus  it  is  safe  to  say  that  in  less  than  a  decade  Darwaza’s  discourse  radically  
changed toward nationalism like that of Rashid Rida. While he was close to the idea 
of decentralization before the war, he began to advocate separation of the Arab 
provinces from the empire after it. For instance regarding the political atmosphere in 
the  Arab  provinces  after   the  1908  Revolution  Darwaza  said  that  “I  and  many  other  
people from different ethnic backgrounds and walks of life were affiliated to the 
CUP club and we joined the excitement   and   joy”   (Derveze,   2007: 244). In the 
beginning of 1910 the FAP promoting decentralization was established and Darwaza 
with his friends launched its branch in 1912.  His thoughts about the FAP, which is 
quoted below, clearly demonstrate his political stance as well as his expectations 
from the empire: 
The FAP promoted administrative decentralization. That is to say, the local 
authorities rather than the central government would deal with the issues 
including education, trade, industry, agriculture, and maintenance of roads.  
The medium of instruction in education in the provinces would be local 
languages and also civil servants had to be from the local people. Moreover, 
the proportional representation of the provinces in the Ottoman Parliament 
would be ensured. As all these provisions matched with the demands of the 
Arabs  we  decided   to   launch   the  party’s  branch   in  Nablus   and  we did do in 
1912 (Derveze, 2007: 269-270). 
 
Not   long  after   the  war  broke  out  he   said   to  his   friend   that,   “there  will be an Arab 
military power consisting of not less than a hundred thousand soldiers and a thousand 
officers and I see this as an opportunity for the Arabs to realize their  independence”  
(Derveze, 2007: 318). If we compare the two quotations revealing Darwaza’s  
discourses, we can see the how he was deeply affected by the socio-political context.   
Similarly,   Salim   Ali   Salam’s   attitudes   towards   the   Ottoman   rule   were  
influenced by the events unfolded during the war.  Even though he refused to take 
part in a revolt organized by Abdulgani al-Uraysi in cooperation with the French in 
1915, he supported the 1916 Arab Revolt. Having a close friendship with Faisal ibn 
Hussein, Salam was informed by Amir Faisal about the secret correspondence 
between Sharif and MacMahon before the revolt broke out. Though he was not 
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comfortable   with   Britain’s   role in the process (Selam, 2009: 32), he rendered his 
support to the revolt. This was most probably because he was in the deep despair 
about  the  empire’s  future  and  found  this  attempt more viable than the others such as 
the one that organized by Abdulgani al-Uraysi and the members of the 
Decentralization Party. Before the war, he had promoted the idea of decentralization 
as an administrative solution in the Arab provinces (Selam, 2009). But after 1915, as 
he was convinced to the possibility of forming an independent Arab state in the 
region with the help of Britain, he began to advocate the separation of the Arabian 
Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire. 
On the other hand, Muhammad Kurd Ali, a cultural Arab nationalist having a 
critical attitude towards the CUP, preferred to adopt a pro-Ottomanist discourse or at 
least  to  appear  so  during  the  war.  Gaining  the  CUP’s  trust  by  refusing  to  propagate  
the French policies in his newspaper, al-Muqtabas, Kurd Ali began to receive 
financial assistance from Cemal Pasha to continue publishing, which spread the 
Islamist and Ottomanist propaganda during World War I. He also wrote in the 
German supported newspaper al-Sharq promoting similar views. Muhammad Kurd 
Ali, like the other four Arab intellectuals had a connection with those who organized 
revolt attempts including that of Sharif Hussein but according to his memories he 
was  not  involved  in  any  of  them.  This  might  be  because  Cemal  Pasha’s  spies  closely 
monitored him and as he many times underscored he did not want to cooperate with 
the Europeans against the empire although he heartily wished that the Arabs having 
an independent state of their own. Moreover, he might have also preferred to support 
the revolt attempts intellectually rather than logistically.  
As  emphasized  earlier,  Arslan  was  highly  critical  of   the  CUP  government’s  
secular policies, particularly those related to judicial system and family, its 
incoherent treatment of Arab nationalists such as al-Zahrawi, and most importantly 
“Turkification”   of   the   Arab   provinces   by   executing   and   exiling   prominent   Arabs.  
These were the only critiques he directed to the Ottoman government in his memoir 
and most of these developments took place during World War I. It seems therefore 
that even though Arslan never gave up hope of uniting under the Ottoman umbrella 
considering  the  European  colonization  as  the  greatest  threat  for  the  Muslims’  unity,  
his positive thoughts about the Ottoman government got damaged due to the 
unfolding events during   the   war.   Thus,   having   a   significant   impact   on   Arslan’s  
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thoughts, World War I changed the tone of his discourse even if it did not transform 
it completely. 
To conclude, World War I was a turning point for the Arabian Peninsula by 
virtue of the fact that it determined the destiny of the region bringing about sweeping 
administrative changes. The war created opportunities for three actors, namely the 
Arab nationalists, the Ottoman Empire, and the Allies, to realize their projects in the 
region. However, only the Allies or more specifically Britain and France, reached 
their goals in the end of the war disappointing the other two particularly the Arabs 
who   were   promised   an   independent   Arab   state.   The   five   Arab   intellectuals’  
ideological discourses and their attitudes towards the Ottoman rule underwent 
profound changes during the war. Factors influencing these changes include Cemal 
Pasha’s  rule  with  an  iron  fist,  the  disastrous  famine  in  Syria  and  Lebanon,  the  revolt  
attempts supported either by the British or the French, the 1916 Arab Revolt as well 
as  the  European  states’  propaganda  damaging  the  empire’s  legitimacy  and  their  false  
promises to the Arabs. 
 
3.4.  Cemal  Pasha’s  Policies and the Arab Intellectuals  
 
 Appointment of Cemal  Pasha,  one  of  the  CUP’s  trio,  both  as  the  commander  
of 4th Army and the governor of Syria immediately after the proclamation of World 
War I was a turning point for many Syrians including the five Arab intellectuals I 
analyze in this thesis. He was sent to Syria in December 1914 for two main goals: the 
first was to organize the attack on the Suez Canal against the British and the second 
was to maintain peace and internal order in   Syria”   (Cemal   Paşa   2001,   112;; Çiçek  
2012, 3). In order to realize these goals he was given full authority in military and 
civilian affairs that is why Ali Fuad Bey, his chief of staff, called him the 
“uncrowned  king”  of  Syria  (Erden,  2006: 107). 
The very first thing he did was to make preparations for the Canal expedition, 
which was critical for Germany, the CUP, and Cemal Pasha himself. A few days 
after he arrived Damascus, he organized a public meeting at Umayyad Mosque 
where he gave a speech ushering in the re-conquest of Egypt (Derveze, 2007: 357). 
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The attack on Egypt was not only intended a threat for the British in the Canal but 
also to incite an uprising, and perhaps conquer, Egypt. The expedition severely 
influenced the Arabian Peninsula mainly because it led to conscription, famine, 
desertions, and epidemics in the region  (Çiçek,  2012).  More  specifically,   the  heavy  
price of the expedition was paid by the Syrians who were already facing a wide range 
of difficulties. The first expedition failed as the Ottoman troops constituted by 
80.000 soldiers could not get through the British defense at the Canal during the two 
days (2-3   February   1915)   of   the   attack.   As   Shaw   underlines,   “the   British   had  
successfully suppressed Arab movements in Egypt through a combination of force 
and promises for some kind of Arab independence in the future. So Cemal was not 
greeted with the expected Egyptian uprising, and strong British resistance forced him 
back from the Suez Canal without  any  success”  (Shaw,  1977: 320).   
Cemal persisted with his ambition and organized a second attack on Egypt. 
Therefore, Meissner Pasha who was appointed by the government, accelerated the 
construction of the Egyptian Branch of the railway that connected Egypt, Syria, and 
Hejaz, so that a greater number of Ottoman troops could be deployed to the Canal. In 
addition to the railway, chausseed roads and carriage roads were constructed in the 
desert. But the second expedition could not be completed due to the toughening 
conditions in Syria and to the movement of the British troops from Egypt towards 
Syria   (Çiçek,  2012).  Cemal Pasha’s  dream  of  being   the  second  conqueror  of  Egypt  
thus came to naught.  
As he could not actualize the first one he concentrated on his second goal 
maintaining  “peace  and   internal  order   in  Syria”.  According   to  Çiçek,   these   two  are  
the   “key   concepts   to   comprehend Cemal’s   rule   in   Syria”   (Çiçek,   2012: 4). From 
Cemal’s  point  of  view,  this  meant  the  eradication  of  all  sorts  of  ‘“barriers’  between  
the State and its different peoples in Syria preventing the creation of the ideal 
citizen”  (Çiçek,  2012;;  80);;  thus,  he  took  action  in  order  to  remove  these  “barriers”.  
As   Çiçek   indicates,   “in   terms   of   its   social   impact,   undoubtedly,   the   most   drastic  
“measures”   were   taken   against   the   Arabist   movement,   which   demanded   certain  
autonomy  for   the  Arab  provinces”  (Ibid). He did not only crack down on the Arab 
reformists but also took certain measures to control Zionism and increasing foreign 
influence in the region.   
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 Deeming the Arab nationalists as the major threat in the region against the 
integration of the empire, Cemal Pasha believed that the Arabist movement had to be 
abolished  (Çiçek,  2012: 88). Indeed, he had quite good relations with the prominent 
Arab nationalists in the early period of his governorate, particularly with Abdulkarim 
al-Khalil, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Amir Shakib Arslan, and Abdulgani al-Uraysi. As 
Darwaza underscored soon after his arrival to Syria he invited renowned Arab 
nationalists to a ceremony in which Arab youth groups read poems praising Arabs. 
During this ceremony he gave a speech underlining the brotherhood between Turks 
and Arabs (Derveze, 2007: 326).     As  observed  by  Çiçek,  moreover,   principally   he  
was  not  against  the  Arabs’  cultural  demands  but  never  trusted  the  Arabists  who  had  
close ties with foreign powers. Therefore, he did not punish the Arab nationalists 
who  had  no  “intriguing”  relations  with   the  European  powers.     As  discussed  above,  
his attitudes towards journalist Muhammad Kurd Ali, a cultural nationalist, 
demonstrates how Cemal appreciated those who refused to collaborate with the 
foreign powers (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 119).  
If   we   take   an   overall   look   at   Cemal   Pasha’s   Syrian   governorate   with   an  
emphasis on the relationship between the Arabs and the government, we see that 
Cemal came to Syria at a time when the CUP government made some compromises 
to satisfy the Arab leaders who organized the Paris Arab Congress.  The government 
issued a decree in April 1913 approving the use of Arabic in law courts and as the 
medium of instruction in schools except the higher sultaniye schools and official 
correspondence in Arabic. Although schools had to wait for the Arabic textbooks, 
court officials who did not know Arabic were replaced in Damascus immediately 
after   the   decree   (Kayalı,   1998).   As   earlier   stated,   representation   of   the   Arab  
provinces substantially increased after the 1914 election and as part of its inclusive 
policies  the  government  included  prominent  Arab  reformists  such  as  Amir  ‘Ali  ‘Abd  
al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri,   Shukri   al-‘Asali,   ‘Abd   al-Wahhab al- Inkilizi, and Salim Ali 
Salam. But World War I came with its own schedule and power relations.  
As explained in the previous section, with the outbreak of the war Arab 
nationalists’   revolt   attempts   dramatically   increased   collaterally   European  
involvement into the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, as the Unionists 
believed that the Ottoman Empire could regain its power if they could conquer 
Egypt, they together with Germany decided to attack it appointing Cemal for this 
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critical task. Thus, the government did not only change its priorities radically after 
the war broke out, but it also reinforced centralization due to the internal and external 
threats that might have disintegrated the empire. Because the very aim of Cemal 
Pasha was to integrate Syria to the Ottoman Empire emphasizing the central 
authority  (Çiçek,  2012: 134), the measures he implemented were in conflict with the 
promises given to the Arab reformists about the use of Arabic and the employment of 
Arab civilians and military personnel in the Arab provinces. He did not only send 
Arab troops to distant theaters of war but also enforced a new law, promulgated in 
March 1916, enforcing the use of Turkish in all companies. Similar changes took 
place  in  schools  too  (Kayalı,  1998;;  219).  According  to  Darwaza,  “the  deployment  of  
Arab troops to such as Dardanelles by locating the Turkish ones in their places after 
the   failure   of   the   Suez  Canal   Expedition  was   part   of  Cemal   Pasha’s   plan   to   crack  
down the  Arab  movement”  (Derveze,  2007: 359-360).  
 All these regulations, which were in contradiction with the promises that were 
given to the Arab nationalists after the Paris Arab Congress, could also be considered 
as   part   of   Cemal’s   ambition   to   “modernize”   Syria.   The   CUP,   specifically   Cemal  
Pasha,   was   committed   to   “produce   physically   and   mentally   ideal   citizens for the 
Ottoman  Empire”  (Çiçek,  2012: 251) in Syria, decreasing the foreign influence in the 
region.   As   Çiçek   observes,   without   by-passing the Arab cultural and intellectual 
legacy   “he   concentered   his   main   interest   on   the   increase   of   the   loyalties of the 
Syrians giving them a consciousness of Ottomanness. In the same context, he made 
essential interventions to the urban space to create visible   modern   cities”   (Çiçek,  
2012: 252). 
As an important requirement of modern citizenship almost three-fourths of 
Muslim and Christian Syrian men aged 17 to 55 were conscripted during the war 
(Thompson, 2000: 22 ), which was happening for the first time in their history under 
the Ottoman rule. The failure of the Canal Expedition and the resulting 
transformation of Cemal’s  policies  from  inclusive  to  oppressive  did  not  only  cause  a  
loss of motivation among the Arab soldiers but also desertion and banditry of Arab 
soldiers  (Çiçek,  2012: 262).  
Cemal also made significant regulations in the Syrian cities particularly in 
Damascus, where he enlarged the old streets, opened a new great boulevard, and as 
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well as gardens and parks, restored the historical monuments, launched the ferry 
traffic across the Dead Sea (Tamari, 2000: 23), tried to improve agricultural 
productivity and the efficiency of transportation with the help of German engineers 
(Çiçek,  2012: 290-294).  
In order to indoctrinate the sense of Ottomanism among the Arabs Cemal also 
took considerable steps in the realm of education in Syria by Ottomanizing religious 
and non-religious schools. In addition to repairing the buildings of schools, during 
his governorate he established 29 new primary schools in various villages of 
Jerusalem, Halilurrahman, Gaza and Jaffa. Consequently, the number of students in 
the public schools was dramatically increased   in   this   period   (Çiçek,   2012: 273). 
Moreover, as part of his activities aiming at educating new scholars for the 
reinforcement  of  the  Ottoman  Caliph’s  authority  in  the  region  “immediately  after  his  
arrival in Syria, the Pasha pioneered the establishment of a religious university in 
Jerusalem called Selahaddin-i  Eyyubi  Külliyesi, and the building of St. Anna Church, 
which was controlled by the French Jesuits, was confiscated for the Külliye”  (Çiçek,  
2012: 274).  
Even though Cemal  Pasha’s  contribution   to   the  modernization  of  Syria  was  
substantial, he is known for his oppression particularly by the Arabs.  Cemal began 
to punish the Arab nationalists immediately after discovering that Abdulkarim al-
Khalil and Rida al-Sulh were preparing a revolt against the empire in collaboration 
with the British. Al-Khalil and al-Sulh met in Tyre and Sidon planning to rebel in the 
case of an Ottoman defeat (Kurd Ali 2006: 134,   183,   cf.   Çiçek   2012).   As   Cemal  
Pasha was informed of the above-mentioned meetings he began to arrest the 
members of the Decentralization Party and also those Arabs who had connection 
with the French consuls in July 1915 (Kurd Ali, 2006).  According to Darwaza, the 
CUP   government   was   aware   of   the   “Arab   Movement”,   thus   it   appointed Cemal 
Pasha because he was the only person who could crack down such a strong 
movement.   Confirming   Cemal   Pasha’s   explanation   on   the   issue   Darwaza,   in   his  
memories, told that soon after he came to Syria Cemal received a bunch of 
incriminating documents seized from the French consulates, revealing the connection 
between some Muslim and Christian Arabs and the French foreign officers. 
Abdulkadir al-Jazairi, his brother Omer, Shafiq al-Muayyad, Abdulhamid al-
Zahrawi, Yahya al-Atrash, Abdulwahab al-Inkilizi, Shukri al-Asali, and Rushdi al-
101 
 
Sham’a  were  among  those  Arab  nationalists  whose  connections  with  the  French  were  
revealed (Derveze, 2007). Cemal Pasha did not punish these Arabists on the ground 
that this would put the unity of Muslims at risk in the context of the war. Moreover, 
he involved some Arab reformists such as Dr. Abdurrahman al-Shahbandar, 
Abdulkarim al-Khalil, Abdulghani al-Uraisi, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Amir Shakib 
Arslan,   and   As’ad   al-Shukairi in his administration. Darwaza claimed that Cemal 
Pasha was planning to be either Khedive of Egypt or sultan of Syria thus he tried to 
establish good relations with the prominent Arab leaders who could help him with 
realizing his ambitions. But as his dream of conquering Egypt came to naught, he 
immediately attacked the Arab nationalists and after the investigation the Court 
Martial decided to execute 11 of Beiruti leaders on August 21, 1916 in the town 
square (Derveze, 2007; 364). Likewise, according to such historians as George 
Antonius and Sulayman Mousa, Cemal cracked down on the Arab nationalists 
because  of  the  humiliation  he  felt  after  the  failed  Egyptian  campaign  (Kayalı,  1998;;  
217).  Mousa  states  that  “Failing  in  his  attempt  he  returned  to  Damascus  and  began  to  
seek a pretext for his failure. It dawned upon him that his best chance lay in leveling 
accusations against Arab political and cultural   leaders”   (Mousa,   1966: 14). Salam, 
Arslan,   Rida,   and   Kurd   Ali,   however,   neither   implied   Cemal’s   dream   of   being  
khedive or sultan in the region nor clearly associated his failed Canal Expedition 
with his oppression in Syria.  
After the executions of the first group, the investigations turned into a process 
of elimination of the Arabist movement in Syria for, as  Çiçek  explains, 
this time, the accusations were more ambiguous. In the light of documents 
seized from the French consulate, all the members of the Arab opposition 
parties were interrogated, regardless of the degree of their active operation to 
provoke people against the Government after the proclamation of the war. 
They were accused to separate the Arab lands from the Ottoman Government, 
and by this way, to cooperate with the  greatest   enemies  of   Islam….Besides 
the hangings, Cemal sent plenty of the members of the notable families into 
exile. Most of the exiles were the relatives of the   hanged   notables   (Çiçek,  
2012: 97). 
As all of the five intellectuals stated in their memories the second wave of executions 
created fear, panic, and animosity among the Arabs. May be the most tragic part of 
this process was the ambiguity of the accusations and the equal treatment of the 
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“reformists”   and   “separatists”   (Çiçek,   2012).   The   analyses   of   the   intellectuals’  
discourses indicate that there was a significant difference between these two groups. 
While the former demanded reforms, particularly decentralization of the Arab 
provinces,  the  latter’s  aim  was,  as  their  name  suggests,  the  complete  separation  of  the  
Arab provinces from the empire. The difference is clearly seen in the statement made 
by Salim Ali Salam who was both Ottomanist and reformist, during the meeting with 
Monsieur Margaret in Paris, the French officer who was responsible for the Eastern 
affairs, after the Paris Arab Congress (Selam, 2009: 22). In this meeting Salam stated 
that, 
It is important for us you understand our feelings and thoughts about affairs 
of our state. Although we demand decentralization and the prerogatives that 
we lost, we are strongly attached to the reign of the commander of believers 
(amir al-mu’minin) the glorious caliph.  Refuting his sovereignty and asking 
you to come to our state and protect us never occurs to our minds (Selam, 
2009: 22). 
 
Salam’s   reformist   attitudes  did  not   change  until   the  Arab  Revolt   broke  out.  Cemal  
Pasha’s  executions  and  exiles  were  not  well  received  at  all  by any of the five Arab 
intellectuals due to this equal treatment; all of them thought that those who were 
hanged did not deserve such a heavy punishment. Thus, while Arslan, Salam, and 
Kurd Ali requested many times from Cemal pardon of those who were convicted, 
Darwaza and Rida could not do so mainly because they did not have a direct and 
close connection with him.  
Having close relations with Cemal, Arslan did not only meet with him in 
person many times to change his mind about the executions and exiles but also talked 
to Enver Pasha and some others in the inner circle of the CUP in order to prevent the 
penalties. Hence, Cemal grew away from him and even had a polemic about him 
with Enver Pasha who was Arslan’s   close   friend   (Arslan,   2009: 134). As earlier 
stated in different occasions, even Shakib Arslan, the most pro-Ottomanist among the 
five, who joined Cemal in the first expedition with a hundred Druze volunteers and 
played significant role in mediating between Cemal Pasha and Druze and Maronite 
groups in Beirut, lashed out at Cemal because of the executions and exiles. Arslan 
says that he had good relationships with him until the latter decided to carry out the 
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cruel punishments (Arslan, 2009: 94). Arslan’s  discourse  was  thus  deeply  influenced  
by  Cemal’s hardening measures. Indeed, from the very beginning Arslan was against 
the idea of confiscating the foreign consulates because he thought that there were 
many Arab notables who had connections with the foreign officers for different 
reasons before World War I but most of these notables already cut their ties with 
them. During the conversation with Bekir Sami Bey expressing his displeasure with 
the   Ottoman   government’s   decision   to   investigate   the   foreign   consulates   Arslan  
stated that, 
I am against the removal of these documents from their places because this 
would worry those who are working to please the government. If they come 
to know that the government is aware of their past contacts with the 
foreigners, they may get involved in activities casing harm to the government 
(Arslan, 2009: 92).  
He asserted that the documents would not only mislead the government but also lead 
to killing of the outstanding Arab leaders based on the ambiguous accusations which 
would widen the between the government and the Arabs (Arslan, 2009; 82).  
Regarding the idea of exiling noble Arab families to Anatolia Arslan thought 
that it was  Cemal’s  attempt  to  Turkify  the  region.  Drawing  attention  to  the  effect  of  
the   victory   in   the   Dardanelles   War   both   on   the   CUP’s   secularizing   policies   and  
Cemal’s  bold  decisions  Arslan  asserted  that,   
Dardanelles victory caused euphoria among the Unionists. Due to this 
euphoria   they   took   extraordinary   decisions.   Discharging   the   women’s  
obligation of veiling was one of them. Similarly, Turkification of Syria and 
elimination of Arab nationalism are of these decisions. The first technique 
they adopted for implementation of this decision was exiling prominent Arab 
families. They assumed that this would weaken the strong families and so 
they could be able to realize the Turkification of the region (Arslan, 2009: 
119). 
Even  though  Talat  and  Enver  Pashas  did  not  assent  to  Cemal’s  practices,  they  did  not  
intervene  in  the  process.  This  is  because  according  to  Arslan,  “Cemal  was  backed  by  
the Turanist group in Istanbul and Talat and Enver could not touch him in order to be 
secured from the evils  of  this  group”  (Arslan,  2012: 113). 
 Arslan did not criticize only Cemal but also the CUP government granting 
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him full authority in Syria. This was the first time he fiercely criticized the CUP 
government in his memories (Arslan, 2009; 119).  He   argued   that  Cemal’s   policies  
stirred up hatred among the Arabs towards Turks and his harsh policies were one of 
the most drastic events that occurred both in the Islamic history and that of Ottoman 
(Arslan, 2009: 101). Furthermore, unlike the other four Arab intellectuals Arslan saw 
a connection between the euphoria and high self-esteem led by the victory of the 
empire  in  Dardanelles  and  Cemal  Pasha’s  radical  policies  in  Syria.  He  drew  attention  
to the fact that the exiles dramatically increased after the victory (Arslan, 2009: 119). 
For him the empire was still under threat and its enemies were as strong as before the 
Dardanelles War thus it was not appropriate to terrorize the region. Arslan’s  
discourse  was  thus  deeply  influenced  by  Cemal’s policies.  
Like   Arslan,   Salim   Ali   Salam  was   also   profoundly   influenced   by   Cemal’s  
ruthless practices. According to him, the very aim of Cemal Pasha was to eliminate 
thoughtful Arab leaders to render the Arabs defenseless (Selam, 2009: 166). As 
explained in early sections of this chapter he advocated the idea of decentralization 
rather than separation of the Arab provinces until he got involved in the Arab Revolt 
in 1916. Aiming to soften the relations between the Arabs and Cemal Pasha, he 
mediated between them but the   latter  was  not  open   to  Salam’s  attempts, he claims 
(Selam, 2009: 30). Cemal took a hard line with Salam as he asked him to release 
some of the detainees. After a long process of demanding reforms from the Ottoman 
government through forming Beirut Reform Committee, organizing the Arab 
Congress, and representing Beirut in the Ottoman parliament, Salam devoted a great 
deal of his efforts to maintain both the Ottoman authority in the region and the local 
autonomy.   Cemal’s   uncompromising   attitudes   and   despotic policies in addition to 
wartime   difficulties,   the   CUP’s   unwillingness   to   make   administrative   reforms  
demanded  for   the  Arab  provinces,  and  European  states’  wide-ranging anti-Ottoman 
campaign all alienated Salam. In such a critical moment his close friend Amir Faisal 
came  to  discuss  his  father’s  plan  to  rebel  against  Istanbul  with  the  help  of  the  British  
to form an independent Arab state that would be led by his father, Sharif Hussein. 
Though he was not comfortable with the idea of cooperating with the British, he 
supported  Sharif’s  plan   and,   as  will   be   explained   in   the   following   section,  he   took  
certain responsibilities in the deportation of the Ottoman officers from Beirut to form 
the Arab state (Selam, 2009: 34).  
105 
 
Salam was not informed only of the preparations of the Arab Revolt but also 
of some other revolt attempts during the war. In the summer of 1915 Abdulkarim al-
Khalil visited him and telling him that he and his friends had negotiated with the 
British to get financial and military assistance for the revolt (Selam, 2009: 151). 
Salam was brought to Aley court martial for a few days to bear testimony because of 
his strong relations with the convicted Arab nationalists. According to Cemil 
Beyhum, one of the close friends of Salam, Cemal Pasha did not hang Salim Ali 
Salam and his friend Ahmad Mukhtar Beyhum because during the Paris Arab 
Congress they opposed to the idea of a French mandate, which was proposed by 
some members, and insisted on the decentralization of the Arab provinces provided 
that the provinces would be under the Ottoman authority (Selam, 2009; 31). 
Furthermore, according to the reports, which were written by French officers in 
Beirut, Salam engaged in activities against the French (Salam, 2009: 76). Thus, he 
was able to escape from Cemal’s  punishment  while  many  of  his  friends  were  either  
hanged or exiled.  
On the other hand, Kurd Ali, who could be identified as a pragmatist, 
managed   to   win   Cemal’s   trust   and   remain   close   to   him   until   Cemal’s   resignation  
though he was a reformist and even launched a branch of the FAP in Syria with his 
friends    (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 132). Considering the wartime as an extraordinary period 
that required caution Kurd Ali thought that a pro-government stance was most 
appropriate during such a critical  phase  (Kürd  Ali, 2006: 132). Thus, he wrote two 
books   propagating   the   government’s   Ottomanist   and   Islamic   discourse.  
Accompanied   by   a   group  of  Syrian   ulema   including  Sheikh  As’ad   al-Shukairi, the 
mufti of 4th Army, took a trip to Dardanelles and then Istanbul glorifying Cemal’s  
policies. He was never involved in any activity that would annoy Cemal. Due to 
these attitudes Kurd Ali was fiercely criticized by some Arab nationalists including 
Izzat Darwaza. As a moment of an inter-textual dialogue, where one of my primary 
sources  speaks   to  another,   this  passage   is  worth  of  quoting:  “Muhammad  Kurd  Ali  
kept being two-faced until the end of the war gaining the friendship of Cemal Pasha. 
He  successfully  benefitted  from  Cemal’s  trusting  him.  We  had  read  his  articles  in  al-
Muqtabas written for the purpose of deceiving and convincing Cemal and his 
friends”  (Derveze,  2007: 365). 
106 
 
When it comes to the executions, Kurd Ali recognized after a few attempts 
that if he wanted to maintain good relations with Cemal he should not bring up the 
issue again; thus, he decided to keep silent. Having said that, Kurd Ali quitted from 
his position in al-Sharq newspaper, which was a mouthpiece of government 
propaganda, immediately after Cemal left Syria, and refused to continue being the 
editor in chief of it even though Mersinli Cemal Pasha who was the second 
commander of 4th Army and known as Cemal Junior, asked him to do so. He 
responded  that  “I  do  not  want   to  be  enslaved  a  second  time.  Cemal  Pasha  captured  
me because after he came to Syria he protected me from possible plots of the 
plotters. But I do not want to be recaptured anymore by anyone for   any   reason”  
(Kurd Ali, 2006: 197). Keep in mind that his words were written way after this 
historical episode has gone, and that this anti-Cemal attitude could very well be a 
post-facto rationalization after the winners and losers of the struggle between 
Cemal/CUP on the one hand, and Arab nationalists and European powers, on the 
other.   His   response   thus   claims   that   this   reflects   Kurd   Ali’s   real   feeling   of   his 
relations with Cemal Pasha. He also claimed that Cemal and Enver lacked a loving 
heart and that they were kind to some Arab leaders including Kurd Ali himself and 
Shakib Arslan only because they wanted to attract Arab supporters.  
 Unlike the other four Arab intellectuals, Rashid Rida did not deal in his 
memories  with  Cemal  Pasha’s  attitudes  towards  the  Arabs  during  his  governorate  in  
Syria. Rather he attacked the CUP in general blaming the Unionists as being Turkish 
nationalists who mistreated Arabs and disrespected both Islam and the Kanun-i Esasi 
(Rıza,  2007: 12). During his sermon in Mina, for example, Rida said that,  
Anyone who is foresighted can understand the Unionists bad intention in 
gathering thousands of soldiers in the Hejaz. Because they, like us, know that 
the enemy states would never attack the Hejaz. It is more appropriate to 
dispatch the soldiers that are located here to the fronts for fighting with 
Russians who occupied Turkish provinces. But for the Unionists punishing 
the Arabs is more important than repelling the Russians from their (Turkish) 
houses. If they were able to complete their plans we would see in the Hejaz 
the similar or the worse oppression they undertook  in  Syria  (Rıza,  2007: 327). 
Besides claiming that if Sharif Hussein did not rebel against the government, the 
CUP   would   implement   ruthless   policies,   most   probably   referred   to   Cemal’s  
practices, in the Hejaz as it carried out in Syria, Rida also emphasized the poverty 
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and  famine  caused  by  the  blockade.  According  to  Rida,  “because the CUP’s  troops  
were deployed in the Hejaz the Allies had to subdue the coasts, which in turn led to 
the extreme poverty…If   this   continued   one  more   year,   people  would   die   either   of  
starvation  or  epidemics”  (Rıza,  2007: 327). As it is obvious in the above quotations 
in his sermon Rida tried to convince the people of the appropriateness of the revolt 
by illustrating the disastrous scenarios that would possibly happen if Sharif did not 
revolt against the empire.  
Furthermore, during the war the court martial in Aley condemned Rida to 
death sentence because of his activities in favor of an Arab caliphate based in Egypt 
paving way for the British  occupation  (Rıza,  2007: 52). It is obvious from his support 
for the Arab Revolt and his project of forming an Arab caliphate that Rida was not 
satisfied   with   CUP   rule   in   general,   and   Cemal   Pasha’s   governorate   in   particular.  
Though he did  not  make  any  statement  in  his  memories  that  manifested  that  Rida’s  
ideological discourse or attitudes towards the Ottoman rule was influenced by 
Cemal’s  policies,  as  stated  earlier  Rida  emphasized  “the  CUP’s  oppression  in  Syria”  
to justify Sharif Hussein’s  rebel  and  his  own  support  for  it.   
Regarding  the  connection  between  Cemal’s  oppression  and the Arab Revolt, 
Darwaza (2007: 398)  argued  that  Cemal  Pasha’s  executions  were  the  last  straw  that  
led to the Arab Revolt. Salam did not make such a statement but apparently he was 
convinced by his friend Amir Faisal ibn Hussein justifying their revolt plans by 
referring  to  Cemal’s  despotic  rule  (Selam, 2009: 32).  Influenced  by  his  close  friend’s  
explanations Salam was convinced of the necessity of acting against the imperial 
authority for the wellbeing of Arabs. So, even Salam did not associate clearly 
Cemal’s  despotism  with  the  Arab  Revolt  in  his  memories,  the  sequence  of  the  events  
that   led   him   to   shift   his   ideological   stance   indicate   that   Cemal’s   uncompromising 
attitudes and heavy punishments played a significant role in transforming his 
ideological discourse which became Arab nationalist. 
While Kurd Ali did not give a view on the issue, Arslan opposed the 
argument   that  Cemal   Pasha’s   ruthless   policies   led   to   the Arab Revolt. He thought 
that there was no connection between the Arab Revolt and the executions and having 
contacts with the British Hussein had plans to rebel against the empire earlier that 
Cemal’s   appointment.   Thus,   in   any   case   Sharif   would   rebel   Istanbul due to his 
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ambitions (Arslan, 2009: 192-193).   On   the   other   hand,   Kayalı   observes   that   “the  
executions   signified   in   the   eyes   of   the  Syrians   the   government’s   resolve   to   revoke  
whatever  concessions   that   it  had  agreed   to  give   to   the  Arabs.  Cemal’s  actions may 
have expedited the revolt  in  the  Hijaz”  (Kayalı,  1998: 221).  
Before ending it is necessary to emphasize on the striking fact that none of 
the five Arab intellectuals mentioned in their memories any of the endeavors Cemal 
Pasha made under the wartime circumstances to modernize Syria. Even Arslan who 
described Cemal as clever, practical, determined, and receptive therefore a perfect 
commander but not a good politician (Arslan, 2009: 190) did not refer to his efforts 
for improving Syria. Absence of such a large scale of modernization effort made by 
the Pasha in the memories of the five Arab intellectuals needs to be examined. The 
parts devoted to Cemal Pasha in the memoirs include the Canal Expedition or the 
issues of exiles and executions. Though at times the authors gave minute details of 
various issues it is definitely interesting that they overlooked all the developments, at 
least   some  of  which   they  witnessed.  Apparently   in   their  minds  Cemal’s  oppressive  
policies overshadowed his remarkable efforts to “make  Syria  as  developed  as  Egypt  
in the eyes   of   the   Syrians”   (Çiçek,   2012: 290). In other words, their anger and 
resentment to his cruelty particularly to the executions prevented them to discuss 
Cemal Pasha a positive manner in their memories even though they wrote them 
decades after his rule. This might be because they wanted to reflect only one -
oppressive- aspect   of   Cemal’s   administration   to   justify   the   present   conditions   in  
which they wrote their memoirs. For they wrote them in a context in which Cemal 
Pasha  and   the  Empire  had  been  defeated,  Arabs  had   their  own  ‘independent’  states  
(though in fact colonialism was in full force in the Middle East), and more 
importantly, Arab nationalism seemed to be a useful, progressive and desirable 
ideology that helped the Arabs won their independence from centuries-old Ottoman 
domination.  As  with  every  ideology,  Arab  nationalism,  too,  had  its  own  ‘others’,  the  
most important of which was the Ottoman rule, which was to be described as the 
‘dark  ages’  of  authentic  Arab  history.  (The  discourse  of  ‘Ottoman  colonialism’  in  the  
Arab world that still persists today is also -at least partly- affected by this ideology.) 
Thus,  speaking  from  within  Arab  nationalism,  the  five  intellectuals’  discourses  were  
heavily shaped by this ideology’s  presentation  of  recent  past,  in  which  the  Ottoman  
rule was completely associated with oppression and backwardness. Accordingly, 
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Cemal  Pasha   the  Villain’s   fruitless   efforts   to   save  Syria   from  economic   and   social  
‘backwardness’  and  to  modernize  the Arab cities were overshadowed by his negative 
image  in  the  intellectuals’  discourses  as  presented  in  their  memoires.  Therefore,  we  
see one more time how ideological positions influence the way of reading and 
reflecting recent history. Similarly, we may recall that none of the five Arab 
intellectuals made any reference in their memoirs to the concept and movement of 
(failed) Arab caliphate, which was one of the most popular issues in the early 
decades of the 20th century among the Arabs. Thus, the act of “selective  reading  of  
recent  history”  that  is  prevalent  in  the  discourses  of  these  memoires  confirms  the  fact  
that history writing is as much about forgetting (voluntary or otherwise) as 
remembering past event.  
 
3.5. The 1916 Arab Revolt and the Arab Intellectuals 
 
The Arab Revolt is the last but not the least turning point that played a key 
role   in   the   transformation  of   the  Arab   intellectuals’   ideological   discourses.  Among  
the five Darwaza, Rida, and Salam were deeply influenced by the revolt whereas 
Kurd Ali and Arslan did not change their attitudes towards the Ottoman rule in the 
Arab provinces after the outbreak of it. While Darwaza and Rida openly supported it 
in their memories, Salam, as discussed earlier, did not spell out his thoughts about 
the Sharif’s  rebel  against  the  imperial  authority  in  his  memoir.  Hassan  Ali  Hallak,  the  
editor  of  Salam’s  memoir,  underscored  Salam’s  support   to   the   revolt  depending  on  
the some other primary sources.  
Among the five only Darwaza who supported the revolt wholeheartedly and 
considered  it  as  a  great  responsibility  that  one  had  to  take  on  the  eve  of  the  empire’s  
demise, provided details about the process of the revolt in his memories. Taking 
King  Abdullah’s  memories  as  the  main  reference  Darwaza  interpreted  the  course of 
events that led to the Arab Revolt entirely from the perspective of the Sharif and his 
sons. Accordingly, and as usual he adopted an Arab nationalist tone in explaining the 
revolt. Therefore there are discrepancies between what he told and the narratives of 
110 
 
some  modern   historians   such   as  E.  Dawn,  H.  Kayalı,  M.  T.  Çiçek,   E.   Tauber,  W.  
Ochsenwald, and M. C. Wilson who have written on the Arab Revolt.  
As for Rashid Rida, according to the travel notes, which constituted his 
memoir, he took a trip to the Hejaz after the 1916 Arab Revolt for pilgrimage. 
During this trip he visited Sharif Hussein and gave a sermon in Mina to render full 
support to the revolt. In the meantime, during a private talk with the Sharif he 
expressed his opinion about the form of the government of the prospective Arab state 
which  was  going  to  be  ruled  by  Sharif  Hussein  with  the  title  of  the  “King  of  the  Arab  
countries”   that  was  modified   to   the  “King  of  Hejaz”   afterwards  causing   discontent  
among the British and French officials (Tauber, 1993).  
On the other hand, Kurd Ali who promised himself not to get involved in 
politics after  World  War  I  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 362) insistently avoided talking about the 
revolt and its consequences in his memories. Except for a few cases it is hard to 
come across any names or issues related to the Arab Revolt. Likewise, it was clear 
that Shakib Arslan neither took part in the revolt nor supported it but until the very 
end of his memoir he did not mention the revolt. As underscored in the previous 
section  he  concentrated  on  Cemal  Pasha’s  policies  and  referred   to  Sharif  Hussein’s  
plans of revolting against the empire since the time of Abdulhamid II just to clarify 
the  assumed  connection  between  Cemal’s  oppression  and  the  Sharif’s  revolt.   
Before   proceeding   to   the   analysis   of   the   intellectuals’   discourses   on   it,   it  
might be useful to give some background information, derived from both my primary 
and   secondary   sources,   about   the   revolt   and   its   leader.   Appointed   as   the   “Sharif”  
(religious dignitary) of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali returned from Istanbul where he had 
been   since   1893,   to   Hejaz   after   the   1908   Revolution   (Çiçek,   2007,   see   also   Kral 
Abdullah, 2007).  The CUP government relied on Sharif Hussein as a proxy to 
protect its interests   in   the   Hejaz   (Kayalı,   1998: 175). Accordingly, in order to 
maintain his prestige, power, and prerogatives Hussein preferred to cooperate with 
the Ottoman government until the outbreak of World War I when imperial and 
international political circumstances provided him with new opportunities to improve 
his personal power and prestige. The relationship between the Sharif and the 
Ottoman government had deteriorated as the latter increased centralization, which 
restricted  the  Sharif’s  local  authority  in  the  Hejaz  in  favor  of  the  governor  appointed  
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by   Istanbul.  Moreover,   the  government  separated  Medina’s  administration  from  the  
Hejaz in 1910 from the sancak of Hejaz to an independent sancak. This 
administrative change and the extension of the Hejaz Railway to Medina signified 
the  CUP’s  aim  at  a  direct  control  of  the  town.  This  led  to  a  chronic  tension  between  
the muhafız of Medina and  Sharif  Hussein  (Kayalı,  1998: 185). 
According  to  Kayalı  the  relationship  between  the  government  and  the  Sharif  
had  radically  changed  with  the  “reorientation  of  Istanbul’s  imperial  policy  toward  an  
Ottomanism with greater emphasis on Islam and crystallization of international 
factors that ultimately precipitated  the  world  war”  (Kayalı,  1998: 192).    Kayalı  also  
observes that, 
Istanbul’s  espousal  of  an  Islamic  ideology  not  only  threatened  to  overshadow  
his   religious   standing   but   also   directed   government’s   attention   to   the   holy  
places as bases for propaganda. In the meantime, the growing international 
tensions prompted Britain to renew contacts with the sharif regarding a 
prospective alliance against the Ottoman  government  (Kayalı,  1998: 192).  
 
As Shakib Arslan also argued, although the contacts between the British and Sharif 
Hussein can be traced back earlier than this (Arslan, 2009: 192)   the   Sharif’s   son  
Abdullah met first time with Lord Kitchener in Egypt on the way back from Istanbul 
in 1913. Abdullah asked him if Britain could help them to defend the holy cities in 
the  case  of   the  CUP’s  attempt to make radical administrative changes in the Hejaz. 
Lord responded that the longstanding friendship between the empire and Britain 
would  prevent  the  latter  to  interfere  in  the  empire’s   internal affairs (Derveze, 2007: 
334).  The  empire’s  entry  into  World  War  I  on  the  side  of  Germany  changed  Britain’s  
stance and General Storrs sent a letter to Abdullah promising to support his father if 
he revolts against Istanbul (Derveze, 2007: 337).  
On the other hand,  aiming  to  limit  the  Sharif’s  authority  the  CUP  government  
appointed Vehib Pasha both as governor and commander of the forces in the Hejaz 
as the CUP came to power again after a short-lived FAP government. Soon after this 
appointment a crisis between the Sharif and the Pasha arose as the latter attempted to 
carry out the Provincial Law and construct the railway from Mecca to Medina 
(Derveze, 2006: 329, 331). Relations between them came to a point where Vehib 
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Pasha  “in  July  1914  advised  ‘for  the  sake  of  Ottomanism’  that  Sharif  Husayn  should  
be dismissed and replaced by his frail predecessor, Ali, for Husayn desired the 
downfall  of  the  state”  (Kayalı,  1998: 208). After a while Sharif Hussein was given a 
document revealing plans by the government and Vehib to depose himself. The 
government deposed Vehib to calm the Sharif (Derveze, 2007: 333).  
According to Darwaza another development that conduced him and many 
other Arabs toward the Arab Revolt was the executions carried out under the rule of 
Cemal Pasha (see above). Faisal ibn Hussein demanded from Cemal Pasha on behalf 
of his father the release of the detainees but he could not accomplish a result. The 
second   wave   of   executions   on   May   6,   1916   accelerated   the   Sharif’s   revolt  
preparation in collaboration with the British who took the responsibility of finance 
and replenishment of the revolt (Derveze, 2007: 398, 419). After the series of secret 
correspondence  with  Sir  Henry  MacMahon,  the  British  dignitary  the  Foreign  Office’s  
Cairo Bureau, negotiating the terms and conditions of the revolt and an independent 
Arab state (see Teitelbaum 2001, Tauber 1993), Sharif Hussein announced the revolt 
against the Ottoman Empire on June 10, 1916 (Teitelbaum 1998; see also Kral 
Abdullah, 2007). Indeed, the Arab Revolt was the only revolt attempt among many 
others, against the empire that became successful in the Arabian Peninsula (Tauber, 
1993).  
Except for some details provided by Salam the five Arab intellectuals did not 
inform us about the military aspect of the revolt or the process through which the 
revolt   was   carried   out   at   the   administrative   level.   Before   moving   to   Salam’s  
description of the course of events in Beirut after the revolt broke out, it is necessary 
to underline a few points discussed by Tauber (1993a), which were mentioned by 
none of the five Arab intellectuals including particularly the identities of the 
participants in the revolt. The revolt, led by the Sharif and his sons, was carried out 
by volunteers, former prisoners of war, deserters, escapees, and others including 
British  and  French  officers.  As  “the  largest  potential  reservoir  of  skilled  manpower  
for the army of the Arab revolt, that is, officers and men, was in the prisoner-of-war 
camps in India  and  Egypt”  (Tauber,  1993a: 102) Sharif Hussein planned to set up a 
regular army of 30.000 men who would be based on the Arabs from the Hejaz and 
war prisoners in India, Iraq, and Egypt. However, as Tauber states,  
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not all the Arab officers and enlisted men who had fought on the Ottoman 
side and had been taken prisoner by the British were prepared to join the 
Arab revolt. There were those who felt a religious bond with the caliph and 
the Muslim empire, and therefore, refused to fight against them in 
cooperation with the Christian Allies. Others refused to join the revolt, not 
out of the political-religious reasons, but out of fear of harming their families 
who remained within the Empire, or even of injuring themselves on the 
battlefield. These latter preferred the safety of prison camps (Tauber, 1993a: 
102).  
 
In spite of all the efforts put by the representatives from army and ulema appointed 
by the Sharif for persuading those who were in  Egypt  and  India,  “the  greatest  attempt  
to enlist Arab prisoners of war prisoners the army of the revolt failed   miserably”  
(Tauber, 1993a: 107-8).  
 The second reservoir of trained manpower for the revolt was deserters. The 
vast majority of the Arab deserters preferred not to join the Sharif’s   army   too  
(Tauber, 1993a: 111).  According  to  Tauber,  “the  regular  soldiers  of  the  revolt  army  
were for the most part Hijazis, though most of the officers were Iraqis  and  Syrians”  
(Tauber, 1993a: 114). The problem of forming a regular revolt army of Arab soldiers 
and officers was not mentioned by any of the five Arab intellectuals. As the 
following paragraphs make clear, Salam and Darwaza reflected the revolt as a 
smooth process.  
After a brief note on the profile of the revolt army that would help us to 
comprehend the conditions under which the revolt was carried out now let us analyze 
how Salim Ali Salam reflected the revolt in his memories.  Salam is the only source 
Among the five intellectuals that provides details about the aftermath of the Arab 
revolt, it might be useful to summarize his narrative of the formation of new Arab 
governments  in  Lebanon,  which  will  also  give  us  clues  about  his  view  of  the  Sharif’s  
revolt   and   the   notion   of   ‘Arab   independence’   after   World   War   I.   According   to  
Salam’s  memories,  on  September  28,  1918  an  Arab government was formed under 
the leadership of Amir Said al-Jazairi in Damascus before Faisal entered the city. On 
September 30, 1918 Al-Jazairi sent a telegraph to Omar Daouk, the mayor of Beirut, 
informing him of the new Arab government in Damascus and asking him to form an 
Arab government in Beirut too. Daouk negotiated the issue with Salim Ali Salam 
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who was then with Ahmad Mukhtar Beyhum2 and Alfred Sursock3. At night they all 
went to the Ottoman governor of Beirut, Ismail  Hakkı  (1870-1922), asking from him 
to leave the city together with all the Turkish officers so that they could form an 
Arab  government.  After   negotiating   all   night   governor   Ismail  Hakkı   conceded   and  
left Beirut in the morning. Then, Salam, Daouk, and Sursock together with Salim al-
Tayyare,   and  Muhammad   Fahuri   came   to   Salam’s   house   in   al-Musaytaba, held a 
meeting and finally announced the formation of the Beirut Arab government under 
the leadership of Mayor Omar Daouk (Selam, 2009: 34).   Salam   even   said   that,   “I  
was given the full authority   of   administering   the   government”.  Moreover,   his   two  
sons, Muhammad Salam and Salah Osman took the task of governing the 
Agricultural Bank (Ziraat  Bankası) (Selam, 2009: 35). Again as Salam stated in his 
memoirs on 6 October, 1918 the Beirut government decided to raise the Arab flag at 
the government office which was located in the great palace; thus, a ceremony was 
held to which prominent religious and political leaders and civil servants attended 
and over which Salam presided. On the very same day Brigadier General Shukru al-
Ayyubi Pasha who was appointed by Amir Faisal as the governor of both Lebanon 
and Beirut came to Beirut and Salim Ali Salam together with a big crowd welcomed 
him in the desert (Selam, 2009: 36). The next day Shukru al-Ayyubi and prominent 
Beiruti   leaders  met  at  Salam’s  house   to  distribute   the   tasks   in   the new government 
(Selam, 2009: 37).  
Even though it is hard to come across any clear pro-Arab Revolt statement in 
Salam’s  memoirs  this  narrative  implies  that  after  defending  Ottoman-Arab unity for 
years Salam did not only support the Arab Revolt but bore great responsibility in the 
formation of the Arab government in Beirut after deposing the Ottoman officials. It 
is  significant  to  quote  a  passage  from  Salam’s  memoir  to  recognize  how  the  Sharif’s  
revolt led him to make a radical ideological shift.  
In summer of 1915, Abdulkarim al-Khalil who was close to Cemal Pasha, 
came   and   told  me   that,   “We  are  planning  a   revolt   together  with   the  British  
against  the  government…so  and  so  people  will  join  us”.  In  response I said to 
him   that,   “O!   Abdulkarim, I recommend you not to get involved in these 
                                                          
2 Mukhtar Beyhum (1876-1920), a prominent Arab personality, was a close friend of Salim Ali Salam. 
He was a member of Beirut Reform Committeee. He also attended the 1913 Paris Arab Congress and 
had a conversation with Monsier Margaret clarifying their pro-Ottomanist stance. 
3 Alfred Sursock, a close friend of Salam, is one of the Christian Beiruties who attendedt he 1913 
Paris Arab Congress. He took part in the formation of modern Lebanon too.  
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activities. On my behalf I   never   give   consent   to   these   attempts”.  We   both  
tried to convince each other but could not reach an agreement (Selam, 2009: 
151). 
 
We  can  comprehend  the  impact  of  the  Arab  Revolt  on  Salam’s  political  discourse  if  
we compare the above conversation, which took place before the revolt, with the fact 
that he fully supported the revolt. Apparently, among the three Arab intellectuals 
namely Salam, Darwaza, and Rida whose ideological discourses were shaped by the 
revolt, it was Salim Ali Salam who was influenced by it the most in spite of the fact 
that Rida and Darwaza adopted more supportive discourses regarding the revolt in 
their memories. This is because, as he became disillusioned with the CUP 
government Darwaza began to look for alternatives for the benefit of Arabs when he 
got affiliated with both the FAP and al-Fatat. Identifying himself as an Arab 
nationalist he never appeared to be pro-Ottomanist, at least in his memories. Thus it 
was not surprising that he supported the revolt and associated it with the Arab 
nationalism which was indeed not the exact motivation for   Hussein’s   revolt  
(Ochsenwald, 1991). The   Sharif’s   discourse   on   the   revolt   included Islamic and 
tribalist elements rather than nationalist in early period of the   revolt   (Ardıç   2012; 
Ochsenwald, 1991).  
On the other hand, as stated earlier, Rashid Rida updated his political 
discourse according to the power shifts that had been taking place in the region in 
order to realize his ıslah project. As he lost hope from the CUP government he 
focused on the project of an Arab Caliphate aiming to form an independent Arab 
state that to be led by an Arab caliph. Therefore, even before the outbreak of the 
Arab Revolt he negotiated with the British to get their assistance in organizing a 
rebellion against the empire (Ryad, 2010). Thus, the Arab Revolt was a great 
opportunity for Rida to actualize his goals even though he was not satisfied with the 
terms of the agreement between MacMahon and Sharif Hussein (Tauber, 1995). 
Likewise, considering the revolt  as  “an  indispensable  initiation  and  a  national 
obligation”  (Derveze,  2007: 415) for the Arab movement Darwaza appreciated Sharif 
Hussein  due  to  his  courage  and  determination.  He  even  asserted  that,  “ 
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in terms of principle, action, and consequence Sharif  Hussein’s  cooperation  
with   the   British   and   the   Arabists’   support   this   collaboration   was   quite  
appropriate. With this step Sharif Hussein undertook a great responsibility of 
leading  to  the  modern  awakening  of  the  Arab  nation…thus  he  deserves to be 
thanked (Derveze, 2007: 414).  
 
In order to appreciate the Arab Revolt in spite of its unexpected political 
consequences Darwaza illustrated a number of cases as a response to the question 
“what   if   the   revolt   had   not   happened”.   According   to   him,   the   revolt   had various 
benefits to the Arab issue.  First of all if the revolt had not happened, the Allies 
would still have won the war but the Ottoman Empire might not have given up on 
Arabs and the Arab issue would not have been a recognized and openly discussed 
worldwide. Therefore, the Arabs would have been destitute of a significant 
instrument that they used to reach their national goals. The second is if the Arab 
Revolt had not broken out colonialism over the Arabs would not have been worse 
than present condition because the Arabs would not be able to propound the 
promises, which they were given, against the colonial powers. Likewise, absence of 
the Arab Revolt would have signified the insufficiency of the Arab movement after 
the Unionists oppressed the members of the movement. The third benefit of the 
revolt for the Arab issue was if the CUP had won the war, it would have attempted to 
deal the Arab movement a deathblow as it did to the Armenians taking advantage of 
the war (Derveze, 2007: 415-416).  
Furthermore, according to Darwaza, Sharif Hussein did not deserve all the 
fierce critiques he got because he believed that he rebelled against those despots who 
deviated from Islam and oppressed the Arabs (Derveze, 2007: 417). He also said 
that, 
it is true that Hussein got involved in a colonial intrigue but no one can claim 
that he did it consciously. It can only be said that both Sharif Hussein and the 
leaders of Arab movements wanted to make use of an opportunity. Even I 
believe that if the Arabs were experienced and well-organized, they would 
render this opportunity into an instrument for realizing their goals (Derveze, 
2007: 420).  
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In order to support this argument he stated that the promises made to the Zionists 
were more ambiguous than those given to the Arabs. However, because the Zionist 
leaders were so determined they could fulfill their ambitions (Derveze, 2007: 415). 
Merely   emphasizing   the   revolt’s   significance   for   the   modern   “awakening”   of   the  
Arabs,  Darwaza  preferred  not  to  refer  to  Hussein’s  personal  motivations that led him 
to revolt against the empire by collaborating with the British and Arabists 
particularly the members of al-Fatat and al-Ahd societies. Though the Arabist tone 
always   dominated   his   memoir,   Darwaza’s   Arabist   discourse   appeared   to   reach   its 
summit in the parts related to the Arab Revolt. It is interesting that even though he 
wrote his memories decades after the revolt Darwaza merely focused on the positive 
aspect of the revolt overlooking its unexpected consequences such as the French 
mandate in Syria.  
Unlike Darwaza, Rashid Rida who also rendered full support to the Arab 
Revolt did not use Arab nationalist elements in his discourse on the revolt. He did 
not  make   reference   to   the   “Arab  movement”   or   the   “Arab   issue”   to   underline   the  
importance of the revolt. Rather he utilized fully Islamic discourse to justify the 
Sharif’s   revolt.  The  difference  between   them  is  quite  clear   in  how  they  defined   the  
Sharif’s  action.  Darwaza  argued  that  Hussein  rescued the Hejaz (Derveze, 2007: 404) 
whereas according to Rida what Hussein did  was  a  conquest  (Rıza,  2007: 284, 334). 
Furthermore,  neither  Rida  nor  Darwaza  discussed  Hussein’s  claim  of  his  caliphate  in  
1924 (soon after the Turkish government abolished the Caliphate in March), which 
was a very significant development at the time. This might be because this claim 
turned into a complete failure soon after its declaration. The Sharif was defeated by 
Ibn  Saud  of  Najd  in  the  same  year,  who  then  founded  Saudi  Arabia  in  1925  (Ardıç,  
2012). On the other hand while   Rida   several   times   addressed   Hussein   as   “his-
majesty”,   “glorious   king”,   and   “his   serene   highness”,  Darwaza   did   not   use   any   of  
these complimentary words for the Sharif.  
After comparing discourses of Rida and Darwaza on the Arab Revolt let us 
now examine Rashid  Rida’s  attitudes  towards  the  revolt.  As  mentioned  early  in  this  
section Rida took a trip to the Hejaz for Hajj in 1916 after the Arab Revolt broke out 
and he visited Hussein. On October, 5, 1916 Sharif Hussein issued the decree to form 
a new Arab state in Mecca just before Rida arrived there. During his visit he gave a 
long sermon before Hussein in Mina, a town near Mecca, which was also published 
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in al-Manar supporting and Islamically justifying the revolt. In his sermon after a 
brief introduction praising the Arabs and the Arabian Peninsula he summarized the 
last century of the Ottoman history and he then began to attack the Unionists holding 
them  responsible  for  the  empire’s  disastrous  situation.  He  did  not  only  underline  the  
CUP’s  bad  governance  that brought the empire to the edge of abyss but also stressed 
its deviation from the Islamic principles: 
As I provided you with the evidences from the official history the 
government is indeed quite weak and it is feared that because of the troubles 
caused by  this  evil  committee  it  will  collapse….Most  of  the  Muslims  struggle  
for  the  government’s  existence  and  also  for its independence. But only a few 
Muslims are aware of the seriousness of the threats which pervade the 
government….I   have   not   seen   anyone   except Amir and Sharif of Mecca 
among the prominent leaders of Muslims who thoroughly recognized 
seriousness of the threat that has been posed to Islam and acted to deal with 
it. Because, knowing the Ottoman government and its leaders the Amir was 
aware that the empire was at the edge of abyss and the Unionists were using 
the law and military power to punish the Arab people by killing those who 
were thoughtful and qualified and confiscating the properties of those who 
were  wealthy  (Rıza,  2007: 326).   
 
Distinguishing the CUP and the empire Rida targeted the CUP rather than the empire 
or Turks in his speech and in one occasion he appreciated Sharif Hussein because he 
aimed at the Unionists rather than Turkish people and the  Ottoman  Empire   (Rıza,  
2007: 322). Moreover,  Rida’s  emphasis  on  Islamic  principles  was  very  similar  to  the  
Sharif’s   own   discourse   in   his   declaration   of   the revolt, where he, too, blamed the 
CUP leadership for disobeying Allah, and claimed that his revolt aimed only at the 
restoration of the Sharia in  the  region,  rather  than  an  act  against  the  Caliphate  (Ardıç,  
2012: 200-204). According to Rida, the Arab Revolt was undertaken for the purpose 
of   protecting   the   House   of   God’s   neighbors   from   the   starvation   and   the   CUP’s  
oppression just as happened in Syria. Moreover, he claimed that the revolt was a 
precautionary act considering the possibility of the   empire’s   demise   (Rıza,   2007: 
322). For Rida, Muslims had to be thankful to Sharif Hussein as he attempted to 
“protect   the  Hejaz”,  which  also  meant   the   “protection  of   Islam”.  Rida   finalized  his  
speech  by  complementing  Sharif  Hussein  who  evaluated  the  sermon  saying  that  “the  
essence  of  the  speech  was  the  Ottoman  Empire’s  being  under  threat.  I  agree  with  this  
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idea. I used to think so before carrying out the revolt. But most people or the 
Muslims do not  comprehend  this”  (Rıza,  2007: 330).  
 After this supportive speech Rida shared with the Sharif his opinions, which 
were not explained in his memories, on the form of the new Arab government. Sharif 
Hussein did not comment on what Rida  proposed  (Rıza,  2007: 320). The memoires 
do not say much about this exchange between the two –nor  about  Rida’s  purpose  in  
his visit. For this we need to resort to the secondary literature: Explaining the 
background  of  Rida’s  trip  to the Hejaz Tauber argues that, 
the  main  purpose  of  Rida’s  visit  to  Mecca  was  to  convince  Husayn  to  join  the  
program  of  his   “Society  of   the  Arab  Association”,  of  which  he  had  already  
informed  Abdullah,  Husayn’s  son,  in  1914.  The  basic  idea  of  his  society  was 
to form an alliance (hilf) between the rulers of the Hijaz, Asir, Yemen and 
Najd, each ruler retaining full autonomy in internal administrative affairs, 
while they would join forces in defending the Arabian Peninsula from foreign 
aggression or influence…The  headquarters  of  the  council  would  be  in  Mecca,  
with Husayn being considered the president of the alliance. When Rida 
presented this program to Husayn, however, the latter refused to discuss it on 
grounds that it was premature to talk about a political alliance until the Arabs 
had reconquered Medina from Ottoman control. It would appear, however, 
that Husayn feared a weakening of his own political status if he agreed to the 
idea of an alliance with other Arab chieftains (Tauber, 1995: 115).  
 
Since Rida’s   memoirs   are   composed   of   notes   taken   during   his   four   trips   between  
1908 and 1918, it is not possible to trace the developments that took place between 
the Sharif and Rida after his trip to the Hejaz. Even though Rida appeared to be fully 
supportive of the revolt, his project was not in harmony with that of Hussein as the 
above   quotation   clarifies.   Moreover,   Rida’s   anti-colonialist discourse bothered 
Hussein who did not want to disturb his British and French collaborators (Tauber, 
1995). Thus, soon after his visit he came to be at odds with Sharif and as Kavak, the 
translator   of   Rida’s   memoirs,   underscored   “Rida   did   not   only   state   that   he  
disapproved   Sharif’s   piracy   of   the   caliphate   but   also   asserted   that   Hussein   who  
became tağut and the caliph  of  evil”  (Rıza,  2007: 13). The animosity between them 
increased   and   Sharif   prohibited   Rida’s   periodical   al-Manar’s   entry   into   the  Hejaz  
(Tauber, 1995). As we have observed in the previous sections of the thesis such a 
radical  shift  in  Rida’s  ideological and political discourse was neither the first nor the 
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last   (see   Mertoğlu   2005).   On   the   other   hand,   Rida   highlighted   that   there   was   a  
disagreement  on  the  Hussein’s  revolt:  while  some  thought  that  revolting  against  the  
Ottoman Empire might not be a good idea considering the fact that it would lead the 
empire to fall into a decline and that Muslims lacked of means to form a new Islamic 
state. Others had a positive view on the revolt hoping that an independent Arab state 
would conduce to refurbish the splendid  Arab   civilization   (Rıza,   2007: 329). This 
note of Rida remarkably demonstrates the diversity of the opinions on the Arab 
Revolt in the Hejaz.  
 In this context, Kurd Ali and Arslan could be positioned in the first group 
who had negative view on the revolt. Thus we do not observe a major change in their 
attitudes towards the Ottoman rule after the breakout of the Arab Revolt. As Tauber 
stated, Muhammad Kurd Ali refused to join the revolt even though he was personally 
asked by Faisal who was a close friend of his to take part in it. Rather, he propagated 
against the British and Sharif Hussein as well as their alliance against the empire 
during World War I in his articles in al-Sharq (Tauber, 1993: 117).  
Having close relations with Faisal ibn Hussein, Kurd Ali was most likely 
aware of the course of events that led to the Arab Revolt. However, he did not give 
any explanation on the process of the revolt in his memoir. As explained in his 
memoir, Amir Faisal was in Damascus not long before the revolt and he wanted to 
return to the Hejaz worrying of being court-martialed on the eve of the second wave 
of executions. Sharif Hussein sent a message to Kurd Ali through a member of Bekri 
family requesting him to accompany Faisal for his safety on the way back Mecca. 
Refusing   the  Hussein’s  demand  Kurd  Ali   replied   that,   “if   I   escape   from  here,   they  
will inflict trouble upon my family. Moreover, my health is not fit for travelling in 
desert”  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 154). Apparently, he carefully avoided taking side of Sharif 
Hussein however as underlined in the previous chapter, on the narrative analysis of 
the memoirs, he was indeed contented with idea of uniting Arabs under an 
independent   Arab   state,   but   he   seems   to   have   a   problem   with   Sharif   Hussein’s  
leadership.   Kurd   Ali’s   feelings on this issue can be observed in the statement he 
made during his conversation with Amir Faisal after 1918. In this conversation he 
stated that,  
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You said that all the Arab provinces will be united under one state. We were 
pleased and delighted. Our youth served to your father Sharif Hussein in 
order to realize this objective. Then you said that the Hejaz, Syria and Iraq 
will be respectively independent. We gave our consent to it involuntarily. 
Now we are collecting everyone in Syria and evacuating Palestine and you 
say  that  “you  Syrians  are  equal  to  Palestine”  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 278). 
 
It  is,  thus,  safe  to  say  that  even  though  Kurd  Ali  did  not  support  the  Sharif’s  revolt  
logistically, he hoped that it would lead to the unity of Arabs under an Arab state.  
His main problem with the Sharif seems to be the fact that the latter collaborated 
with the British whereas Kurd Ali was strictly against the idea of colonization and 
even cooperation with European  powers  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 151). 
According to his memories, after 1918 Amir Faisal went to London to discuss 
Syria’s  future  as   the  idea(l)  of   independent  Arab  state  in  Syria  turned  out   to  be  hot  
air. He sent a letter to Kurd Ali from there asking him to propagate for the British 
mandate in Syria. Kurd Ali neither promoted the British mandate nor that the French. 
Expressing his disappointment with the British Kurd Ali said;  
I like the British people individually but I am not content with their 
administration. I feel deep sorrow when I remember that they let down the 
three attempts of the Arabs who were then under the Ottoman Empire that 
could lead an independent  Arab  union  (Kürd  Ali,  2006: 152).  
 
He  also  emphasized  how  the  British  challenged  the  Arabs’  attempts  at  repairing  the  
Hejaz Railway mainly for two reasons: the first was they did not want the pilgrims 
use transportation other than British ships. The second was that they did not desire 
the unity of emirates in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Kurd Ali trade between 
Syria and the Hejaz went down due to the disconnectedness of different Arab groups 
(Kürd  Ali,  2006: 153).  Thus,  we  see  that  his  view  of  the  Sharif’s  revolt  was  closely  
related with his perspective on European colonialism in the Arabian Peninsula: 
despite his (cultural) nationalist inclinations, his animosity toward foreign intrusion 
into the Arab-Muslim lands seem to have led Kurd Ali to withdraw his support from 
Sharif   Hussein’s   independence   project   due   to   the   latter’s   cooperation   with   the  
British. Note also that Kurd Ali did not consider the Ottomans  as  a  ‘foreign’  power  
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that occupied the Arab homeland, even though he wrote his memoirs during the 1940 
when Arab nationalism was rather popular in the Arab world.  
As for Amir Shakib Arslan, as in the case of Kurd Ali, he did not devote a 
substantial   part   in   his   memories   to   the   Hussein’s   revolt.   He   avoided   giving   any  
information about it even though he discussed various issues and events that might 
indeed be related to the Arab Revolt. For instance not long before the breakout of 
World War I he took a trip together with A. Jawish to the Hejaz particularly to 
Medina   propagating   the   government’s   Islamist-Ottomanist campaign and 
establishing an Islamic university (Arslan, 2009: 67). In his narrative on this trip 
Arslan did not even mention the name of Sharif Hussein who was then the most 
active and influential figure in the region. This absence by itself shows his pro-
Ottoman and anti-secessionist attitude in general and his dislike of the Sharif in 
particular. But he also explicitly talked about the Sharif emphasizing his intrigues 
with the British officers against the Ottoman rule. 
As mentioned earlier, Arslan dealt with the issue of the Arab Revolt in the 
very end of his memoir in order to clarify the assumed relationship between the 
revolt and   Cemal   Pasha’s   executions   in   Syria.   Arslan   disagreed   with   those   (e.g.  
Darwaza) who assumed a cause-and-effect relationship between them. According to 
Arslan, Sharif Hussein did not only have connection with the British but he also had 
the idea of revolting against the empire even before CUP rule. As he explained in his 
memories, an Egyptian administrator, representing Sharif Hussein went to London in 
1912 trying to forge an agreement between Arabs and the British. According to this 
agreement, the British would provide Arabs with arms so that Arabs would revolt 
against the Ottoman government and consequently they would be allied with the 
British in the future. The British foreign ministry refused this project on account of 
the fact that Britain too wanted to capture the Arab territories. So indeed, Britain had 
years ago prohibited the British tradesmen selling guns to Arabs in Yemen, Oman, 
and   Iraq.  On   top  of   it,  Britain  bought   the  Arabs’  machine  guns  by  paying  over   the  
odds gradually disarming people of the Arabian Peninsula as it planned to occupy the 
region (Arslan, 2009: 192). Sharif Hussein once again attempted to ally with the 
British in early months of World War I but the British did not feel the need of 
cooperating with him. As the First World War escalated the British realized that they 
were  in  need  of  Arabs’  assistance  and  this  time  accepted  Sharif’s  proposal (See also 
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Kayalı,   1998: 192).   In   any   case   according   to   Arslan,   Cemal   Pasha’s   oppressive 
administration or executions was not the primary cause of  Sharif  Hussein’s  revolt  at  
all. For him, even if Cemal Pasha did not oppress the Arabs, the revolt would be 
broken out.  
Before ending this section it is necessary to make a few points on the 
relationship between the Arab Revolt and Arabism/Arab nationalism just to clarify 
the arguments made by Darwaza who deemed the revolt as the turning point for the 
Arab movement and Arabism. According to Wilson,  
the ideology of Arabism was not espoused by the Hashemites until it became 
of particular use to them with particular audiences. It became useful insofar 
as they began to take political action in areas outside of the bounds of their 
traditional sphere in Arabia. It also became useful when they began a 
dialogue with a European power whose political frame of reference was 
ethnic nationalism (Wilson, 1991: 214). 
 
Supporting  this  argument  Wilson  also  underlined  the  fact   that  “the  nationalism  that  
became reigning ideology in the Arab world after the demise of the Ottoman Empire 
owed its spread less perhaps to the Arab revolt than to the end of the Ottoman 
empire”  (Wilson,  1991: 205). As explained further by Ochsenwald, taking the revolt, 
which occurred in the Hejaz, as an origin of Arab nationalism is indeed quite ironic 
considering two major facts: first the very basis of the social and political structure of 
the Hejaz was Islam and the second fact is that the Hejaz lacked of social and 
economic dynamics such as middle class, secularism, and the press that contributed 
to the emergence of Arab nationalism (Ochsenwald, 1991).  Based  on  Wilson’s  and  
Ochsenwald’s  observations,  it  is  safe  to  argue  that  assuming  Arab  nationalism  as  the  
main driving force behind the Arab Revolt is a farfetched argument. Therefore, 
Darwaza’s   discourse   on   the   revolt   seems   to   be   heavily   influenced by the 
developments that unfolded in the region after World War I. Apparently, he 
reconsidered the revolt in the light of the ideological transformation that took place 
in the Arabian Peninsula after the empire disintegrated. Arab nationalism became the 
only   feasible   ideology   in   the  Arabian  Peninsula   as   the   region’s   administration  was  
reformed by the mandate powers after the empire’s   withdrawal   from the Arab 
provinces.   Being   in   need   of   new   symbols   for   attaching   to   the   concept   of   “Arab  
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nation”,  many  Arab  nationalists   including  Darwaza  imposed  a  national  value  to   the  
Arab Revolt which would be deemed as the first successful step bringing the Arabs 
out of the Ottoman authority after centuries. 
 Unlike Darwaza, Rida adopted an Islamist discourse to justify the revolt just 
like  Sharif  Hussein  himself  did.  As  Wilson  underscores,  “the  language  of  nationalism  
suited   Husayn’s   needs   in   some   ways,   but   in   Mecca   itself and in other important 
forums, the language of Islam was an equally   important   tool”   (Wilson,  1991: 213-
214).  As  quoted   in   the   first   chapter,   in  his   “Proclamation”  of   independence,  which  
was published on June 27, 1916 in al-Qibla, the Meccan newspaper that was 
“founded   to   propagate   and   justify the   Arab   revolt”   (Wilson,   1991: 214), Sharif 
Hussein pledged to protect the Holy Land and to restore the sharia (Ardıç,  2012).  As  
stated by Cleveland, al-Qıbla did not only accuse the CUP as being Turkish 
nationalist but also argued that, 
the Ottoman Empire has been taken over by reckless party which has 
launched an attack on Islam, an attack which is fitna (sedition) in every sense 
of the term. The leaders of the state do not care about religion or the shari’a  
…and have begun to live under the signs of apostasy and unbelief (quoted in 
Cleveland, 1986: 89).  
 
These   statements   of  Sharif   overlap  with  Rida’s   Islamist   discourse   that   he   used   for  
legitimizing the revolt against the empire. As Ochsenwald observes Islam was the 
single  most  important  social  force  shaping  people’s  mindset  as  well  as  the  politics  in  
the Hejaz (Ochsenwal, 1991) indeed Kara  (2003)  and  Ardıç  (2012)  have  argued  that  
this was the case for the entire Ottoman cultural milieu at the time. Therefore, it was 
not reasonable to put forward another (secular) form of justification in that particular 
context. Moreover, it can be said that Darwaza used a nationalist discourse to explain 
the Arab Revolt not only because he was an Arabist when the revolt took place but 
also because he wrote his memories in 1980s when Arab nationalism was dominant 
in  the  region.  On  the  other  hand,  Rida’s  memoir  consists  of  the  travel  notes  that  were 
taken when the revolt was still underway. Given the fact that Islam was the only 
reference   point   in   the   Hejaz   at   that   time   Rida’s   discourse   appeared   to   be   quite  
feasible.  
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    CHAPTER 4 
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           CONCLUSION 
 
Analyzing the discourses of the five prominent Arab intellectuals (Rida, 
Darwaza, Kurd Ali, Arslan, and Salam), this thesis has aimed at making a modest 
contribution to the understanding of the relations between the Ottoman government 
and the Arab intellectual elites during the Second Constitutional Period which began 
with the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and continued through World War I. This 
study is located at the intersection of the literatures on the emergence of Arab 
nationalism and on Arab-Ottoman relations in the early 20th century. The data I have 
analyzed come from the memoirs written by the above-mentioned five leading 
intellectuals of the Arab world at the time. In addition to these primary sources, I 
have also utilized the secondary literature in order to locate the primary data (the 
narratives and discourses of these intellectuals) in their proper historical context. In 
examining their memoirs I have adopted the comparative-historical method in 
addition to Foucaultian   discourse   analysis,   particularly   his   concepts   of   ‘threshold’,  
‘historical  emergence’,  and  ‘analysis  of  decent’.  In  order  to  analyze  the  intellectuals’  
ideological discourses I have utilized an ideological spectrum ranging from 
Ottomanism to Arab nationalism, the two major ideologies that influenced many 
Arab intellectuals in this period. After presenting a narrative analysis of their 
memoirs in Chapter 2, I have positioned their authors on the aforementioned 
spectrum. In the third chapter I have discussed the major socio-political factors that 
might have led to the transformation of their ideological discourses and indicated 
how their ideological and political stances played a significant role in determining 
their views and explanations of the events and issues of the time. Rather than dealing 
with each intellectual individually, I have constantly compared their attitudes 
towards the unfolding events within the framework of the Ottoman-Arab relations. 
The period between 1908 and 1918 is quite significant not only because it 
included various political developments in the region that terminated the Ottoman 
rule in Arab lands, but it also signified the culmination of the Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization process that had been going on through the 19th century.  As  Kayalı  
observes,   “though   only   a   brief   episode   when   viewed   against   the   vast   span   of  
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Ottoman history, the second constitutional period (1908-18) was marked by 
extraordinary social and political transformations”  (Kayalı,  1998: 2). As the empire 
lost its European territories in the Balkan Wars in 1913, its Arab provinces “became  
the only significant extension of the empire outside its new Anatolian   heartland”  
(Hanioğlu,  2008: 173). Therefore, the relationship between the Ottoman government 
and the Arabs became more significant than ever. The CUP attempted to maintain 
the territorial and cultural integration of the empire through the idea(l) of 
Ottomanism, which included both Islamic and Turkic elements, against the major 
threat of nationalism rapidly spreading throughout the empire, particularly among its 
non-Muslim subjects. Ottomanism worked very well in the context of the Arab 
provinces of the empire during critical times, such as the Tripolitanian War uniting 
all the groups involved. However, Arab intellectuals, definitely not the majority of 
the Arab public as one of them admits (Derveze, 2007: 421), appealed to Arab 
nationalism as the disastrous  wars  signified  the  empire’s  weakness  and  the  European  
powers dramatically increased their anti-Ottomanist propaganda aiming to realize 
their imperialist ambitions in the region. Each of the five Arab intellectuals came 
from different social backgrounds and region as well as ideological and political 
orientations. Yet they all somehow went through a discursive transformation during 
the CUP administration. The main direction of this transformation was from 
Ottomanism to -different forms of- Arab nationalism. This thesis has attempted to 
explain that transformation in the discourses of five leading Arab intellectuals and in 
reference to various sociological factors and with due sensitivity for the historical 
context.   
For the examination of this discursive change, I have chosen a number of 
crucial events  (“turning  points”)  that I argue, affected this change crucially the most 
during 1908-1918. Clearly, it is difficult to identify a specific turning point after 
which   all   the   five   intellectuals’   attitudes towards the Ottoman rule in the Arab 
provinces were transformed. Historical events are more complex, fragile, and 
contingent than they are assumed (Smart, 2002). Therefore, in order to comprehend 
the factors that played a role in shaping ideological discourses of the Arab 
intellectuals, it is necessary to take into consideration the multiple processes through 
in which the intellectuals became involved. In spite of the complexity of the relations 
and processes that Arslan, Darwaza, Kurd Ali, Salam, and Rida were associated with, 
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I have identified, based on an analysis of their own evaluations, I have identified four 
major historical turning points between 1908 and 1918 that appeared to be influential 
in determining the Arab intellectuals’   attitudes   towards Ottoman rule in the Arab 
provinces.   The   first   was   the   transformation   of   the   CUP’s   policies   from   being  
relatively libertarian to oppressive. The second was the outbreak of World War I and 
the impact of European colonialism on the Peninsula. The third turning point was 
Cemal   Pasha’s   policies   during his governorate in Syria. The last -but not least- 
breaking point was the 1916 Arab Revolt.  
In  Ottoman  political   center,   following   the   three   decades   of  Abdulhamid   II’  
autocratic reign the Young Turks had initially introduced wide ranging civil liberties 
but soon they adopted oppressive policies as the empire faced internal and external 
troubles and political turmoil caused by failed wars and separatist nationalism 
threatening its very existence. The CUP’s   authoritarian   and,   according   to   many  
Arabs; nationalist policies expedited the alienation of all the five Arab intellectual 
discussed here from the Ottoman government. In the political realm, the issue of 
decentralization was the very basis of their conflict with the government. This issue 
was particularly important for Salam, Darwaza, and Kurd Ali. Therefore, Salam and 
his reformist friends in Beirut formed the Beirut Reform Committee. Moreover, Arab 
intellectual elites from different regions organized the 1913 Paris Arab Congress, 
where they declared a set of reformist goals, including above all the decentralization 
of the Ottoman government. As the Unionists began to recognize the exigency of 
making comprehensive reforms in the administration of the Arab provinces they 
issued  a  Provincial  Law  in  March  1913,  “which  would  have  had  to  address  the  main  
points of contention between the CUP and its decentralist opposition”  (Kayalı,  1998: 
86).  
The breakout of World War I, which was a watershed for the Arab-Ottoman 
relations, upset the projects and plans that would improve the relations between the 
Arab provinces and the imperial center. In the context of the Arab Provinces the war 
years involved far-reaching developments including the appointment of Cemal Pasha 
as the military-governor of Syria with extraordinary powers, his failed Suez Canal 
Expedition,  the  European  powers’  wide  ranging  anti-Ottoman campaigns, the famine 
that spread through geographical Syria, and the 1916 Arab Revolt. Causing radical 
power shifts in the Arab provinces, all these developments led the Arab intellectuals 
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to review their political discourses. It is thus possible to observe in their pre-war and 
post-war statements how their political stances had shifted. While Salam, Rida, and 
Darwaza advocated administrative decentralization before the war they slid towards 
the idea of separation of the Arab provinces from the empire after the war. In spite of 
his fierce criticism of the executions and exiles, Arslan remained an Ottomanist until 
the elimination of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 because he saw the Ottoman 
Empire as the only independent Muslim state and hence the only political umbrella 
under which Muslims could unite against European imperialism. Interestingly, Kurd 
Ali, a cultural nationalist, who used to heavily criticize the CUP government in the 
pre-war   period,   appealed   to   Ottomanism   propagating   the   government’s   Islamic  
campaigns to unite Muslims around the Ottoman caliph in the wartime.  
One of the most significant developments that took place after the breakout of 
the war was the appointment of Cemal Pasha as the commander of the 4th Army and 
the governor of Syria. When the  CUP’s,   or  more   specifically  Cemal’s   ambition   to  
reconquer Egypt (which was under British invasion at the time) ended up in bitter 
disappointment, he turned his attention to the task of “maintaining  peace  and  order”  
in Syria. In the light of the incriminating documents seized from the French 
consulates in the beginning of the war, Cemal Pasha cracked down on Arab 
nationalists who were affiliated with such secret Arabist societies and parties as al-
Fatat and the Decentralization Party and had “intriguing”   relations   with   the  
European   powers.   Cemal’s   interrogation resulted in the execution of a group of 
renowned Arab(ist) notables and the exile of a great number of Arabs to Anatolia. 
Cemal’s   oppressive policies alienated all the Arab intellectuals discussed in this 
thesis, including Salam and Arslan who were politically and ideologically closest to 
the Ottoman center among them.  
As the Ottoman Empire entered the Great War on the side of Germany, the 
Allies, particularly Britain and France, further intensified their anti-Ottoman 
campaign in the Arab lands on which they had ambitions. In addition to spreading 
their propaganda against the Ottomans through Egypt-based journals and 
newspapers, the British heavily utilized the notion/movement of an “Arab  Caliphate”  
triggering the conflict between the Arabs and the imperial government. Though they 
did not openly stated in their memoirs, this movement might have influenced our five 
Arab intellectuals. Among the five it was Rida who advocated the notion of Arab 
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Caliphate the most. The reason for the absence in their narratives of this notion in 
their memoirs,  which  were  all  (but  Rida’s)  written  after  the  war,  was  perhaps because 
it was a failed project, as the British gave up on their plans to install Sharif Hussein 
as  an  alternative,  “loyal”  caliph  when  it  became  clear that the Ottomans had already 
lost the war. During the war Britain did not only reach secret agreements with France 
and Russia to divide up the Ottoman territories (e.g. the infamous Skyes-Picot 
agreement) as well as promises to both the Arabs and the Zionists. Thus, the secret 
correspondence  between  MacMahon  and  Sharif  Hussein  of  Mecca  led  to  the  latter’s  
revolt against the Unionist Ottoman government in 1916 with the military support of 
the British.  
Indeed attempts at revolt against the Ottoman government became prevalent 
among some Arab elites during the war seeing it as an opportunity to actualize their 
dreams to form an independent Arab state in the region with the help of either Britain 
or France.  Rida, Darwaza, and, in the later stages of the war, Salam supported the 
revolt organized by Sharif Hussein who justified his rebellion on the ground that the 
Unionists had disobeyed Allah, and claimed that the very aim of the revolt was the 
restoration of the Sharia in the Hijaz. Rida, too, accused the CUP leadership of 
bringing the empire to the edge of collapse by deviating from Islamic principles. 
Salam and Darwaza also supported the Arab Revolt while the latter used an Arabist 
discourse to justify it. On the contrary, having a strong anti-colonialist stance Arslan 
and Kurd Ali neither supported Sharif’s   revolt   when   it   was underway nor they 
discussed it in their memories decades after it broke out.  
In less than a decade, the attitudes of Darwaza, Rida, Arslan, Salam, and 
Kurd Ali towards the Ottoman authority in the Arabian Peninsula had undergone a 
profound transformation owing to the dramatic socio-political changes both in the 
Ottoman capital and the region between 1908 and 1918. Sliding from the Ottomanist 
edge of the ideological spectrum towards the Arabist one, Rida once a vigorous 
advocator of the CUP became a bitter enemy of it as forming an Arab state led by an 
Arab caliph became possible after World War I broke out. (He would later cut his 
relations with Sharif Hussein, too, however.) Likewise, Darwaza who was previously 
affiliated to the CUP and the FAP promoting decentralization began to advocate the 
secession of the Arab Provinces from the empire after the war. Until the breakout of 
the 1916 Arab Revolt, Salam as an Ottomanist and reformist was always against the 
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separatist ideas advocating no more than administrative decentralization. Unlike the 
previous three, Kurd Ali as a cultural nationalist moved to the Ottomanist side of the 
spectrum as he had good personal relations with Cemal Pasha due to his anti-
European posture. Finally, Shakib Arslan whose main objective was striving for the 
unity of Muslims regardless of their ethnicities did not appeal to Arab nationalism 
until the mid-1920s.   
Although this thesis has attempted at a comprehensive examination of a 
number of primary sources, it has its limits. Focusing on merely a decade (1908-
1918), a specific region (the Arab provinces and particularly geographical Syria), and 
a small number of Arab intellectuals whose memories have reached us, this thesis 
has left out a great deal of issues, groups of people, and vast territories that were part 
of the late Ottoman context. The relationship between the Ottoman government and 
the Arabs who had four hundred years of continued political, social, and economic 
engagement deserves to be examined not only from the perspective of intellectual 
elites, but also those who belonged to different social strata such as merchants, 
diplomats, and if possible, the ordinary people.  
Controlling much of Western Asia, Southeastern Europe, and North Africa at 
the height of its power during the 16th and 17th centuries and influencing some 
oversea regions such as Aceh, the Ottoman Sultanate enjoyed strong relationships 
with a variety of communities with different ethnic and religious identities. There is a 
considerable need to uncover the attitudes of people from these communities towards 
the Ottoman rule in different periods of its existence in these regions. In addition to 
the Arab provinces, Iran and North Africa, particularly Egypt are significant 
geographical areas that might be made subject to such an examination. Also, it would 
be quite enlightening to demonstrate the views of those from the Balkan countries 
some of which were parts of the empire until the early twentieth century. Examining 
attitudes and ideological and political discourses of individuals from various 
communities, which constituted the Ottoman population, would fill the gaps in 
understanding of Ottoman political, social, and cultural history and shed light on 
controversial  debates  such  as  the  ‘Ottoman  colonialism’  in  the literature. This thesis 
might, in this context, be read as a small contribution to the understanding of the late-
Ottoman history of the Middle East.  
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